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The War on Terrorism

Countering Global
Insurgency in the
21st Century

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To my wife of thirty-one years, Sherry Lynn, for walking with me through life, encouraging me to dream, and allowing me to be a professional Special Forces soldier; to my brothers and mentors in Special Forces: Jeff Riker, Walt Shumate, J.C. Clark, J.D. Pruitt, Billy Cole, Wade Ishimoto, Billy Waugh and Edward Brodey; and to the war we should have been allowed to win.

Foreword

Countering global insurgency will be a critically important mission for our nation in the 21st Century. Previous insurgencies were only marginally threatening to American interests because of the regional focus and intrinsically limited scale of those insurgencies. But the technologies that enable the prosperity of a global marketplace and enhance the lives of those who participate in that marketplace also provides our insurgent enemies with the means to directly threaten our nation and way of life.

Today's Global War on Terrorism places us in an unfamiliar environment that many have called the first global insurgency. In this global insurgency, as in other insurgencies, our shadowy opponents will not confront us in the open. Rather they will attack our vulnerabilities, the exploitable seams that inherently exist between coalition partners, government agencies, and military commands. In these attacks, 21st Century global insurgents will use terrorism and other asymmetric tactics as their principle method to penetrate those seams, create divisiveness, and ultimately disrupt our functionally oriented defenses.

Although aspects of this struggle differ greatly from previous struggles, much of it is similar to conflicts in which we have been triumphant in the past. While we must transform to meet the nuances of this threat, there are traditional capabilities in our existing security establishment that are well suited to confront a global insurgency as well as emerging peer competitors. Key programs within this establishment, such as Security Assistance, and supporting doctrinal concepts, such as Foreign Internal Defense, provide many of the tools needed

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to develop and implement a successful engagement strategy against these threats. Of particular importance are the interagency aspects of these concepts. Interagency cooperation is more critical than ever

before, allowing us to maximize limited resources, avoid duplication, and leverage expertise across functional and regional structures. Interagency cooperation can close the seams that exist in both national and international bureaucracies.

Mr. Bates' vision of national interagency structure provides a conceptual framework for developing our engagement strategy in the Global War on Terrorism. This framework integrates every instrument of national power at the global, multi-regional, regional and national level with those of our partners and allies. He argues that to be successful within this framework, we must leverage the capabilities of our coalition partners and allies while respecting their sovereignty and the constraints under which they must operate. We must understand that supporting relationships will be situationally dependent. The Department of Defense cannot and should not always be in the lead. We must find common ground with our coalition partners and allies and assure unity of effort and purpose.

Mr. Bates has taken his 30 plus years of experience in the area of unconventional warfare, irregular conflict, and support to Host Nation's Internal Defense and Development Strategy. He combines this experience with current national strategy and emerging concepts and doctrine to provide an excellent starting point for continued debate on this critically important subject. I challenge the reader to consider his views and add to the discussion. This article is by no means the final word on this subject; rather, it is an important contribution to the national and international discussions that help us focus our collective efforts to defeat the global insurgency that threatens us all.



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The War on Terrorism

Countering Global Insurgency in the 21st Century

James A. Bates

Overview

In this paper, the author argues that if we are to be victorious in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the nation must again become experts in the application of Security Assistance (SA) utilizing the principles of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) engagement, now. If the nation continues to ignore SA/FID/IDAD support as an applicable tool for the GWOT, then the strategic engagement strategy will be next to impossible to formulate and execute in the short term and will exact harsh retribution internationally, nationally, politically and militarily in the long term for the nation.

SA/FID/IDAD engagement has unfolded in a distinct pattern over the past 50 years. From the late 70s thru the 80s, policymakers saw a strategic rationale for these security cooperation engagement options and the Department of Defense reconstituted SA/FID/IDAD engagement doctrine, concepts and organizations. The Department of State and Department of Defense developed an effective approach for support to Host Nations (HNs) IDAD Strategy and implemented it in El Salvador. The result was a successful engagement strategy in El Salvador.

In the 90s policymakers went through a period of total abandonment of the SA/FID/IDAD mission and the strategic rationale faded. These capabilities atrophied. During this period of remission, the nation should have utilized its interagency intellectual and military expertise to analyze ongoing mutations of global insurgencies-based incidents and developed a cogent SA/FID/IDAD engagement strategy for the future.

In the 90s policymakers went through a period of total abandonment of the SA/FID/IDAD mission ...

We must with great haste reeducate and retrain a new generation of advisers and trainers to think like the threat and help the HN formulate and execute a plan to counter that threat. This strategic and regional engagement strategy within our national interagency framework must stress: analysis, selectivity, SA/FID/IDAD engage-

ment and concentrate on the principle phases of FID in support of our allies.

For total victory we must reevaluate the national spectrum of the GWOT and put in place the correct regional engagement strategy options and force emphasis in the appropriate place. Early regional engagement provides the foundation for stabilization so that future military engagements may not be required. By setting the conditions for success, we will successfully protect our nation from present and future global insurgency-based events.

Introduction

What one section of the American Government has tried to set into motion is a program of covert operations organized in terms of different policy from that which guides government's overt actions. Analysis and experience prove this double deal to be impossible. One of the two results follow: either the desired effects of the covert operations is cancelled out by the counter-influence of the overt actions; or the covert operations degenerate into irresponsibility and adventurism.

– James Burnham, 1952¹

This paper adds to the growing debate concerning the challenges of the United States strategic engagement strategy and recommends options for the emerging 21st Century. This author envisions a national interagency structure to integrate every instrument of national power. This structure will focus, collaborate and coordinate at four strategic levels, global, multi-regional, regional and national, and will implement three regional engagement strategy options. These are Conflict/Unilateral Operations, Support to Insurgencies and Security Assistance (SA) utilizing the principles of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) that will effectively facilitate the execution of the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

The author's means for ensuring victory in the GWOT depends on first defining and understanding the type of war we are engaged in. To accomplish this we must implement the appropriate global, multi-regional, regional, and national analysis and the appropriate regional engagement strategy options to counter these terrorists' threats and actions.

In February 2002, the U.S. published its first National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. It called for "a strategy of direct and continuous action against terrorist groups" that will disrupt, deter, over time degrade, neutralize and ultimately destroy terrorist organizations.² Since then, governments and public audiences continue to

debate the strategic and regional engagement strategy and its effectiveness despite continued progress. President Bush characterized this conflict as “different from any other war in our history.”³ The extent of the debate reveals the differences between known and perceived thoughts and the efforts required by the U.S., its allies and coalition partners to counter terrorist groups in today’s global environment.

Entering the fourth year of the GWOT, the engagement strategy of the U.S., its allies and coalition partners and the rest of the world, continues to evolve.⁴ Afghanistan and Iraq were examples of ruling regimes that have sponsored, supported and gave sanctuary to transnational terrorists. As a result, these regimes have been neutralized and replaced, but will our stabilization strategy for these two countries prove successful for the long term?

To paraphrase Ralph Peters, author of *When Devils Walk the Earth*, we must understand the mentalities of two basic types of terrorists, the practical and the apocalyptic.

We must be able to differentiate between the “traditional” politically-oriented terrorists with specific goals and the far more dangerous religious terrorists that are irreconcilably hostile to the U.S. and the West.⁵ The terms threat, enemy, insurgents, and terrorists, are synonymous within this paper with reference to traditional insurgents and transnational insurgents. The term traditional and practical terrorist is synonymous within this paper with reference to traditional insurgents. The terms radical, violent fundamentalists, and religious apocalyptic terrorists are synonymous within this paper with reference to transnational insurgents.

We must be able to differentiate between the “traditional” politically-oriented terrorists with specific goals and the far more dangerous religious terrorists ...

The global war against these transnational and traditional insurgents includes an internal struggle within the Islamic faith between radical, violent fundamentalists and the non-violent Muslim. The traditional insurgent’s objective is not mindless violence, revenge or profit.⁶ The transnational insurgents follow an ideology that influences their strategy and base of support as they proclaim to work toward a definite stated goal; in reality they desire the apocalyptic destruction of nation states⁷ and replacement of the current world order with an Islamic Caliphate.⁸ We must perceive these threats as insurgencies: “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of constituted governments through use of subversion, and armed conflict.”⁹

Defining Engagement Options

“I don’t think they play at all fairly,” Alice began, in a rather complaining tone, “and they all quarrel so dreadfully one can’t hear oneself speak—they don’t seem to have any rules in particular; at least, if there are, nobody attends to them—and you’ve no idea how confusing it is all the things being alive ...”

Alice, in Alice in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll¹⁰

Decisions about whether and how to intervene in external and internal conflict are matters of national policy. We must fight transnational and traditional insurgents’ networks and their support, through the integrated use of “every instrument of national power—diplomatic, economic, financial, information, law enforcement, intelligence and military”¹¹ to achieve short and long term goals that serve our national interests. These decisions are influenced by a number of considerations. Among the most important is a systematic analysis of the situation. Such a systematic analysis depends on identifying and asking the right questions and developing and implementing the appropriate strategic and regional engagement strategy options. In the broadest terms, the following might be considered:

- Co-opt the insurgents by helping and supporting the Muslim world to achieve social, economic and religious progress.
- Persuade the insurgents support structure it is wrong to kill innocents. Encourage them to accept responsibility they have so far completely avoided. An example might be to invoke the Islamic religious and western religious dogma, using religious leadership, including “Mullahs” and the Pope, to adopt a stance against using religion in the name of warfare.
- Coerce the insurgents through punishing attacks: for example cultural, economic and military actions.
- Deter the insurgents’ action by threatening something of great value. What does an insurgent value? His cause, organization, family, clan or tribe?
- Deny the insurgents further sponsorship, support and/or sanctuary by ensuring other nation states accept responsibility and take action against these transnational and traditional internal threats within their sovereign territories.
- Subvert from within the insurgents’ organization the sponsorship, support and sanctuary given by other nation states and/or transnational organizations.

- Destroy the insurgents, both physically and organizationally: for example neutrilize, dismantle or destroy the organization's structure and resources.
- Replace the insurgents' organization by subverting the sponsorship, support and sanctuary given by other nation states and/or transnational organizations.
- Ignore the insurgent's actions and pursue U.S. agenda thru our own initiatives.

These options can be applied individually or in combination against each part of an insurgent's system. Interactions between the effects and execution on different parts of the insurgent's system must be continually evaluated to preclude unintended consequences or failure.

There has been a great deal of analysis of the insurgents' motivation, generally focusing on chronic problems in Muslim society. Often cited are the lack of political participation, economic mismanagement, corruption and demographic trends in Muslim society.¹² While it may be beyond our national capabilities

and resources to solve all these problems, we must encourage and support Muslim societies to solve these problems. The answer lies in looking at the social system that supports and sustains the insurgents, then devising and executing a sustained engagement strategy that addresses and attacks every part of that system in an appropriate fashion.

The answer lies in looking at the social system that supports and sustains the insurgents ...

Defining Strategy Options

Implementation of the three regional engagement strategy options (Conflict/Unilateral Operations, Support to Insurgencies and SA utilizing the principles of FID) to defeat the insurgents requires dealing appropriately with each of the unique parts of the insurgent's system. We must address the process as follows: think holistically and systematically across the elements of national power, and analyze the external and internal interrelated global and multi-region dimensions as they affect the regional theaters of operations. For example, the diplomatic, economic, financial, information, law enforcement, intelligence and military effects. The analytical results would confer and influence the collective strategic and regional engagement strategy options and execution. Applications of the three key GWOT engagement strategy options are depicted in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Three key GWOT engagement strategy options.¹³

1. Conflict/Unilateral Operations: Find, Fix, and Finish = Direct Action. This option will be used continuously.
2. Support to Insurgencies and/or Surrogates thru UW. We must be prepared to conduct support to Insurgencies or Surrogates as needed. Support to Insurgencies or Surrogates will deter, disrupt, undermine, neutralize and/or replace regimes that sponsor, support and give sanctuary to transnational and traditional insurgents.
3. SA utilizing the principles of FID in conjunction with support to Host Nations (HNs) Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Strategy provides the most productive and far-reaching option, used wisely, for long-term success in the GWOT. The U.S. must employ and properly execute the three phases of FID: Indirect, Direct and Combat Operations for victory in the GWOT. We must utilize advisers and trainers to provide assistance to the HNs government.¹⁴
4. The principal tool HNs utilize in their IDAD Strategy is Counterinsurgency (COIN). If we want to suppress or destroy these transnational and traditional insurgents, then we must reeducate and retrain a new generation of advisers and trainers to think like the threat and help the HN formulate and execute a plan to counter that threat.
5. The Department of Defense as a whole does not generally understand or execute COIN well. Our historical successes are General Crook during the 1880s, U.S. Marines' experi-

ences in South America in the 1920s and 1930s¹⁵ the Phoenix Project in Vietnam during 1968-72 and El Salvador in the 1980s. These are too few and for the most part forgotten and not understood today.

U.S. Support to Host Nations Internal Defense and Development Strategy

The role of the U.S or any external power in assisting HNs IDAD strategy to defeat transnational and traditional insurgencies is by advising, training and assisting the indigenous forces in establishing governmental control within their national borders. The critical unstated assumption in FID and IDAD doctrine is that the supported HN governments must be and remain legitimate.¹⁶ A HNs IDAD Strategy encompasses the full range of measures taken to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, terrorism and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions. Examples are the diplomatic, economic, financial, information, law enforcement, intelligence and military organizations that respond to the needs of the HN society.¹⁷ The HNs IDAD campaign can be seen as four overlapping, sometimes simultaneous, phases of a synchronized effort to attain broader goals.¹⁸ The following is a short overview for consideration:

- Preparation Phase
 - Delineate the “DIFFERENT” operational areas
 - Establish Information and Intelligence data bases
 - Estimate and obtain operational and sustainment requirements
 - Organize, train and equip forces
 - Perform analysis and plan operations
- Development Phase
 - Isolate the insurgents from the population using Populace and Resource Control (PRC) measures, saturation patrolling and/or combat operations
 - Implement short and long term civil and military civic action programs
 - Organize and develop paramilitary self-defense forces
 - Suppress the insurgent infrastructure thru Information Operations (IO)
 - Continue PRC, Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) activities to mobilize the population
- Offensive Phase
 - Engage the operational areas; for example PRC measures, IO, CA/PSYOP programs, and/or Combat Operations

- Destroy, disperse or clear insurgent forces from the area
- Destroy or suppress the insurgent infrastructure
- Reestablish HN governmental control
- Completion Phase
 - Continue the developmental stage activities
 - Transfer area consolation activities to appropriate HN civil agencies
 - Pass PRC security responsibilities to the local police forces and paramilitary
 - Expand consolidation operations into adjacent HN areas¹⁹

The final objective for the HNs' IDAD strategy is developmental work which provides for "building viable security, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society" and is the basis of economic prosperity for the populace.²⁰ Applying FID/IDAD engagement in a global conflict that crosses multi-region, regional, national and cultural boundaries will be a challenge. Analysis of these transnational and traditional insurgents will highlight those challenges and suggest potential engagement strategy options.

These transnational and traditional insurgencies must be viewed as complex and differing systems in order to construct analyses and develop collective strategic, multi-regional and regional engagement strategy options for each. From a national interagency perspective, the Systems of Systems analysis that Combatant Commands such as the European Command use to explore the notion of Effects Based Operations, this process is essential to incorporate in the analysis process. This approach constructs national templates of the risk countries from the context of all elements national power and is essential in order to integrate the diplomatic, economic, financial, information, law enforcement, intelligence and military effects with engagement strategy options to counter these wider global threats.

Analysis of these transnational and traditional insurgencies will yield characteristics of each component of the insurgents' system that will suggest potential vulnerabilities and methods of engagement. This analysis will propose appropriate strategic, multi-regional and regional engagement strategy options that will have devastating effects on the different parts of the insurgents' system to deter, neutralize, defeat or destroy them.

Command and Control Recommendations

As stated prior, a National Inter-Agency Coordination and Planning (NIACP) structure must be established at the national level with the responsibility to focus, collaborate, coordinate and synchronize national interagency planning and engagement for the execution of

all GWOT activities.²¹ The application of a NIACP would ensure the synergy of diplomatic, economic, financial, information, law enforcement, intelligence and military integrated action. The challenge this hypothesis poses for all levels of national power is the authority and the appropriate national, interagency, strategic and regional engagement strategy guidance and the tools necessary for the execution of these complex, interrelated activities of a rapidly changing global environment.


This proposed NIACP structure would require an equivalent of a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the national interagency construct. The result would be national interagency coordination based on common words and common understandings. In this national interagency concept the Department of State (DoS), DoD, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Commerce (DoC), Department of Agriculture (DoA), Department of Transportation (DoT), Department of Energy (DoE) and Department of Labor (DoL), among others would coordinate their activities in a national construct eliminating overlapping and redundant control. This would create the ability to apply the correct synchronized application of national power. The appropriate strategic, global, multi-regional, regional and national engagement strategy options in a coherent, responsive and executable manner.

The result would be national interagency coordination based on common words and common understandings.

The NIACP's responsibilities would provide the conduit for monitoring and coordinating global, multi-regional and focus the regional support for Ambassadors and their Country Teams and the Regional Combatant Commanders (RCCs) in a collaborative and coordinated execution of the GWOT. RCC's Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) must be established and structured at every Combatant Command as CENTCOM and PACOM has done. The NIACP would be the strategic and multi-regional link for the RCC's JIACG coordination of all multi-regional and regional activities, and would insure relevant consistency of the global, multi-region and regional picture for multi-regional and regional engagement strategy.

This recommendation would provide the foundation for planning and analysis in the collective national interagency construct: for example DoS, DoD and the RCCs to enhance and exploit the regional execution of the GWOT. As Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins stated in their RAND Study, *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda*,²² the article provides

important insights into this problem. Each part of the insurgency system has unique characteristics and avenues of influence. The key is to see the insurgents as part of a complete and complex system, as shown below.



From Figure 3-3 (RAND Study MR-1619, p. 15).

Conclusion

The U.S. cannot discount or surrender to transnational and traditional insurgents. Our national policy, engagement strategy and forces must adhere to the theory of “Napoleon’s corporal”; the lowest level in the force needs to fully understand what is expected. The application of war for these strategic and regional engagement strategy options and the specifics of national interagency coordination must be clearly delineated or the men in the trenches will carry the mules that were intended to carry them.

For total victory we must reevaluate the national spectrum of the GWOT and place the correct engagement strategy options and force emphasis in the appropriate place. Unfortunately, support to HNs IDAD Strategy holds little appeal for the Nation since it offers few opportunities to exercise our best technology generate new requirements for expensive programs and does not give the immediate results that our leadership perceive Direct Action operations do.

Defeating any transnational and traditional insurgency is a complex and long-term task, may take up to four U.S. election cycles, for which there is no smart weapon, silver bullet or critical node that will provide quick victory. The “war” against transnational and tradition-

al insurgents in support of our National and/or HNs IDAD Strategy will look like the chaotic and dirty “small wars”²³ of the past.

More important than the few military conflicts, we must have sustained and comprehensive SA/FID/IDAD Engagement that utilizes interagency and U.S. military advisers and trainers to “drain the global swamp” where transnational and traditional insurgents “breed.” Providing U.S. advisers and trainers to support the HNs IDAD Strategy will place a premium on educating the interagency and U.S. military forces to – THINK – not just execute Direct Action operations.

The insurgents win when the U.S. and/or HNs either lack the will for a protracted campaign or when it neglects the complex insurgent system and focuses only on military aspects. While the military must focus on its area of competence, prosecuting the war must be a collective effort that is shaped by all the elements of national power in a collaborative construct to support a long term successful solution. The strategic engagement strategy must also avoid taking actions that damage the HN’s legitimacy or loses international credibility in the long run.

We will not be able to kill or capture every disaffected individual who is a potential insurgent. Insurgents who are willing to sacrifice their own lives to attack us are unlikely to completely give up their struggle or ideology easily. Nor are we likely to solve all the underlying Muslim social frustrations that give rise to transnational and traditional insurgencies. The best we can expect if we continue to apply only Direct Action operations as the primary regional engagement strategy option is to reduce transnational and traditional insurgents incidents to a “tolerable” level, much the same as police departments do with inter-city street crime and counter-drug efforts.

Therefore to be victorious in the GWOT, we must utilize an NIACP structure to focus, collaborate, coordinate and synchronize the four strategic applications (global, multi-regional, regional and national) and the implementation of the three regional engagement options (Conflict/Unilateral Operations, Support to Insurgencies and SA/FID/IDAD Engagement Strategy) for global, multi-regional, regional and national execution of the GWOT. With this national interagency engagement strategy we will be able to disrupt, undermine, neutralize or destroy present transnational and traditional insurgencies and subsequent transnational and traditional insurgent conflicts that spill out onto the global stage from remaining pockets of oppression and sanctuaries.

If we do not have the national resolve and perseverance to defeat and destroy these transnational and traditional insurgents then

surely our children and grandchildren will suffer the catastrophe consequences of our ineptness and be forced to shoulder the burden of our failure to successfully prosecute the Global War on Terrorism. Through our failure to act appropriately, Apocalyptic Forces will extract retribution and exact destruction upon our future generations.

God Bless America.

*Guerrillas never win wars,
but their adversaries often lose them!!*

Charles W. Thayer – 1963²⁴

Endnotes

1. James Burnham, *Containment or Liberation?*, John Day Company, Inc, New York, 1952, p. 196.
2. George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, The White House, Washington, DC, Feb 2003, p. 2.
3. For a good early perspective see Elaine M. Grossman, "Is the U.S. Military Ready to Take on a Non-Conventional Terror Threat," *Inside the Pentagon*, 18 Oct 2001, Pg. 1. A global perspective, though still focused on conventional military operations is evident in Eliot Cohens article "World War IV," *Wall Street Journal*, 20 Nov 2001. More detailed discussions can be found in Lt Col Andrew J. Smith (Royal Australian Army), "Combating Terrorism," *Military Review*, Jan-Feb 2002, pp. 11-18; or in Colin S. Gray, "Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror," *Parameters*, Spring 2002, Pp. 5-14. A general treatment can be found in T. Irene Sanders, "To Fight Terror, We Can't Think Straight," *The Washington Post*, 5 May 2002, p. B2.
4. *Terrorism* will be defined consistent with the U.S. State Department's annual report, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, which is drawn from Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d). "The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." "Transnational terrorism" will be defined consistent with Bard E. O'Neill in *Insurgency and Terrorism*, *Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's. Inc., 1990) p. 24 - terrorism carried out by autonomous, non-state actors to distinguish it from acts conducted by groups controlled by a sovereign state.
5. Ralph Peters, "When Devils Walk the Earth", *Center for Emerging Threats*, Oct 2001, Note: p. 1.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 2. The actions of the practical terrorist, to whom we have grown accustomed, are calculated to change political circumstances. For all his violence, the practical - political - terrorist is a man of hope. He may be controlled.

7. Ibid., p.2. “while, for the apocalyptic, destruction is an end in itself, despite his extravagant statements about strategic objectives. The religious apocalyptic terrorist is a captive of his own rage, disappointments and fantasies. He must be killed.” p. 19 “It is impossible to content him. His agenda is inchoate, intuitive and destructive without limit. It is reality that has not pleased him, and he wants to destroy reality.”
8. The Caliphate envisioned would unite the Muslim world under one temporal and religious ruler, a Caliph who serves as the successor to the prophet Mohammed.
9. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (The Joint Staff, Washington DC, 12 Apr 2001), p. 207.
10. Lewis Carroll, *Alice in Wonderland*. Penguin Putnam Inc, New York, Dec 2000, p.83.
11. George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The White House, Washington, DC, February 2003. p. 1.
12. Bernard Lewis has written a series of useful articles over the last decade, including: “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 266, no. 3, (September 1990): p. 47-60; “The Revolt of Islam,” *The New Yorker*, 19 November 2001; and “What Went Wrong,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 1 (January 2002).
13. Developed by LTG William G. Boykin and James A. Bates – February 2003.
14. Joint Pubs 3-07 p. III 10, and 3-07.1 p. V-4, V-29. Traditionally SA/FID/IDAD engagement support with advisers and trainers to provide assistance to HN’s IDAD COIN forces.
15. Historical Small Wars Manual, NAVMC 2890, (Headquarters, Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington DC, 1 Apr 1987).
16. Government legitimacy rests in the minds of the people governed. They consent, or acquiesce to the government’s rule in return for a combination of physical security, meaningful participation in government decision making, and material reward. As Thomas Jefferson wrote: “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” This does not mean legitimate governments must be liberal democracies or meet each requirement equally. So long as adequate mechanisms exist to satisfy the perceived needs of the governed, the people will regard the government as legitimate. Despite its repressive nature, the population of the USSR seemed to grant the Communist governments legitimacy until it completely failed to meet their material needs. The current government of China appears to maintain legitimacy by meeting the population’s security and material needs despite providing little meaningful participation in government decision making.
17. Historical Field Manual No. 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 20 Sep 1994), p. 1-1.

18. Historical Field Manual No. 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 20 Sep 1994), p. 1-18.
19. Historical FM 100-20 / AF 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (Headquarters, Department of the Army and the Air Force, Washington DC, 5 Dec 1990), Chapter 2, p. 2-1 / 2-25, Appendix C, p. C-1 / C-9.
20. JP 3-07, Department of Defense Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (The Joint Staff, Washington DC, 16 June 1996), p. III 9-10 and JP 3-07, Department of Defense Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (The Joint Staff, Washington DC, 30 April 2004), p. B 1-2.
21. COL David Plumer, SOCCENT Desert Storm After-Action Report, p. 6.
22. Paul K. Davis, Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda (RAND MR1619-DARPA, Santa Monica, CA, 2002). Available at www.rand.org.
23. Colonel C. E. Callwell, classic text *Small Wars*, University of Nebraska Press, 3rd edition 1906, reprinted 1996, p. 21. "Small war is a term which has come largely into use of late years, and which is admittedly somewhat difficult to define. Practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field, and it thus obviously covers operations varying in their scope and their conditions."
24. Charles W. Thayer, *Guerrilla*, Harper & Row, New York, 1963, p. 1.

About the Author

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