

# Special Operations Forces Interagency Reference Guide



SOF Interagency Reference Guide



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Fourth Edition

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Prepared by  
Joint Special Operations University  
Department of Strategic Studies  
MacDill AFB FL 33621

### Joint Special Operations University and the Department of Strategic Studies

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense leadership.

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The mission of JSOU is to prepare SOF to shape the future strategic environment by providing specialized joint professional military education, developing SOF-specific undergraduate and postgraduate-level equivalent curriculum, and by fostering special operations research, analysis, and outreach in support of the USSOCOM objectives.

JSOU conducts research through its Department of Strategic Studies (SS) where efforts center upon the USSOCOM mission:

**USSOCOM mission.** USSOCOM develops and employs fully capable Special Operations Forces to conduct global special operations and activities as part of the Joint Force to support persistent, networked and distributed Combatant Command operations and campaigns against state and nonstate actors, to protect and advance U.S. policies and objectives.

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On the cover. Graphics by Shutterstock.

The content of this manual represents an ongoing, dynamic project to capture existing inter-agency structures, organizations, and responsibilities. Changes driven by new presidential administrations, fresh policy and current events inevitably alter the interagency landscape. All information comes from open sources to include official fact sheets and background obtained from various official websites. The cutoff date for input to this Fourth Edition was 30 June 2019. Any omissions are completely unintentional.

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.

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## Foreword

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This *Special Operations Forces Interagency Reference Guide* is designed to support the Joint Special Operations University's (JSOU) mission and, in particular, its Interagency (IA) Education Program. This program includes six educational activities:

1. Combating Terrorism Executive Interagency Seminar
2. Special Operations Support Team Orientation Course
3. Combating Terrorist Networks Seminar
4. Special Operations Forces (SOF)-Interagency Collaboration Course
5. SOF Orientation for Interagency Partners
6. Interagency Education Outreach

Mr. Charles Ricks, a JSOU Senior Fellow, first compiled this guide over a decade ago and continues to provide updates and revisions so that it remains a valuable reference work for JSOU students, SOF staff officers, and partners within the IA enterprise. This is now the fourth edition of this publication.

The first edition launched with a narrow focus on overseas counterterrorism (CT) activities. In the succeeding edition, the aperture of that lens widened to eliminate the distinction between international and domestic terrorism threats—threats from terrorism cannot be responsibly segregated geographically. The subsequent edition altered the scope yet again to include the broader challenges of the combating terrorism (CbT) mission. Also introduced were the roles of diplomacy and development in building stability and as used for preventive and resilience measures in the face of terrorist threats.

This new edition recognizes the changing nature of the international security environment and the adaptive and evolutionary nature of the IA process. While CT and CbT remain essential SOF activities, the IA concepts, principles, and processes discussed here apply similarly to the involvement of SOF across the entire competition continuum and to all SOF core activities. As noted by the fifth SOF Truth, “Most special operations require non-SOF support.” That reality continues to form the basis for this guide as it addresses SOF IA engagement across the entire international competition continuum.



Colonel John D. Poucher, U.S. Air Force, Ret.  
Director, Department of Strategic Studies



# Introduction

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I am pleased to introduce this fourth edition of the *Special Operations Forces Interagency Reference Guide*. This quick reference guide provides an overview of the whole-of-government approach to U.S. security issues for those attending Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) courses, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) enterprise, and for the partners who comprise the U.S. Government Interagency (IA) community. Some of the changes to this edition include:

1. Movement beyond counterterrorism and combating terrorism to address the SOF and IA engagement along the entire competition continuum.
2. A continued and expanded discussion of the balance between hard and soft power and three pillars of national security introduced in the third edition.
3. An emphasis on the need for an awareness and inclusion of organizational cultures and cross-cultural organization skills while engaging in relationship-based activities, either nationally or internationally.

As outlined in the most recent National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017), the U.S. faces competition across political, economic, and military spectrums. While we are faced with competition from great powers, there are also countries and nefarious organized groups who strive to destabilize regions and harm the United States. The U.S. must successfully outcompete these countries and groups to assure that the U.S. remains safe and prosperous.

Our National Security Strategy outlines four vital national security interests based on the principle of America first:

1. Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life.
2. Promote American prosperity.
3. Preserve peace through strength.
4. Advance American influence.

The safety and success of our nation depends on those who serve throughout all of government. It requires an understanding of all options available to protect American interests through political actions, economic actions, or military and security actions. This new edition of the *Special Operations Forces Interagency Reference Guide* directly supports that understanding by looking at the international security environment in the context of our national strategies and policies, and the national and international organizations that partner with us.

This manual will serve as an essential component of the JSOU IA education curriculum and will serve as an important resource for the professional development of SOF and the professional development of those in the IA community.



Ambassador Henry S. Ensher  
Senior Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD)  
United States Special Operations Command



# Chapter 1. SOF, the Elements of National Power, and the Interagency Process

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National Security is a team sport. - Dr. Michael Vickers

Addressing threats to national security is about marshalling a wide range of expertise, resources, and experiences, none of which exists entirely within any one organization or agency of the United States Government (USG). The line of departure for any discussion about the interagency (IA) process is a shared awareness that no single department, agency, or organization of the USG can, by itself, effectively address the multitude of international and domestic security threats that confront the United States. That is bedrock reality.

Obviously, that realization holds equally true for Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF are inherently joint; they are similarly joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) in their strategic, operational, and tactical approaches. It has also been established that it is not possible for individual countries and coalitions, to go it alone against the extensive and ever-changing threats that they face to their own territorial integrity and political sovereignty or against whatever regional and global challenges that surround them.

Such threats arise from both state and non-state actors who often generate mischief at levels below those that might provoke large-scale international responses. Such situations have become known as gray zone or hybrid warfare threats. There are simply too many agendas and too many actors in play around the world to be handled unilaterally. With the realization that such threats defy narrow solutions and require comprehensive approaches, the concept of the IA process—also called the whole-of-government (WOG)—has emerged over time as the dynamic that harnesses the elements of

national power to address a broad spectrum of security threats and to ensure the security of the United States and its people.

This awareness of complexity also holds for soft-power efforts that include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who are working around the world to create stability, reduce opportunities for unrest and violence, and build resilience within traditional political boundaries and beyond. For example, a March 2019 conference on Advancing Non-Traditional Security Governance Through Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration, held in Singapore, declared that “National governments alone cannot solve the multifaceted problems associated with Non-traditional Security Threats.” These included “irregular and forced migration; economic inequality; environmental degradation; digital threats; and social friction.” (<https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/06PR190613>).

This IA guide provides a substantial, but not complete, survey of the many participants, domestic and international, who are invested in the national and international security IA and interorganizational processes. These various USG, domestic, and international players work continuously to create environments that discourage the conditions that lead to poverty, human misery, instability, violence, and conflict. This guide addresses the complex mix of players and structures within both the USG IA and, to a lesser extent, the wider international community. Its intended audiences include, primarily, the SOF enterprise, but also extend to USG IA and international partners according to the following purposes:

1. Educate SOF to enable them to learn about, and function effectively within, the IA environment.
2. Expose USG IA partners to the SOF enterprise.
3. Acquaint the wider international security community, to include allied and partner countries, IGOs, and NGOs, with SOF thinking and to assist them in understanding SOF perspectives on SOF activities along the competition continuum.

SOF engagements with JIIM partners in operational environments frequently begin with the predictable uncertainty of encountering individuals and

organizations previously unknown to a special operations warrior. Thus, among other things, this IA guide seeks to answer four basic questions:

1. Who are all these people?
2. For whom do they work?
3. What do they contribute to my mission?
4. How are we expected to work together?

This IA guide also addresses five broad areas:

1. The USG IA Process
2. The capabilities and capacities of IA actors
3. Locations of IA engagement
4. Drags on IA engagement created by friction
5. International actors and partnerships

## SOF and the Elements of National Power

Strategists and practitioners of operational art seek to apply all appropriate elements of national power to address specific national security challenges along the competition continuum. This dynamic includes all those diverse actions taken while conducting SOF core activities.

So, what are these elements of national power? First, they represent much more than the easily remembered and quickly recited acronym *DIME-FIL*. It is useful to think of them as the tools that are available to political leaders and others to ensure the successful achievement of foreign and domestic policy goals. Traditionally they have included diplomatic, information, military, and economic measures (DIME). In recent years, adapting to the realities of the rapidly changing international security environment, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement (FIL) have become included in the mix to form *DIME-FIL*. One can also think of them as elements of national influence because their successful employment can result in influencing other states and actors to respond in a way that is beneficial to U.S. policy and interests. Working in various combinations, the elements of national power influence the collective ability of SOF, and their IA and international partners, to achieve desired outcomes. Interagency engagement should not involve a competition for influence. Instead, it seeks a harmonization of disparate efforts to achieve desired influence effects.

As noted previously, it is virtually impossible to imagine a national security scenario that lends itself to solutions that are purely military, diplomatic, or economic in nature. The same is true about each of the other elements of national power. Each element features its own expertise, resources, and experiences. Depending on the situation, specific elements of each will be harmonized with the others to produce the most useful effects.

A traditional role for SOF has been to transcend the seemingly strictly defined military component of the elements—the M in DIME—and make contributions within the other functional elements. This reality is acknowledged within the concept of the *Special Operations Warrior*, an individual with the skill sets, expertise, resources, and experiences to work within the IA structure at various points to produce defense, diplomatic, and development effects as required within any area of operations (AO). These functional elements are frequently referred to as the 3 Ds of national security. Again, the interactive dynamics of the 3 Ds and wider IA relationships apply to the full range of SOF core activities, though in different ways depending on the situation. As defined in Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*, SOF core activities include:

1. Direct Action
2. Special Reconnaissance

3. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
4. Counterterrorism
5. Unconventional Warfare
6. Foreign Internal Defense
7. Security Force Assistance
8. Hostage Rescue and Recovery
9. Counterinsurgency
10. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
11. Military Information Support Operations
12. Civil Affairs Operations

No matter the specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by SOF conducting their core activities, they in some way fit under the 3 D umbrella and, in a broader context, the full DIME-FIL model. It is within the functioning of the collaborative IA process that the fifth of the SOF Truths manifests itself most clearly: “Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.” Once again, SOF activities span the JIIM continuum.

### Interagency and Civilian Power

One of the most important changes within the IA process over the past decade or so has been the clear articulation of the concept of civilian power as seen in the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) in 2010 and subsequent documents and initiatives. Its title, *Leading Through Civilian Power*, acknowledged the reality that merely clustering organizations on a chart doesn’t mean they share the same strategic vision or sense of an agreed unity of effort. IA leadership remains an essential element. Yet, as reflected within this guide, IA dynamics, to include leadership, can look quite different from that which SOF are familiar.

First of all, IA leadership typically flows from individual and organizational leaders rather than from commanders. Designated leaders organize, animate, and guide the process. The command and control of IA activities also function differently. IA direction usually flows from cooperative and coordinative relationships, rather than from directives and orders. In the absence of strict organizational infrastructure reflected in diagrams, concepts such as influence without authority and leadership without authority become important. Good ideas and initiatives frequently emerge, seemingly in random fashion, from the pool of expertise,

resources, and experiences that populate the IA process. Sorting out the available expertise, resources, and experiences, and creating the right mix of capabilities to address specific challenges, are essential ongoing tasks. In many ways, the IA process serves as an industrial strength problem-solving dynamic. This realization is expressed in the pages of the 2010 QDDR: “The Department of Defense is uniquely positioned to stop violence, create conditions of security, and build the military capacity of foreign nations. The Department of Justice has essential skills and resources to improve foreign justice systems. The Department of Homeland Security can help countries develop their capacity to control their borders against smuggling and illicit trafficking while facilitating the free flow of legitimate commerce, and protect their ports, airports, online networks, and other infrastructure. The Department of Health and Human Services can help stop the spread of disease that all too often accompanies conflict and contributes to building sustainable health systems. The Department of Agriculture can help ensure food security and promote rural economic development. The Department of Energy can help establish the energy infrastructure necessary for recovery and economic growth. The Department of Treasury can improve financial systems and economic governance, and the Department of Commerce can expand business opportunities. Together, these capabilities support the civilian power indispensable for conflict and crisis response.” (QDDR, 2010, 138-140).

In the most general sense, the QDDR defines civilian power as “the combined force of civilians working together across the U.S. government to practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and prevent and respond to crises ... It is the power of diplomats in 271 missions around the world, development professionals in more than 100 countries, and experts from other U.S. government agencies working together to advance America’s core interests in the world.”

As established in the President Barack Obama Administration’s Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-6, the 2010 and 2015 QDDR and other USG documents, diplomacy (Department of State—DOS), development (U.S. Agency for International Development—USAID), and defense (Department of Defense—DOD) form the three core pillars of our national security structure and

U.S. foreign policy. Yet these three pillars do not stand alone, or in narrow relationships, with the other two. As discussed in this guide, many other actors also play essential roles as defined by the DIME-FIL elements of national power. Civilian power functions primarily within the domain of indirect action: diplomacy and development. However, it is not the intent of that notion to restrict military contributions—especially those undertaken by SOF—to the defense pillar while limiting the diplomatic and development pillars only for civilians. In her speech to a special operations-hosted event on 23 May 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton spoke extensively of the necessary partnerships among the 3Ds (defense, diplomacy, and development) to achieve smart power. She said, “We need Special Operations Forces who are as comfortable drinking tea with tribal leaders as raiding a terrorist compound ... We also need diplomats and development experts who understand modern warfare and are up to the job of being your [SOF] partners.”

One important aspect of the 2010 QDDR was the devotion of an entire chapter to “Preventing and Responding to Crisis, Conflict and Instability.” Chief among the components of this chapter is the designation of conflict prevention and response within fragile states as a core civilian mission. This initiative, of

course, signals a more extensive role for civilians in DOS, USAID, and other stakeholder agencies who have since become increasingly involved with those actions employed to shape the environment and create the conditions necessary to achieve success. As part of this expanded role for civilian power, the QDDR established the strategic objective of “re-establishing USAID as the world’s premier development agency.”

The 2015 QDDR, *Enduring Leadership in a Dynamic World*, built on the original initiative and was evolutionary in nature. It expanded basic principles laid out in the earlier 2010 version. It proposed a strategic vision and incorporated some of the results emerging from a fresh emphasis on strategic planning throughout the DOS and USAID. The 2015 QDDR focused on four cross-cutting areas:

**1. Increasing our partnerships and engaging beyond the nation-state.** Relationships with mayors, governors, business leaders, faith leaders, scientists, and engineers become more important as populations become increasingly urbanized, creating potential challenges to overall quality of life and giving rise to grievances that demand innovative solutions to ensure stability and remove the potential for the growth of extremist movements, internal conflict, and general instability within countries and regions.

**2. Improving governance.** The quality of governance at all levels affects the security and interests of the U.S. and its allies. Public distrust of political leadership and the quality of government services can lead to exploitation by extremist elements and political opportunists seemingly in the mainstream who thrive within poorly governed jurisdictions. Effective governance is able to address grievances and instability while confronting violent extremism.

**3. Managing and mitigating physical risk.** Continue to develop capable leaders and managers who are able to operate effectively in the increasingly dangerous diplomacy and development environments around the world.



A panel discusses the mobilization of local faith leaders for global development goals at the second annual Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom cohosted by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., on 17 July 2019. Photo by Mark Burrell/USAID

**4. Enhancing the use of data, diagnostics, and technology.** As part of the ongoing effort to build dynamic organizations by improving efficiency in outcome achievement, pursue innovation in the kinds of technology and artificial intelligence to achieve high-quality information and knowledge management. The 2014 Joint Strategic Plan for the DOS and USAID identified the following strategic priorities:

- Preventing and mitigating conflict and violent extremism
- Promoting open, resilient, and democratic societies
- Advancing inclusive economic growth
- Mitigating and adapting to climate changes

These two lists provide the foundation for a clear strategic path for the evolution of non-kinetic, civilian power initiatives to build stability and deter the emergence of intra and interstate conflict. This dynamic has continued to evolve. Experience has also shown that SOF serve as partners traveling along that same path who continue to play crucial roles in the areas of diplomacy and development.

### **SOF and the Interagency Process**

As defined in Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (17 January 2017, incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018), IA coordination is defined as “Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.”

Dealing with national and international security issues, however, involves more than just the engagement of departments, agencies, and organizations of the USG. The successful application of U.S. foreign policy and military power to achieve foreign policy and national security objectives also requires the inclusion and, if possible, commitment of host nation (HN) participants, partner nations (PNs), IGOs, and NGOs. Because of this complexity, the special operations warrior frequently requires innovative personal flexibility to achieve assigned national security objectives. Essentially, SOF can become a source of expertise, resources,

experience, and leadership for all three pillars of the national security structure.

At times, the details of understanding the complex relationship cultures inherent within the JIIM security environments can appear daunting. This IA guide is intended to assist SOF and others to navigate the relevant details of IA engagement. IA relationships provide SOF with strategic, operational and, at times, tactical partners who bring their own expertise, resources, and experiences to a given task. At the same time, IA engagement places SOF within a persistently rich environment of information and insights. Throughout the process, SOF both benefit from and provide value to the entire JIIM Enterprise.

Within an IA environment in which familiar command and control concepts are replaced by cooperation and coordination, the ability to establish and sustain both personal and institutional relationships is decisive in producing desired effects. Within various echelons of authority and leadership, SOF must seek out the individuals and organizations who most effectively contribute to mission objectives. These are the critical players who display both influence and leadership beyond the scope of their enabling authorities. By their very nature, SOF frequently perform such roles.

As with any human endeavor, some degree of disruptive friction is inevitable. Each IA partner brings its own expertise, resources, and experience. Each also possesses a unique organizational culture and traditions, with its own languages (acronyms and so forth), authorities, policies, TTPs, narratives, and measures of effectiveness—and, frequently, their own agendas. Department and agency stovepipes can create friction and disrupt the effectiveness of IA engagement. The tension between one’s horizontal loyalty to IA partners and vertical loyalty to one’s parent organization is very real and influential.

Stovepipes almost inevitably create a degree of insularity that can hinder necessary IA cooperation and collaboration. Individuals, especially those new to the IA dynamic, often see organizational loyalty as their first responsibility and can be reluctant to share information or discuss the commitment of resources without assurances of a return on their organization’s investment in the process. Self-preservation and careerism can create disruptive barriers to open

engagement among IA partners. Efforts to break down stovepipes and flatten relationships within the IA process remain persistent activities strategically in Washington, D.C., overseas within country teams, and among operators on the ground from throughout the IA enterprise.

Stepping outside the USG IA model, international partners of all stripes also rely on their own interministerial, or interorganizational infrastructures, a reality that increases the complexity of all relationship-based processes. They also will frequently impose caveats based on their policies and controlling authorities. These establish parameters that can set limits on the sharing and employment of personnel and other resources and the conditions under which they can be employed. While frustrating, these conditions exist and must be accounted for.

By contrast to the disruption wrought by such friction, trust and unity of effort breed confidence among members of any IA dynamic. Individual, organizational, and IA effectiveness are the by-products of partners who listen closely and are the most responsive; willing to share their expertise, resources, and experiences; provide the most-accurate information and best data bases; craft the most perceptive analyses and assessments; and can present the most promising options. These behaviors represent credible measures of effectiveness for participants.

Another potential disrupter occurs because of duplication or redundancy. Many of the same skill sets are found in different departments and agencies throughout the USG and among international partners. Perhaps the most obvious would appear to be the intelligence function, which finds a home almost everywhere. The 17 members of the USG Intelligence Community (IC), eight in DOD alone, demonstrate the need to harmonize scattered, but seemingly similar, functions. Once again, international partners also bring with them a myriad of different intelligence cultures and capabilities. However, similarity does not necessarily mean harmful redundancy. As discussed in chapter 2, cooperation and collaboration among multiple intelligence organizations, operating in various domains and with diverse missions, are essential for national security.

Whether domestically or internationally, an understanding of organizational cultures and the ability to conduct productive negotiations are essential skills for SOF. That applies to every unfamiliar culture encountered, whether domestic or international, governmental or nongovernmental.

The unique strategic role of SOF lies in their ability to establish a small-footprint presence with skill sets capable of addressing the 3D challenges they may encounter. Since they bring expertise, resources and experiences relevant to all three pillars of national defense and U.S. foreign policy, SOF can generate effects in all three domains and assist in gaining and maintaining immediate strategic initiative.

It is important to realize that the USG IA community is not a body with a fixed structure and a developed operational culture. There is no interagency building in Washington, D.C., or anywhere else! Instead, it is a loose and frequently undefined process of multiple, ad-hoc relationships and structures that are often personality and situationally dependent for their success. Yet again, leadership and influence without authority are relevant factors. This is a condition that is normally unfamiliar to the special operations warrior. Stepping outside the comfort zone of military organizations and operations introduces uncertainty about the ways and means to accomplish the mission and achieve assigned strategic objectives.

The special operations warrior can take some solace in the recognition that working within the complex IA environment is not a new challenge. As far back as 1940, the *Small Wars Guide of the United States Marine Corps* identified the problem: “One of the principal obstacles with which naval forces are confronted . . . has to do with the absence of a clean-cut line of demarcation between State Department authority and military authority.” Further on, that early guide asserts that a need exists “for the earnest cooperation between the State Department representatives and naval authorities.”

What has changed, however, is the complexity of the international security environment and the dramatic increase in the number of departments, agencies, and organizations that now play significant roles in ensuring the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of our nation. What was once written about

relationships between the War Department and the DOS now applies similarly to DOD relationships throughout the USG and beyond.

This *Special Operations Forces Interagency Reference Guide* is intended to assist the special operations warrior who is faced with the often-bewildering array of USG IA departments, agencies, and organizations as well as the HNs, PNs, IGOs, and NGOs who also act as players within any given AO. To comprehend the complexity of the JIIM environment, first set aside your knowledge of the broad international environment. Consider only the number of distinct cultures, languages, traditions, and narratives contained just within the DOD, or within the individual service components, or within the SOF enterprise. As noted earlier, this guide focuses on departments, agencies, organizations, and programs by identifying who they are, where they fit, and how they contribute to the shared IA responsibility to achieve national security objectives. Much of the expansion in IA engagement in recent years has come as a result of the increased emphasis on employing civilian power to shape environments, create stability, and build resilience in environments plagued by violence and conflict.

Recent experiences teach much about the rapidly changing international security environments that SOF encounter. However, there exists little to prepare SOF for the diverse mix of players and agendas encountered within the multiple venues of any specific battle space. Sometimes it might appear that there are lots of different people and organizations performing all sorts of unrelated and uncoordinated tasks directed toward unclear objectives. If that were true, such a situation would represent a recipe for failure. In reality, the ideal is to achieve synchronization of all the various skill sets and resources available within the various organizations of the USG and also externally within HNs, PNs, IGOs, and NGOs.

At its core, the IA process synchronizes U.S. strategic national security efforts. Though the similarities are not exact, organizing IA partners for specific purposes is a bit like task-organizing military units for specific missions. In both cases, organizations (or portions of those organizations) with the necessary expertise, resources, and experience are brought together for the accomplishment of a specific task or set of tasks.

Navigating the IA environment requires special operations warriors to be guided by achievable expectations and to maintain high levels of situational awareness; display a willingness to listen and learn; and exercise the skill of knowing when to lead, support, or, when appropriate, enable those outside DOD to achieve their objectives.

Though it may sometimes appear to be the most efficient course of action, expecting SOF and other military forces to perform most required tasks in the AO is typically self-defeating and risks alienating both partners and those most in need of assistance. It is likely that, somewhere in any AO, there exists a non-SOF/DOD, USG IA partner, or external organization that has the expertise and resources to accomplish a given task. The first step is to review existing policy and strategy to determine which agency has been designated the lead in a given situation. The USG IA process seeks to orchestrate the various means and mobilize the required resources to bring each initiative to a successful conclusion. The assignment of lead agencies establishes responsibility for task accomplishment and defines the lines of effort for the required workflow.

Beyond the USG IA process, the coordination of the agendas of HN, PNs, IGOs, and NGOs in support of shared national security objectives is essential to ultimate success. Once again, it is predictably counterproductive to launch a multitude of well-intentioned activities that may only coincidentally focus on the true requirements of the situation.

While the USG IA process supports unity of effort by USG departments, agencies, and organizations, the successful inclusion of HN, PN, IGO, and NGO initiatives further strengthens the shared effort. However, by its very nature, that inclusion carries with it the risk of jeopardizing the desired unity of effort.

The special operations warrior plays a variety of essential roles within the national security IA process, chief among them as a unique source of expertise, experience, and leadership. SOF serve as strategic enablers on the ground who act across IA structures and animate IA activities.

### **What SOF Provide to the USG Interagency Enterprise**

Beyond their multi-domain, influence-producing effects through their 12 Core Activities, SOF provide

specific value-added support to the execution of USG IA strategic goals and operational national security objectives:

1. SOF function as a resource for addressing uncertainty.
2. Because of an on-going operational SOF presence in many different countries, SOF provide an immediate, knowledgeable, experienced, and trusted presence on the ground where such traits are most needed.
3. SOF serve as facilitators by providing an anchor for the activities of other IA partners, even if SOF do not perform specific tasks themselves.
4. Because of SOF cultural knowledge and insights, language aptitude, relevant skill sets, diverse expertise, and varied experiences in complex environments, the evolution from IA discussion and planning to desired effects can move quickly.
5. SOF add clarity by developing the situation, assessing immediate causes of crisis, and framing a common operating picture that enhances IA understanding of the scope of any situation.
6. SOF provide the USG IA enterprise with an expanded strategic reach through the various relationships and networks SOF have developed in the past as a result of sustained interaction with various foreign partners.
7. SOF expand the IA enterprise capacity to generate strategic effects by harmonizing and synchronizing efforts with other SOF entities who share similar responsibilities on behalf of their own countries.

- from Charles W. Ricks, *Preserving Sovereignty in a Borderless World*, JSOU Press Occasional Paper, June 2017

## The Strategic National Security Structure

Though based in Washington, D.C., representatives of the USG IA community are also present on the ground within the AO through the work of the U.S. embassy country team, USAID, and others. They will inevitably, in some form, have an impact on military operations (see chapter 4, Overseas Interagency Structures).

We begin with the White House in discussing the strategic direction that emerges in the form of the policies and decisions taken to advance the national security of the United States. It is important to recall that the IA community is not a physical place or a formal organization with clear lines of authority. Rather it is a process of information exchange, negotiations, coordination, and collaboration among all of the various USG departments, agencies, and organizations tasked with national security responsibilities. Faced with threats and challenges, IA actors are problem solvers working on some of the most important issues facing the country.

**The White House**  
<https://www.whitehouse.gov>

The President, supported by and working through the National Security Council (NSC) and other senior officials, directs the development and implementation of national security strategies and policies, oversees necessary planning, and makes the decisions required to activate those plans. Continuous liaison between the White House and the various USG IA components seeks to ensure the availability of the most timely and accurate information and the clearest strategic guidance to enable the achievement of national security goals against specific threats and within the targeted areas of operation.

### Interagency Workflow

Engagement among IA partners features both vertical stovepipes, which are unique to the work of individual departments and agencies, and lateral connectivity that allows for cooperation and collaboration among those partners. For instance, the IC serves as the coordination



Figure 1. Interagency Workflow

hub for some 17 separate intelligence organizations that are nested throughout the USG in various departments and agencies. Similarly, the DOS Counterterrorism (CT) Bureau acts as the lead for IA partners throughout the USG engaged in CT activities. While the IA mostly resides strategically within the National Capital Region (NCR), the operational IA exists away from the NCR. It is within the operational environment that policy and strategy are transformed into what actually happens on the ground to generate desired effects. Throughout the USG, the workflow of information exchange, analysis, assessments, draft strategy, policy options, courses of action, consequence analysis, and recommendations for the way ahead moves laterally among the relevant USG IA components. Products from that workflow then rise vertically from the USG IA community through the structure of the NSC to the President.

Once policies, strategies, and decisions are promulgated, the engaged USG IA components use them to guide the direction, management, oversight, execution, and evaluation of national security activities employing DIME-FIL tools throughout the world. Figure 1

portrays the workflow relationship between the USG IA community and the NSC.

Overseas, the U.S. Embassy Country Team, led by the ambassador, functions as the face of the USG IA process. Staffed with representatives of the relevant USG IA components, the Country Team takes those steps necessary to achieve all U.S. foreign policy objectives. It works with the on-scene military commander to synchronize country team activities with military operations and with the HN, PN, IGOs, and NGOs to maximize the effects of the shared effort.

#### **The National Security Council (NSC)**

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc>

The NSC process institutionalizes the reality that no department, agency or organization can, by themselves, address the wide variety of threats facing the United States. The gathering of diverse expertise, resources, and experiences animates IA relationships to define problems, identify solutions, and apply them as effectively as possible. The NSC came into existence under President Truman through the National Security Act of 1947 and has been under the Executive Office of the

The National Security Council is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors and cabinet officials.

President since 1949. It provides advice and counsel to the President on the synchronization of foreign, military, and domestic policies to provide for the national security of the United States. As the NSC is the President's coordinating hub for national security power and influence, its structure changes as administrations change. Each version of the NSC is crafted to meet the unique preferences and priorities of each chief executive. It is through the NSC that all the components of national power (DIME-FIL) are animated to address national security threats.

Traditionally, an early step for a new administration is to publish its vision of the ideal structure for the NSC and to define work-flow procedures and responsibilities. Predictably, some Presidents are more involved with the details of the NSC workings than others.

President Donald Trump issued National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) on 28 January 2017. This document began the process of outlining his vision for the structure and functioning of the NSC. On 4 April 2017, the President issued NSPM-4 (see <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/national-security-presidential-memorandum-4/>), which replaced "all other existing Presidential directives and guidance on the organization or support of the NSC and HSC (Homeland Security Council)." This included his NSPM-2. In early February 2020, a reduction in the size of the NSC Staff was announced, along with a realignment of various functional areas. Once again, while sometimes controversial, periodic reductions and expansions of the NSC Staff, accompanied by functional realignments, take place throughout the life of any presidential administration.

In the recent past, President Barack Obama issued Presidential Policy Directives (PPD). Before that, they had been called National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) (George W. Bush administration), Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) (Clinton administration), National Security Directives (NSD) (George H.W. Bush administration), and National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) (Reagan administration).

Regardless of title, the documentation of Presidential decisions becomes the touchstone for the actions of the USG IA components.

It should also be remembered that these directives constitute the President's Executive Branch decisions. Thus, they should be in compliance with existing law and, by themselves, constitute direction rather than law.

Members of the NSC are identified by both statutory mandate and presidential preference. The latter category varies from individuals who are invited to attend and those who shall attend. Specific persons can move between those two discretionary categories. Thus, the general membership on the NSC changes when administrations change and frequently during an administration. What is today may not be tomorrow. But the general structures remain constant. Under the direction of NSPM-4, the NSC consists of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Homeland Security, National Security Advisor, Homeland Security Advisor, and the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations (UN). The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are regular attendees as is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the President, the Counsel to the President, the Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited as attendees to any NSC meeting.

Other members of the cabinet are included during the consideration of specific issues such as international economic issues. As noted earlier, the specific NSC structure varies from administration to administration. However, the basic elements of the NSC typically will remain in place as administrations change. The NSC staff conducts issue and situation analyses, develops policy options and courses of action, projects consequences of policy development, formalizes recommendations for the President, publishes and circulates documentation of Presidential decisions, and oversees policy execution based on those decision documents.

### The National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC)

The NSC/PC serves as the Cabinet-level senior IA forum that is responsible for discussing policy issues and situations that affect the national security interests of the United States. It is chaired by the National Security Advisor, who sets the agenda and supervises the preparation and presentation of assessments, reports, and options that support the work of the committee.

Additional members include the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Homeland Security, Chief of Staff to the President, the DNI, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the CIA, National Security Advisor, Homeland Security Advisor, and Representative of the United States of America to the UN. As with the NSC, the heads of other departments, agencies, and organizations are included as appropriate depending on the issues or situations under discussion. These include international economic issues, homeland security concerns, and science and technology issues. Given the broad scope of its responsibilities, the NSC/PC serves as a strategic hub for IA policy deliberations and recommendations and provides oversight for policy implementation.

### The National Security Council Deputies Committee (NSC/DC)

The NSC/DC serves as the “senior sub-cabinet forum for consideration of, and, where appropriate, decision making on policy issues that affect the national security interests of the United States.” It assigns work to and reviews the output of NSC staff and policy groups. The NSC/DC acts to ensure that issues brought before the NSC/PC and the NSC itself have been properly analyzed, staffed, and structured for review and, as appropriate, decision.

Chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor, membership includes the Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Treasury, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Secretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Deputy DNI, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Director of the CIA, Deputy National Security Advisor, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy, Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security

Advisor to the Vice President, and the Administrator of USAID. The Deputy to the United States Representative to the UN “may be invited when appropriate.” As before, consideration of specific issues could include representatives from other executive departments and agencies.

In general, the NSC/DC serves to sharpen the focus of IA coordination as information and recommendations flow from the Policy Coordination Committees, and then through the NSC process to the President. Decisions are then documented and disseminated for execution.

Two specific responsibilities are particularly important to the functioning of the IA process:

1. The DC shall also focus significant attention on monitoring the implementation of policies and decisions and shall conduct periodic reviews of the Administration’s major national security and foreign policy initiatives.
2. The DC is responsible for establishing Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) and for providing objectives and clear guidance.

### The National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs)

Oversight of national security policy development and execution is accomplished by a collection of regional and functional Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs). Serving as the “main day-to-day forum for IA coordination of national security policies,” PCCs are engaged in the daily management of the “development and implementation of national security policies by multiple executive departments and agencies” and the IA process. Participation is targeted primarily at the Assistant Secretary level.

PCCs conduct analysis; prepare assessments, strategy drafts, policy options, and courses of action; and craft recommendations for the NSC/DC, NSC/PC, and NSC. Once issued, the PCCs monitor the implementation of Presidential decisions within their areas of responsibility.

Once again, PCCs exist in every Presidential administration, though their specific number, areas of interest, and workflow are likely to vary. Likewise,

individual PCC membership, meeting schedules, and workflow are likely to reflect the requirements of the individual PCC.

The NSPM-4 of 4 April 2017 outlines the purposes of the PCCs and changes their previous name from Interagency Policy Committees (IPC)—a term that remains in many pre-2017 documents. Recent administrations have not been in the habit of publishing a definitive public list of PCCs/PCs. Administrations, acting through the DC, will establish regional and issue-related PCCs. Some are temporary in nature and are intended to address specific issues or situations and are then disbanded. Typically, presidents will expand and reduce the scope and number of PCCs under whatever name they are known. Such a trend is not unusual as presidential vision and ways of doing business adapt over the course of an administration to new circumstances and changes in the threat environment.

Examples of PCCs/PCs from the recent past include the following regions:

- a. Europe and Eurasia
- b. Western Hemisphere
- c. Mexico/Central America Regional Strategy
- d. East Asia
- e. South and Central Asia
- f. Africa
- g. Middle East
- h. Iran
- i. Syria-Lebanon
- j. Africa
- k. Russia
- l. Iraq
- m. Afghanistan

Examples of Functional PCCs/PCs include:

- a. Arms Control
- b. Biodefense
- c. Combating Terrorism
- d. Information Strategy
- e. Contingency Planning/Crisis Response Group
- f. Counterterrorism Security Group
- g. Defense Strategy, Force Structure and Planning
- h. Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations
- i. Detainees
- j. Global Environment

- k. HIV-AIDS and Infectious Diseases
- l. Information Sharing
- m. Intelligence and Counterintelligence
- n. Interdiction
- o. International Development and Humanitarian Assistance
- p. International Drug Control
- q. International Finance
- r. International Organized Crime
- s. Maritime Security
- t. Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense
- u. Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations
- v. Records Access and Information Security
- w. Space
- x. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications
- y. Transnational Economic Issues
- z. Weapons of Mass Destruction—Terrorism
- aa. Avian and Pandemic Influenza
- ab. Communication Systems and Cybersecurity

A review of these PCCs/PCs provides another glimpse at the variety of threats to national security that persist in our contemporary environment. That is one of the reasons that DOD representation exists on most PCCs/PCs.

### Strategic Policy Documents

Acting through the NSC, successive presidents have developed several different strategies that then drive the development of additional implementing strategies and the writing and execution of operational plans. Changes in administrations or individuals within administrations frequently result in changes of priorities and titles. But, taken as a whole, the strategy dynamic is evolutionary in nature. While changes are inevitable, one can understand current policy and strategy only in the context of what came before and what is going on now. Thus, this guide often retains references to earlier versions of policies and strategies to ensure proper context and understanding of what was intended and what has resulted. Chief among these are:

- a. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
- b. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
- c. The National Strategy for Homeland Security

- d. The National Counterintelligence Strategy
- e. The National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding
- f. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime

Drawing on this strategic guidance, the Secretary of Defense promulgates The National Defense Strategy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides direction through The National Military Strategy.

In response to all of these, the commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has been tasked by the Secretary of Defense to prepare The Global Campaign Plan for the War on Terror from which each geographic combatant commander has developed a supporting theater campaign plan.

Within the DOD, these strategies and plans are further delineated under classified Contingency Plans and Execute Orders related to specific threats to the United States.

#### National Security Strategy of the United States


<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>

One of the evolutionary trends in recent years has been the elimination of distinctions between homeland security and national security. A single, integrated National Security Staff (NSS) structure now handles policy development and execution and manages both homeland security and national security crises. This step has served to eliminate disruptive redundancy and duplication of effort and has resulted in a clearer shared picture of the national security environment facing the United States. The merger has also facilitated unity of effort on matters of national security and placed critical NSC policy concerns under a single leadership authority. Reflecting this merger into a National Security Team, the following list constitutes the four vital national interests contained in the most recent National Security Strategy of the United States.

1. Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life.
2. Promote American prosperity.
3. Preserve peace through strength.
4. Advance American influence.

This has been a quick introduction to the interagency environment. The pages that follow provide an overview of the national security IA process and the role of SOF within that process. The following chapters include:

- Chapter 2: Threats, Intelligence, and the Intelligence Community
- Chapter 3: Defense, Diplomacy, and Development
- Chapter 4: Overseas Interagency Structures
- Chapter 5: Beyond the U.S Government Agency Community
- Chapter 6: Counter and Combating Terrorism
- Chapter 7: Interagency Evolution: Past and Future



Several appendices at the back of the guide provide supporting information to the chapter structure:

- Appendix A List of Organizations and Programs
- Appendix B Ranks of Foreign Service, Military, Civil Service, and NATO Officials
- Appendix C Interagency-Related Definitions
- Appendix D USG IA, and Other Abbreviations/ Acronyms

A reminder about using this Special Operations Interagency Reference Guide: Because of the changing nature of the USG IA structure and functioning, organizations and programs are constantly being created, eliminated, merged, and renamed to develop the necessary capabilities, reduce duplication of effort, clarify lines of responsibility, and increase operational efficiencies. Thus, information that is accurate at the time of publication may not be subsequently during the life cycle of any version of this guide. However, to the extent possible, the internet web links for organizations and programs, along with listings of organizations, programs, and acronyms; a section of definitions; and a bibliography are included to assist a user of this guide to track changes as they evolve.

## Chapter 2. Threats, Intelligence, and the Intelligence Community

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**I**t has become almost trite to say that knowledge—and the information that enables knowledge—is power. But it is also accurate to accept that reality. The multi-domain competition for open-source and classified national security and commercial or industry information drives political, diplomatic, economic, financial, and defense activities throughout the world—even among allies and partners. Innovative information collection, management, analysis, and distribution provide situation awareness and actionable information, knowledge, and understanding among all the elements of national power. If information is the raw material, then IA interaction operationalizes that information and transforms it into actionable intelligence that supports SOF core activities and other national security activities.

As with all things IIIM, intelligence is not a single-organization activity. The DNI serves as the hub for IA intelligence activities throughout the USG. That individual facilitates the cooperation and coordination among 17 separate, but complementary, functional and domain-specific intelligence organizations in what has come to be called the IC. Beyond the IC, relationships among allies and PN intelligence services seek to provide the same levels of cooperation and collaboration in the worldwide competition for information and intelligence.

### Office of the Director for National Intelligence (ODNI)

<https://www.dni.gov>

The DNI serves as the head of the USG IC. The DNI began functioning in April 2005, but the concept of a coordinator of national intelligence had been under discussion since the mid-1950s. The DNI works under authorities and duties outlined in the National Security

Act of 1947 as amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

The DNI serves as the head of the U.S. IC; manages and oversees the execution of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) with a budget in excess of \$50 billion; and acts as the principal intelligence advisor to the President, NSC, and Homeland Security Council. The DNI also oversees the coordination of foreign partnerships and relationships between the IC and the intelligence services of foreign governments; establishes requirements and priorities for national intelligence; and transforms the IC into a unified, collaborative, and coordinated organization. The DNI works with the Secretary of Defense to oversee the development and implementation of a program management plan for the acquisition of major systems.

The mission of the ODNI is simply stated as follows: “Lead and support Intelligence Community integration; delivering insights, driving capabilities, and investing in the future.” The IC includes 17 diverse organizations:

- Two Independent Agencies
  - Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
  - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- Eight DOD Elements
  - Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
  - National Security Agency (NSA)
  - National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
  - National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
  - Intelligence Elements of the DOD Services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force)
- Seven Elements from other Departments & Agencies

- Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
- Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis
- Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence
- Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Department of Justice’s Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) Office of National Security Intelligence
- Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research
- Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis

On 22 January 2019, the DNI issued the IC’s 2019 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) to establish the path for the IC for the next four years. This specific NIS is the fourth such document published. The NIS aligns IC priorities with the current National Security Strategy. It communicates NIS priorities to the IC workforce, partners, oversight, customers, and fellow citizens. The 2019 NIS focuses on integration of talent and information; innovation; partnerships; and transparency. It also identifies seven mission objectives: strategic intelligence; anticipatory intelligence; current operations intelligence; cyber threat intelligence; counterterrorism; counterproliferation; and counterintelligence and security.

In addition to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), discussed in chapter 6, the ODNI operates three additional national centers:

1. The Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC). The newest of the centers, the CTIIC was formed as a result of a 2015 Presidential Memorandum concerning cyber threats to U.S. national interests and to share information about such threats among the federal cyber community, operators, analysts, and policy makers. It has five specific responsibilities: provide integrated all-source analysis of intelligence related to foreign cyber threats or cyber incidents; support federal cyber centers by providing intelligence related to their respective missions;

oversee development and implementation of intelligence-sharing capabilities to build situation awareness; ensure that indicators of malicious cyber activity and related threat reporting is downgraded as low as possible for distribution to both USG and private entities; and facilitate and support IA efforts to develop and implement plans to counter foreign cyber threats to U.S. national interests using all elements of national power.

2. National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC). Established in 2005, the NCPC brings together the counterproliferation efforts of the entire IC to ensure that the USG is positioned to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is staffed by persons from throughout the IC. It leads the IC and wider USG IA in preventing the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, related technologies, and expertise. It operates through the Directorate of Advanced Concepts and Tradecraft; Directorate of Intelligence Integration; Directorate of Interdiction and Counterproliferation Facilitation; and Directorate of Resource Management and Investment.
3. National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC). Drawing on individuals with extensive national security, law enforcement, and various analytic, investigative, and policymaking backgrounds, the NCSC works within several mission areas including insider threats (National Insider Threat Task Force—NITTF), supply chain risk management, and personnel security. The NCSC pursues five strategic goals: advance our knowledge of and ability to counter foreign and other adversarial threats and incidents; protect critical U.S. infrastructure, facilities, classified networks, sensitive information, and personnel; advance our counterintelligence and security mission and synchronize capabilities through partnerships; strengthen effectiveness through stakeholder engagement, governance, and advocacy; and

achieve its mission through organizational excellence.

Each year, the U.S. IC publishes its Worldwide Threat Assessment, which outlines in detail on-going global and regional threats. The specifics will vary from year to year, but each annual assessment represents a comprehensive look at the current international security environment. The threat assessment provides strategic focus and helps to frame the activities of IA partners. Inevitably, changing conditions mean that the assessment is subject to modification. New information and fresh analysis can leave gaps, requiring an IA dynamic that is flexible and adaptive to address those gaps.

The Worldwide Threat Assessment assists SOF in understanding the current and future international security environment. It provides a path for SOF strategic thinking and helps frame the mosaic of variables that contribute to international instability and generate threats to individual citizens, communities, regions and national sovereignty.

Though current events indicate a reemergence of near-peer competition worldwide, especially with China and Russia, it can be argued that the emerging international security environment remains irregular in nature. This trend will require SOF who are prepared, positioned, lead well, and are able to lead others within the DOD and coordinate cross-functionally with the wider USG and, as appropriate, with elements of the international community to meet these emerging threats. The IC's Worldwide Threat Assessment regularly identifies a menu of threats that demand attention. These can include:

1. Global Threats
  - a. Cyber
  - b. Online Influence Operations & Election Interference
  - c. Weapons of Mass Destruction & Proliferation
  - d. Terrorism
  - e. Counterintelligence
  - f. Emerging and Disruptive Technologies and Threats to Economic Competitiveness
  - g. Space and Counterspace

- h. Transnational Organized Crime
  - i. Economics and Energy
  - j. Human Security
2. Regional Threats
  - a. China and Russia
  - b. East Asia
  - c. Middle East and North Africa
  - d. South Asia
  - e. Russia and Eurasia
  - f. Europe
  - g. Africa
  - h. The Western Hemisphere
3. Other Threats (not exhaustive)
  - a. Sovereignty Issues
  - b. Poor Governance
  - c. Failing and Failed States
  - d. Ethnic Conflict
  - e. Cyber Crime
  - f. Pandemics
  - g. Trafficking of Drugs, Weapons, and Human Beings
  - h. Piracy
  - i. Regional Instability
  - j. Resource Competition (energy, food, and water)
  - k. Globalization
  - l. Climate Change
  - m. Demographic Polarization
  - n. Illiteracy
  - o. Ideology and Religion
  - p. Wealth Disparity
  - q. Corruption

### The USG Intelligence Community (IC)

<https://www.intelligence.gov>

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 restructured the coordinative relationships among the members of the USG IC. The legislation established the ODNI with the responsibility to act as the lead agency for the IC, execute the National Intelligence Program, and serve as the principal advisor to the President and NSC on intelligence issues involving national security.




Figure 2. USG Interagency Components of the Intelligence Community

Figure 2 portrays the IC. With the ODNI serving as its IA intelligence hub, the members of the IC represent an extensive cross-section of the USG. As noted earlier, the 17 core members of the IC also maintain close working relationships with other agencies uniquely positioned to develop useful intelligence information. This fact adds to the inherent complexity of the extensive USG IC and requires a high level of situation awareness on the part of SOF warriors and others who rely on the IC partners.

The IC produces a wide variety of intelligence products. At the most senior level, these include the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and the World Intelligence Review (WIRe). However, there are numerous other reports available to IC members and associates from throughout the USG.

Oversight of the IC is exercised by a variety of Executive and Legislative Branch organizations. Executive Branch supervision is carried out by the NSC and by the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB), the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), and the OMB.

The DNI and IC are responsible for providing timely and objective intelligence to the President, other department and agency heads, and the Congress as required to successfully prosecute national security activities. They are also tasked to develop, resource, execute, and evaluate intelligence strategies and programs on all matters involving national security and homeland security.

To facilitate its leadership of the IC, the ODNI organization consists of the following Directorates, which are organized around ODNI Core Functions:

- Enterprise Capacity (EC)
- Mission Integration (MI)
  - National Intelligence Council (NIC)
  - National Intelligence Management Council
  - President's Daily Brief (PDB)
- National Security Partnerships (NSP)
- Strategy and Engagement (S&E)

As noted earlier, the IC operates through four Mission Centers:

- Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC)
- National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC)
- National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC)
- National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

Oversight of the IC is carried out by:

- Civil Liberties, Privacy and Transparency (CLPT)
- Equal Opportunity & Diversity (EEOD)
- Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG)
- Office of General Counsel (OGC)

With the large number of intelligence agencies scattered throughout the USG, the DNI and IC face the challenge of synchronizing USG activities in support of national intelligence requirements. In addition to the IC, there are other IA bodies that are concerned with information exchange and intelligence operations.

To illustrate the IA nature of the USG intelligence process, the various organization-specific intelligence activities are discussed here rather than in sections associated with their parent organizations. Note the domain-specific nature of their responsibilities and, subsequently, the wide-ranging relationship networks each maintains throughout the USG IA dynamic and, more specifically, with those organizations involved directly with national security. It is important to note the close interaction between the roles of the IC members and SOF core activities. The IC includes:

### Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

<https://www.cia.gov>

First established in 1947 by the National Security Act, the CIA's role was modified under the terms of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which created ODNI. The CIA remains the largest provider of all-source national security intelligence to senior U.S. policy and decision makers. The director of the CIA works with all agencies contained within the IA IC and reports to the DNI. The CIA employs human and other resources to collect, evaluate, organize, assess, and disseminate intelligence products throughout the USG IA process to policy makers, decision takers, and other users. The CIA functions through the National Clandestine Service (NCS), Directorate of

Intelligence (DI), Directorate of Science & Technology (DS&T) and the Directorate of Support (DS).

Additionally, the CIA operates several function-focused centers that are staffed by representatives from throughout the IC. These include the Counterterrorism Center (CTC); Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC); Counterintelligence Center (CIC); and DNI Open Source Center (OSC). The CTC features both analytic and operational functions designed to prevent and disrupt terrorist threats. Working with partners from throughout the USG IA process, the CTC targets terrorist leaders and cells; disrupts their plots; severs their financial and logistical links; and limits terrorist access to safe havens.

The CNC confronts three primary threats to U.S. National Security: international drug trafficking; transnational criminal networks; and war crimes. In addition to analysis, the CNC develops actionable intelligence to identify, disrupt, and dismantle major criminal networks and bring to justice violators of human rights. Interagency partners include U.S. law enforcement, homeland security, military organizations, along with foreign law enforcement and intelligence services.

The primary mission of the CIC is to protect CIA operations from compromise by foreign adversaries. CIC analyzes the intentions and activities of foreign intelligence services and advises the Director of the CIA and other Agency components on counterintelligence and counterespionage objectives, strategies, and resources.

The OSC collects, translates, produces, and distributes open source information for national security stakeholders. These include policy makers, the military, state and local law enforcement, operations officers, and analysts throughout the USG.

### Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

<https://www.dia.mil>

The DIA is the chief provider of military intelligence to DOD and serves as a major participant in the USG IC. The Director of DIA acts as the principal advisor on intelligence matters to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands. DIA provides intelligence products to policy makers, war fighters, and force planners for their use in meeting their responsibilities

within the national security arena. The DIA applies varied expertise in a wide range of interests to include military operations, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and defense-related political and economic issues.

Among DIA's strategic objectives are:

1. Prevent strategic surprise and support contingency operations
2. Strengthen core mission capabilities
3. Partner and innovate to gain advantage
4. Optimize performance relevance

The DIA's workforce of more than 16,500 military and civilian personnel represents expertise in foreign military and paramilitary forces, capabilities, and intentions; proliferation of WMD; international terrorism; international narcotics trafficking; information operations; and defense-related foreign political, economic, industrial, geographic, and medical and health issues. A quick look at DIA activities clearly indicates the important resource it provides to SOF and SOF core activities. The DIA operates through various directorates: Analysis; Operations; Science & Technology; and Mission Services. It maintains Intelligence Centers focused upon the Americas; Asia/Pacific; Europe/Eurasia; and Middle East/Africa. The Director chairs the Military Intelligence Board, which coordinates activities of the defense IC.

#### **National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS)** <https://www.nsa.gov>

The core mission of the NSA/CSS is to lead the USG in cryptology that encompasses both SIGINT and cybersecurity products and services, and enables computer network operations (CNO) in order to gain a decisive advantage for the nation and our allies under all circumstances. To those ends, NSA/CSS serves as the nation's cryptologic organization that pursues the tasks of signals intelligence and cybersecurity. For instance, it enables network warfare operations to defeat terrorists and their operations at home and abroad, consistent with U.S. laws and the protection of privacy and civil liberties. NSA/CSS serves a wide variety of customers throughout the IA enterprise to include the military leadership, senior policy makers, and those involved with various national security activities. It also works

with certain international allies in support of their efforts. Areas of interest include terrorism, narcotics trafficking, criminal gangs, and asymmetric threats. Among the NSA's assets are the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center, National Security Operations Center, and the Research Directorate. Executive Order 12333, originally issued on 4 December 1981, established NSA/CSS responsibilities. Some of these include:

- "Collect (including through clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence information and data for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental missions;
- act as the National Manager for National Security Systems as established in law and policy, and in this capacity be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director, National Intelligence;
- prescribe security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling, and distribution of signals intelligence and communication security material within and among the elements under control of the Director of the National Security Agency, and exercise the necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations."

EO 12333 was amended on 31 July 2008 in order to:

- Align EO 12333 with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004;
- implement additional recommendations of the 9/11 and WMD Commissions;
- maintain or strengthen privacy and civil liberties protections.

The CSS ensures military integration by coordinating and developing policy and guidance on signals intelligence and cybersecurity missions. CSS was established in 1972 to assure full partnership between the NSA and the military department cryptologic components. These include the United States Fleet Cyber Command; the United States Marine Corps Director of Intelligence; the United States Army's Intelligence and Security Command; the United States Air Force's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency; and the United States Coast Guard Deputy Assistant Commandant for Intelligence.

### National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

<https://www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx>

NGA is responsible for supplying timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of U.S. national security objectives. It provides imagery and geospatial information to assist decision makers and military commanders in understanding the intricacies of areas of the earth that are of interest. NGA provides tailored, customer-specific geospatial intelligence, analytic services, and solutions to assist in planning, decision making, and execution. For instance, “anyone who sails a U.S. ship, flies a U.S. aircraft, makes national security policy decisions, fights wars, locates targets, responds to natural disasters or even navigates with a cellphone relies on NGA.” NGA is the lead federal agency for geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). GEOINT refers to the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth. Among other activities, NGA provides information to support humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. It also manages the National System for Geospatial Intelligence. NGA is a member of the U.S. IC and is designated as a DOD Combat Support Agency.

### National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

<https://www.nro.gov>

The NRO designs, builds, and operates the nation’s reconnaissance satellites and serves as the nation’s eyes and ears in space. Because of the unique placement of its resources, the NRO is able to provide global situational awareness of activities on the ground while focusing specifically on locations of particular national security interest. It is a major IA player, working with the NSA, NGA, CIA, U.S. Strategic Forces Command, the military departments, IC, DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Treasury, and the rest of the interagency community. NRO also draws expertise from private sector aerospace companies and research centers. The National Reconnaissance Program budget comes through the National Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program. NRO systems provide:

- Monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Tracking international terrorists, drug traffickers, and criminal organizations
- Developing highly accurate military targeting data and bomb damage assessments
- Supporting international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations
- Assessing the impact of natural disasters to include earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, and fires

### Military Department Intelligence Services

<https://www.25af.af.mil>, <https://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil>, <https://www.uscg.mil>, <https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/intelligence>, <https://www.oni.navy.mil>

As already identified, there are eight DOD components within the IC: These are the DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, and the intelligence elements of the four DOD services. Coast Guard Intelligence, though not from the DOD, is included here as a logical addition. The military departments field domain-unique intelligence organizations with a full-spectrum of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination capabilities, appropriately linked to the service’s areas of expertise. For instance, U.S. Air Force intelligence, designated as the Twenty-Fifth Air Force, provides multisource intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance products, applications, and resources to include cyber and geospatial forces and expertise. It also serves as the Air Force cryptologic component that is responsible to the NSA/CSS for Air Force issues related to tactical warfighting and strategic operations. “The U.S. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (USAF ISR) enterprise is America’s leading provider of finished intelligence derived from airborne, space, and cyberspace sensors.”

Because of their mission orientations, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines rely heavily on human intelligence (HUMINT) techniques continuously enhanced by other technology-based resources. U.S. Army Intelligence (G-2) is responsible for oversight of all intelligence activities within the Department of the Army. It engages in five major military intelligence disciplines: imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and counterintelligence and security countermeasures. The

Marine Corps integrates trained intelligence personnel into all echelons of command beginning with battalion/squadron and employ intelligence battalions for all-source intelligence; radio battalions for signal intelligence (SIGINT); unmanned aerial systems squadrons for airborne Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and reconnaissance battalions for ground reconnaissance. With the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) serving as its production center, much of the Marines' focus is placed on the complexities of expeditionary warfare.

With its sustained global reach, the U.S. Navy serves as the primary agency for maritime intelligence. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is co-located within the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC). The intelligence content supports the core Navy missions to include forward presence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), power projection, sea control, and deterrence. ONI also provides intelligence on foreign naval capabilities, trends, operations and tactics, and global civil maritime activities.

Intelligence gathered from the military departments flows through the IC and other IA venues to support national security and foreign policy initiatives overseas. Each military department intelligence service also serves as an individual member of the IC.

### **Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Intelligence (IN)**

<https://www.energy.gov/nationalsecurity>

The DOE's intelligence programs reach back as far as the World War II Manhattan Project. The IN conducts assessments of global threats from nuclear terrorism and works to stall the proliferation of nuclear technology, resources, and expertise. The IN focuses on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; energy security; science and technology; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste. Working through the IA IC, the Office of Intelligence enables the exchange of intelligence throughout the USG IA process on energy matters and conducts evaluations of emerging threats to U.S. economic and security interests. More specifically, IN serves as the IC's technical intelligence resource in the core areas of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; energy security; science and technology; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste. Separate from the Office of Intelligence, DOE

also provides Nuclear Emergency Support Team assistance to deal with technical aspects of radiological or nuclear terrorism. The DOE also manages the strategic petroleum reserve and is involved with protection and resilience systems against cyber and physical attacks on U.S. energy infrastructure and the development of emergency responses.

### **Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)**

<https://www.dhs.gov/about-office-intelligence-and-analysis>

The DHS intelligence function includes I&A and other separate intelligence offices located within each of the departments' operational components. The I&A mission is to "equip the Homeland Security enterprise with the intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient." The Under Secretary for I&A (U/SIA) serves as the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer and is responsible to both the Secretary for Homeland Security and the DNI.

I&A's four strategic goals are to: promote understanding of threats through intelligence analysis; collect information and intelligence pertinent to Homeland Security; share information necessary for action; and manage intelligence for the Homeland Security enterprise. Through its information-sharing mission, I&A serves as the USG IA lead in sharing information and intelligence with local, tribal and territorial governments and the private sector. In addition to serving as a critical information and intelligence hub for those entities, I&A performs the same function for DHS leadership and components as well as the wider IC. I&A pursues five lines of analysis to include threats related to border security; threat of radicalization and extremism; threats from particular groups entering the U.S.; threats to the Homeland's critical infrastructure and key resources; and WMD and health threats. Relationships with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are particularly important for addressing border issues. I&A synchronizes internal intelligence activities through the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC).

To ensure the strongest possible unity of effort, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis directs the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, which includes I&A and diverse organizations such as CBP; ICE; U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCG, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), USSS; and the Federal Emergency Management Administration. I&A serves as the executive agent for the DHS State and Local Fusion Center Program and has officers working out of dozens of fusion centers located throughout the country.

While I&A serves as the DHS representative within the IC, the separate intelligence offices in U.S. ICE, CBP, TSA, USSS, and Citizenship and Immigration Services all maintain strong relationships and interaction with various members of the IC because of the specialized nature of their responsibilities. I&A initiatives have included the Homeland Security Intelligence Framework and the Intelligence Enterprise Management Catalogue, both serving as information, assessment, and management tools.

#### **Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)–National Security Branch (NSB)**

<https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-branch>

Established on 12 September 2005, the NSB represents the consolidation of FBI CT, counterintelligence, weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence components under the leadership of a single Bureau official. The formal NSB infrastructure includes: Counterterrorism Division (CTD); Counterintelligence Division; WMD Directorate; the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC); the High-Value Detainee Interrogation, and the Counterproliferation Center. Drawing on the information derived from the joint terrorism task forces located throughout the U.S. and the Field Intelligence Groups, the NSB produces assessments of the structure, capabilities, motivation/ideology, and linkages among terrorist groups and networks. NSB is also responsible for the conduct and management of all foreign counterintelligence investigations. Its goal is to “develop a comprehensive understanding of the threats and penetrate national and transnational networks that have a desire and capability to harm us.” These include terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, criminal organizations, and those seeking to develop and spread WMD.

The CTD tracks terrorists both domestically and internationally. It is another of the IA partners who

bridge the divide between domestic and international CT operations. The division fields squads of CT specialists in numbers that vary depending on the nature and intensity of the threats in specific areas. CTD operations are conducted through the following four branches.

1. Operations Branch I: International Operations Sections I and II
2. Operations Branch II: Including the WMD and Domestic Terrorism Section (WMD/DT); Communications Exploitation Section (CXS); and Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS)
3. Analytical Branch
4. Operational Support Branch

#### **Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Office of National Security (ONSI)**

<https://www.dea.gov/intelligence>

As the nexus between terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime continues to grow as a world-wide destabilizing driver, the wider security challenges posed by drugs and drug cartels have become recognized as a major threat to national security. Operating from 21 field divisions within the U.S. and some 80 offices in more than 60 countries, the DEA maintains a major international law enforcement presence in support of national security objectives. DEA representatives serve on U.S. embassy country teams (chapter 4), and the Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) serves as the DEA presence within the IC. The ONSI contributes both to the task of combating terrorism and leveraging IC support to the DEA’s law enforcement mission. “DEA has sole responsibility for coordinating and pursuing drug investigations abroad and works in partnership with foreign law enforcement counterparts.” The DEA/ONSI works with the IC and the wider IA process to address threats from drug traffickers, immigration violators, and global terrorist networks. Among its responsibilities are the following:

- a. Investigate and prepare for the prosecution of major violators of controlled substance laws involving interstate and international environments;

- b. Investigate and prepare for the prosecution of criminals and drug gangs who perpetuate violence in communities and terrorize citizens through fear and intimidation;
- c. Manage a national drug intelligence program in cooperation with federal, state, local, and foreign officials;
- d. Coordinate with various government agencies, to include foreign governments, to conduct programs to reduce illicit-drug availability within the U.S. through crop eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials; and
- e. Oversee all programs involving law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries under the policy guidance of DOS and the local country teams.

An example of a DEA IA organization is the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). Begun in 1974 with only two organizations, it now hosts 21 agencies from throughout the IA enterprise as it seeks to identify threats to national security with a particular emphasis on the Southwest U.S. border region.

#### **Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)**

<https://www.state.gov/s/inr>

As a member of the USG's IC, INR's primary responsibility is to provide quality intelligence information and resources to support U.S. diplomacy and the achievement of national security objectives. It grew out of the tradition established by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II and represents the oldest civilian intelligence component in the USG. INR takes part in three essential lines of effort: all-Source analysis; intelligence policy and coordination; and analytic outreach. Its analysts rely on all-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, in-house public opinion polling, and interactions with domestic and foreign scholars.

It seeks to provide global coverage of terrorist threats and other relevant national security and foreign policy concerns. INR produces reports on topics of interest to include political/military developments, terrorism, narcotics, and trade. It is also a regular contributor to the IC's National Intelligence Estimates, the Presidential Daily Brief, and other senior level products. INR also conducts policy reviews of counterintelligence

and law enforcement activities. Its Humanitarian Information Unit provides unclassified information to the USG IA community and other partners to support responses to humanitarian crises worldwide.

Its broad analytic interests include offices for African Affairs; Analytic Outreach; East Asia and the Pacific; Economic Analysis; Europe; Geographer and Global Issues; Near Eastern Affairs; Opinion Research; Russia and Eurasia; South Asia; Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues; Terrorism, Narcotics, and Crime; and the Western Hemisphere. INR also maintains relationships with intelligence agencies and expertise residing in academia, think tanks, research councils, NGOs, and the private sector.

#### **Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)**

<https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Intelligence-Analysis.aspx>.

The OIA came into existence as a result of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004. The office operates as a subordinate agency of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Analysis (TFI). OIA gathers, analyzes, and produces intelligence on financial support networks for terrorist networks and other threats to national security. Its strategic priorities are terrorist financing, insurgency financing, and rogue regimes/proliferation financing. More specifically, OIA combats terrorist facilitators, WMD proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats. OIA has developed expertise in understanding how terrorist financial networks operate and in developing intelligence to help cut off necessary funding mechanisms. OIA is also active in tracking resources flowing to rogue states involved with the production and proliferation of WMDs. Topics of particular interest include designations of specific individuals and groups for targeted action; money laundering; protecting charitable organizations; Hawala & alternative remittance systems; and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). OIA is a member of the USG IC.

As noted previously, each of these intelligence organizations operates both within its own parent organization structures while cooperating and collaborating with their IC partners on a regular basis by sharing information and intelligence, especially during times of crisis and strategic requirements. Perhaps nowhere else

is the need for IA effectiveness demonstrated so persistently as in the IC. The formal nature of the multiple relationships speaks to the importance of the dynamic enterprise that is the IC.

Additional organizations engaged with the IC are listed below.

### Information Sharing Environment (ISE)

<https://www.ise.gov>

Experience teaches that success in protecting national security and preventing future terrorist attacks and successfully targeting terrorists and their networks rests on the effective sharing of information among all relevant parties. This engagement involves the efficient gathering, analysis, and sharing of intelligence among the organs of the USG, state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and PNs. The goal is to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its interests around the world.

It has become clear that greater institutional flexibility and resilience are required of all participants. To support a wide-ranging agenda of initiatives, the ISE was created through Section 1016 of the Intel Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 and supports the intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs communities of the USG. Structurally, the ISE is led by a program manager and supported by the Information Sharing Council.

The ISE pursues the following goals: create a culture of sharing, reduce barriers to sharing, improve sharing practices with federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign partners, and institutionalize sharing. To achieve these goals, the ISE employs various specific Lines of Effort to include these:

- a. *Facilitate* the establishment of a trusted partnership among all levels of government, the private sector, and foreign partners.
- b. *Promote* an information-sharing culture among ISE partners by facilitating the improved sharing of timely, validated, protected, and actionable terrorism information supported by extensive education, training, and awareness programs for ISE participants.

- c. To the maximum extent possible, *function* in a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated manner.
- d. *Develop and deploy* incrementally, leveraging existing information-sharing capabilities while also creating new core functions and services.
- e. *Enable* the federal government to speak with one voice on terrorism-related matters and to promote more rapid and effective interchange and coordination among Federal departments and agencies and state, local and tribal governments, the private sector, and foreign partners, thus ensuring effective multidirectional sharing of information.
- f. *Ensure* sharing procedures and policies protect information privacy and civil liberties.

Analysts, operators and investigators support the ISE from a variety of communities within the USG Interagency structure. These include law enforcement, public safety, homeland security, intelligence, defense, and foreign affairs. The ISE Program Manager (PM-ISE) is responsible for harmonizing the efforts of the expertise from these and other agencies.

- National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC)
- Criminal Intelligence Training Master Calendar

### Fusion Centers & Intelligence Sharing

<https://www.it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=nationalInitiatives&page=1181>

Various states and municipalities have established fusion centers to ensure the efficient sharing of information of importance to the law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and CT communities. Most of the scores of functional fusion centers now operating follow guidelines developed through the DOJ-sponsored Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the DHS-sponsored Homeland Security Advisory Council. These guidelines are divided into three areas of concentration: law enforcement intelligence, public safety, and the private sector. The National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding ([https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy\\_1.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf)) guides the IA effort.

Federal support includes:

- a. DHS and DOJ's Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services
- b. DHS's Fusion Center Initiative, including providing DHS personnel to the fusion centers to assist
- c. DOJ's Information Sharing Resources for the Justice and Public Safety Communities
- d. DOJ's Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative

### **Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX)**

<https://www.ncix.gov>

The office of the ONCIX is a component of the ODNI and is made up of representatives from USG intelligence and security departments, agencies, and organizations. It is led by the National Counterintelligence Executive who is appointed by the DNI in consultation with the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the CIA. Its mission is to “provide effective leadership and support to the counterintelligence and security activities of the U.S. IC, USG, and U.S. private sector entities who are at risk of intelligence collection or attack by foreign adversaries.” Priority issues include cyber security; economic espionage; insider threats; and supply chain threats. The ONCIX is responsible for conducting an annual National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and other counterintelligence reports, developing and executing the National Counterintelligence Strategy, and preparing assessments of strategy implementation with an eye toward improving the effectiveness of counterintelligence operations.

## Chapter 3. Defense, Diplomacy, and Development

The concept that defense, diplomacy, and development serve as the three pillars of national security is one that is central to the functioning of the IA dynamic. Of course, that does not exclude the inclusion and important contributions of other functional areas throughout the USG. Neither does it imply that the three pillars replace the broader DIME-FIL model nor the traditional notion of SOF effects in all three domains. In fact, the continued recognition of the notion of the three pillars and the roles of SOF accommodate and absorb, but certainly do not replace, the components of the DIME-FIL model. Essentially, the three pillars provide a sense of strategic direction that facilitates unity of effort across the IA relationship.

The effort to build synergy among DOD, DOS, and USAID activities has, over recent years, produced a shared sense that instability brought on by poor or non-existent governance, poverty, movements of peoples, malicious state and non-state actors, and other factors must be addressed in a comprehensive way among USG organizations and with public-sector engagement, allied and coalition partners, and intergovernmental and NGOs. Post-World War II experiences, especially in the post-9/11 international security environment, teach that regions of instability lead not only to terrorism and insurgency, but to wider conflict and disruption of the international rule sets and order. SOF play roles in all of these.

Building on various past and present policies and strategies seeking unity of effort among the DOD, DOS and the USAID, new strategies, structures and planning have come into being. More specifically, the DOS and USAID published [February 2018] their Joint Strategic Plan, FY 2018-2022 that further advances the concept of civilian power and its relationships with its IA partners. The information below captures examples of the complete document that can be accessed on the internet [<https://www.state.gov/joint-strategic-plan/>]:

- Goal 1: “Protect America’s Security at Home and Abroad”
  - Strategic Objective 1.1: “Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their Delivery Systems.”
  - Strategic Objective 1.2: “Defeat ISIS, al-Qa’ida and other transnational terrorist organizations, and counter state-sponsored, regional, and local terrorist groups that threaten U.S. national security interests.”
  - Strategic Objective 1.3: “Counter instability, transnational crime, and violence that threaten U.S. interests by strengthening citizen-responsive governance, security, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”
  - Strategic Objective 1.4: “Increase capacity and strengthen resilience of our partners and allies to deter aggression, coercion, and malign influence by state and non-state actors.”
  - Strategic Objective 1.5: “Strengthen U.S. border security and protect U.S. citizens abroad.”
- Goal 2: “Renew America’s Competitive Advantage for Sustained Economic Growth and Job Creation”
  - Strategic Objective 2.3: “Advance U.S. economic security by ensuring energy security, combating corruption, and promoting market-oriented economic and governance reform.”
- Goal 3: “Promote American Leadership through Balanced Engagement”
  - Strategic Objective 3.1: “Transition nations from assistance recipients to enduring diplomatic, economic, and security partners.”
  - Strategic Objective 3.2: “Engage international fora to further American values and foreign policy goals while seeking more equitable burden sharing.”

- Strategic Objective 3.3: “Increase partnerships and civil-society organizations to mobilize support and resources and shape foreign public opinion.”
  - Strategic Objective 3.4: “Project American values and leadership by preventing the spread of disease and providing humanitarian relief.”
  - Goal 4: “Ensure Effectiveness and Accountability to the American Taxpayer”
- Strategic Objective 4.1: “Strengthen the effectiveness and sustainability of our diplomacy and development investments.”
  - Strategic Objective 4.2: “Provide modern and secure infrastructure and operational capabilities to support effective diplomacy and development.”

The rest of this chapter takes a look at the various components of the defense, diplomatic, and development pillars of national security.

## Defense: The First Pillar

### National Defense Strategy (NDS)

<https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

The National Defense Strategy describes the international security environment as a place of “increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order—creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory.” It also makes clear that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. foreign policy.” That said, countering and combating terrorism remain essential SOF core activities and remain

an essential aspect of SOF’s many roles within that changing international security environment.

The NDS goes on to mention “rapid technological change, challenges from adversaries in every operating domain, and the impact on current readiness from the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation’s history.”

The ultimate strategic goal is to “compete, deter, and win in this environment.” How that goal will be achieved is the focus of this IA Guide: “A more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust constellation of allies and partners, will sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order.”

What the NDS calls the “central challenge” is the “reemergence of long-term, strategic competition”, often at levels below what would normally trigger some form of military action. Thus, it is the case that Gray Zone and Hybrid Warfare often require soft power activities that deter and mitigate the disruptive behavior of state and non-state actors seeking competitive advantages by leveraging instability and creating chaos that proves advantageous to what they define



A U.S. Army Special Forces Multi-Purpose Canine team waits to clear a house full of improvised explosive devices in the Middle Euphrates River Valley’s Deir Ezzor province, Syria, on 11 October 2018. Photo by U.S. Army Sergeant Matthew Crane

as their national interests. The competitive employments of acts that apply coercion in the interests of gaining influence threaten sovereignty while “blurring the lines between civil and military goals.” Thus, the need for a robust, innovative, and adaptive IA enterprise and further relationship-based operations.

Addressing the challenges of this environment involve the “seamless integration of multiple elements of national power.” Accordingly, to cope with the expanding “competitive space,” the NDS outlines this strategic approach:

- “Be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable.”
- “*Integrate with the U.S. Interagency ... to employ all dimensions of national power.*” It identifies working with the “Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, USAID, as well as the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and others to identify and build partnerships to address areas of economic, technology, and informational vulnerabilities.”
- “Counter coercion and subversion.” This includes addressing those state and non-state actors who are “using corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxies, and the threat or use of military force to change facts on the ground.”
- “Foster a competitive mindset.”

### Integrated Campaign Planning

[https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint\\_concept\\_integrated\\_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257)

March 2018 saw the release of the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC), which is an initiative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address the multitude of challenges addressed in this IA Guide. While acknowledging the traditional military role of military forces to “prevail in armed conflict”, this concept states that the “Joint Force must also be ready to counter or defeat the efforts of hostile actors working to undermine our interests without triggering an overt conflict.” That imperative is essential to animating the various capabilities and capacities nested among of the three pillars of national security.

Even more relevant to the IA enterprise, is the declaration that the

heart of the concept is the fundamental insight that the Joint Force plays an essential role in securing and achieving national aims in conditions sometimes regarded as outside of the military sphere: competition below the threshold of armed conflict and the often lengthy consolidation of gains that inevitably follows war.

Emphasizing that the

Joint Force will not act alone ... The JCIC advocates better alignment of military and non-military activities. Accordingly, it was developed in coordination with the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and multinational and IA partners. The active participation of each of these stakeholders will be essential to the success of future campaigns.

### Department of Defense (DOD)

<https://www.defense.gov>

As the proponent of the Defense Pillar of the 3-Ds (defense, diplomacy, and development), the DOD provides its full range of capabilities and resources to the national security effort. As a major participant in the NSC and IA processes, it plays an important role in the workings of the USG IA community as it goes about its responsibilities to “provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared to win. Reinforcing America’s traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength.”

DOD further participates in a variety of IA clusters that perform specialized roles within its authorities to act. The activities of all DOD components are under specified organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence oversees the NSA, the NRO, and the NGA. The DOD components listed here obviously do not represent a comprehensive survey of DOD capabilities and resources. However, they do reflect major DOD components.

### Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict ASD(SO/LIC)

<https://policy.defense.gov/OUSSDP-Offices/ASD-for-Special-Operations-Low-Intensity-Conflict/>

The ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to special operations and low-intensity conflict. The ASD(SO/LIC) provides policy oversight for strategic capabilities, force transformation, and resources while supervising special operations and low-intensity conflict activities. Drawing on the requirements of SOF core activities, the ASD(SO/LIC) retains policy oversight responsibility for strategic capabilities, force transformation, and resources. Included is capability development involving general-purpose forces, space and information capabilities, nuclear and conventional strike capabilities, and missile defense. The ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for counter-narcotics and global threats; partnership strategy and stability operations; and special operations and combating terrorism.

### Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

<https://www.darpa.mil>

DARPA was established as part of DOD to conduct advanced research and manage development programs. DARPA's mission is to "prevent strategic surprise to the U.S. and to create strategic surprises for our enemies by maintaining the technological superiority of the U.S. military." SOF are beneficiaries of various initiatives that are nested within some 250 research and development programs under the direction of nearly 100 program managers. Through the years, DARPA has continuously refocused its work in direct response to, or in anticipation of, national security threats and revolutionary technology opportunities. SOF technology development also engages directly with private sector components of the U.S. technology and industry base to ensure the most capable equipment and technology in the most timely and cost-effective manner.

Most recently, DARPA's strategic initiatives have included detection, precision ID, tracking, and destruction of elusive targets; urban area operations; advanced manned and unmanned systems; detection, characterization and assessment of underground structures; robust, secure, self-forming networks; space; increasing the tooth-to-tail ratio; bio-revolution; and core

technology. DARPA pushes technology transitions and seeks solutions to technological challenges.

Among many others, specific efforts focus on investing in research and technologies that enable strategic advantage of technological surprise; developing technologies and systems that facilitate game changing TTPs that address the entire spectrum of armed conflict; conducting irregular operations in difficult politico-military circumstances; countering asymmetric threats; maintaining superiority on the conventional global battlefield (force protection, force projection, anti-access, logistics); detecting, preventing, and negating WMD; and creating and maintaining situation awareness.

### Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

<https://www.dsca.mil>

Working under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, the DSCA seeks to "advance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by building the capacity of foreign security forces to respond to shared challenges." DSCA is responsible for directing and managing security cooperation programs and resources in support of national security objectives. Security cooperation activities are intended to build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests; build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access. An important subset of security cooperation is security assistance, which represents a collection of programs to deliver weapons systems and other defense items as well as various services to friendly governments to promote defense burden sharing and regional stability. Examples of security assistance initiatives include foreign military sales, foreign military financing grants or loans, and international military education and training.

DSCA Directorates and organizations include (<https://dsca.mil/about-us/org-chart>):

- Building Partner Capacity (BPC) Directorate
- Integrated Regional Teams (IRT)
- Directorate of Security Assistance
- Directorate of Strategy (STR)

- Security Cooperation Workforce Development Directorate (WDD)
- Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS)
- Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)
- Regional Centers
  - George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
  - Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
  - William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
  - Africa Center for Strategic Studies
  - Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies

#### United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC)

<https://www.army.mil/info/organization/usasac/>

Known as the “Army’s Face to the World” because it serves as the primary entry point for U.S. Army material and service-related foreign military sales requirements, USASAC is responsible for managing security and assistance programs for the Army. It serves as a critical tool in assisting countries develop security capabilities that ensure self-sufficiency and resilience in the face of a variety of threats to include terrorism. USASAC efforts focus on assisting allies to build defensive skills, deter aggression, achieve regional stability and promote democratic values. Security Assistance is supervised and directed by the DOS in coordination with the White House, Congress, and Department of the Treasury. Strategic goals of security assistance include achieving regional security, deterring aggression, maintaining alliances, enhancing coalition partners, and affirming democratic values. Military assistance programs are conducted by DOD. Since August 2015, USASAC has been home to the Ministry of Interior-Military Assistance Group as part of its expanding global mission. USASAC currently manages some 5,000 foreign military sales programs with a total value of more than \$160.7 billion. In doing so, USASAC serves 140 partners, allied countries, and multinational organizations.

#### Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC)

A TSOC exists in each of the theater unified commands to carry out special operations missions specific to the theater to which they are assigned. They are able to establish the necessary command and control structures to conduct special operations within their areas of responsibility that employ Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine SOF capabilities. All TSOCs are under the combatant command (COCOM) Of the Commander, USSOCOM and operational control (OPCON) of their respective regional Unified Commands. TSOCs also interact with conventional forces and IA, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to extend the reach of the strategic effects inherent in SOF activities. TSOCs ensure strategic capabilities are fully employed and SOF are fully synchronized with conventional and JIIM operations when necessary.

The seven TSOCs are:

1. Special Operations Command Africa
2. Special Operations Command Central
3. Special Operations Command Europe
4. Special Operations Command Korea
5. Special Operations Command North
6. Special Operations Command Pacific
7. Special Operations Command South

#### United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)

[https://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber\\_Command](https://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command)

The asymmetrical threats to global connectivity and human security continue to increase and diversify. To respond to the dynamics of the cyber security threat and the changing nature of warfare, President Donald Trump, on 18 August 2017, elevated the USCYBERCOM from a sub-unified command to a Unified Combatant Command that is now responsible for cyberspace operations. Its mission is to “direct, synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace planning and operations to defend and advance national interests in collaboration with domestic and international partners.” CYBERCOM concerns itself with three major areas of focus: defending the DOD information network; providing support to combatant commanders for execution of their missions around the world; and strengthening the country’s ability to withstand and respond to cyberattacks. It works with IA and international partners to

pursue these mission requirements. With the elevation of USCYBERCOM came the establishment of the Integrated Cyber Center/Joint Operations Center (ICC/JOC). USCYBERCOM Component Commands include:

- Army Cyber Command
  - <https://www.arcyber.army.mil/Pages/ArcyberHome.aspx>
- Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet
  - <https://www.public.navy.mil/fcc-c10f/Pages/home.aspx>
- Air Forces Cyber/Twenty-Fourth Air Force
  - <https://www.afcyber.af.mil>
- Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command

### Interagency Defense Efforts Against Cyber Threats

Cyber threats range from the home computer, protected by some form of anti-virus program, through public and private sector networks, to the heart of the national security system. Exchanges of information between intelligence agents in dark alleys in Cold War Europe long ago are now replaced by menacing hackers who attack computers and computer systems in all environments from anywhere in the world. They use worms, viruses, malware, and other techniques to penetrate those systems and threaten individuals, governments, businesses and corporations by stealing identities, proprietary information, military and intelligence data, financial data, and passwords to access bank accounts, and other instruments of wealth. Essentially, cyber threats target all functional components of the DIME-FIL structure of national security tools. Once only science fiction, these threats have now become daily realities. Sometimes the objective is to achieve kinetic effects through cyberattacks designed to destroy everything that is on a hard drive or server. No one is immune. Yet each person, business, and organization, public and private, is affected differently. Recalling the central theme of this guide, no single organization—public or private sector—can successfully defeat cyber threats alone.

Thus, cyber threats to the USG IA infrastructure provide an illustrative case study of the evolution of an issue-specific IA response. As every organization is threatened, each one seeks to protect itself by creating

mechanisms that can defeat even the cleverest hacker's intrusion attempt. In addition to everyone in the USG attempting to protect their own systems, each relies on cyberspace to do business. For example, the IC relies on cyberspace for the gathering and sharing of information, intelligence, and counterintelligence; DOD is concerned with specific National Security Threats emerging from cyberspace; DOS is concerned with safeguarding the sensitive information of diplomacy; law enforcement agencies like the FBI, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and others and regulatory agencies in the Department of the Treasury, DOC, DOE, and elsewhere maintain significant presences in cyberspace that bring with them vulnerabilities to mischievous and deliberate targeting.

While not strictly a threat, a mastery of information and influence technology, often rooted in the social media capabilities of cyber space, is important to those involved with public diplomacy, public affairs and psychological operations initiatives. Theirs is the business of narrative development and perception shaping, both quite vulnerable to the instantaneous movement of text, photos and video images through text messaging, Twitter, and the seemingly endless appearance of even newer cyber-communication techniques.

Once again, no one is immune. Many IA structures have developed and adapted to address traditional threats to national security. While IA efforts to confront cyber threats are not as advanced as many of the others, components have emerged that are addressing cyber threats in their various manifestations.

As always, policy and strategic guidance has, over time, come from the National Security Staff and the NSC. In January 2008, President George W. Bush established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) through NSPD 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 23. The CNCI was made up of multiple initiatives focusing on various cyber security challenges. Its strategic goals were to:

1. Establish a front line of defense against today's immediate threats
2. Defend against the full spectrum of threats
3. Strengthen the future cybersecurity environment

Subsequently, President Barack Obama built upon the CNCI. In December 2009, he appointed a new White House Cyber Security Coordinator along with the Cybersecurity Office in the National Security Staff. Close coordination is maintained between this office, the Federal Chief Information Office, Federal Chief Technology Officer, and the National Economic Council.

The general strategic goals established by the NSS at the time were to:

1. Improve our resilience to cyber attacks
2. Reduce the cyber threat

Specific steps to achieve these goals included “hardening our digital infrastructure to be more resistant to penetration and disruption; improving our ability to defend against sophisticated and agile cyber threats; and recovering quickly from cyber incidents—whether caused by malicious activity, accident, or natural disaster.”

The review identified 10 specific actions that should take place. Some of these are:

1. Designate a privacy and civil liberties official to the NSC Cybersecurity Directorate
2. Conduct IA-cleared legal analyses of priority cybersecurity issues
3. Initiate a national awareness and education campaign to promote cybersecurity
4. Prepare a cybersecurity incident response plan and initiate a dialogue to enhance public-private partnerships

One of those recommendations, for the promulgation of an International Strategy for Cyberspace, was completed and signed by President Obama in May 2011. With initial policy and strategic guidance in place and evolving, various USG IA programs, various structures and partners have emerged over time to address cybersecurity:

- Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
- White House National Security Coordinator
- National Security Council Cyber Security Directorate
- Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force

- Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (S/CCI) (DOS)
- United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)
- Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) (DHS)
- FBI Cybercrime (computer intrusions, internet fraud, identity theft)
- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Cyber Crimes Center
  - Cyber Crimes Section (money laundering, financial fraud, narcotics & human trafficking)
  - Computer Forensics Section
  - Cyber Administration Section
- Electronic Crimes Task Force—London (DHS) (2 in Europe) (prevent, detect, and investigate electronic crimes to include terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and financial payment systems)
- Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) (DOC)
- Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and similar investigative/law enforcement agencies
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
- National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)
- Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) (DOS)
- Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX)
- National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) <https://csrc.nist.gov/nice/>

Once again, the list above is by no means comprehensive. However, it does identify the emerging structures and some of the IA partners working against cyber threats to National Security. New and updated departmental and IA programs have also been initiated in the years since to address the increasing cyber threat environment.

### United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM)

<https://www.africom.mil>

To reduce the frequently ad-hoc nature of the USG IA process, DOD has partnered with other USG components to form USAFRICOM. It is an example of the kinds of innovation that can emerge from IA and relationship-based engagement. Established in 2007,

USAFRICOM was the first organization of its kind to institutionalize the IA structure necessary for the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in a very complex region of the world. Prior to the establishment of USAFRICOM, no fewer than three U.S. military headquarters were responsible for building relationships with countries that make up the African continent. The USG IA process was made more complex as other USG departments, agencies, and organizations pursuing diplomatic, economic, and informational national security objectives simultaneously throughout the continent.

USAFRICOM continues to travel its unique path of incorporating DOS, USAID, Treasury, DOC, USCG, and other USG components into the staff and leadership structure of the command. This step has resulted in far greater partnership inclusion than the traditional USG IA process could ever achieve.

AFRICOM features two deputy commanders. One represents the traditional Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO). That officer is complemented by a senior U.S. diplomat who serves as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Engagement. The Ambassador serving in that latter capacity directs planning and programming for health, humanitarian assistance and demining actions, disaster response, security sector reform, strategic communications, and others related functions. Based on background and experience, the Ambassador is also well suited to ensure that USAFRICOM activities are in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives, a check traditionally made through the USG IA process. Staffing throughout USAFRICOM supports the efforts of the Ambassador and provides immediate interface and coordination with the more traditional military staff structure. For instance, more than 30 representatives from more than 10 federal agencies are positioned throughout the command. Interagency integration is facilitated through

## Diplomacy: The Second Pillar

As noted earlier, the recognition of civilian power as a national security concept marks an important advancement in the problem-solving and operational skills of the USG IA community. Expanding upon the earlier discussion of the DOS and USAID

AFRICOM's J-9, Office of Interagency Coordination and AFRICOM's Interagency Board.

Working together, USAFRICOM engagement enables our African partners to create a security environment that promotes stability, improved governance, and continued development. The language expressing this intent is consistent with the concepts of civilian power and the 3Ds put forward in the 2010 and 2015 QDDRs, along with other policies and strategies discussed earlier, and animated by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), USAID, and other agencies.

More specifically, AFRICOM maintains partnerships with the European Union (EU), Africa Union (AU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UN. Also, with regional economic communities such as the East African Community; Economic Community of Central African States; Economic Community of West African States; and the Southern African Development Community. USG IA partners include the DEA, DHS, DOS, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), FBI, USAID, U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Geological Survey.

Thus, AFRICOM functions as a strong case study in IIIM engagement across a significant portion of the world's surface and a wide variety of challenges along the competition continuum.

Additional DOD Organizations and Initiatives

**Defense Security Service**

<https://www.dss.mil>

**Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) & USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD**

<https://www.dtra.mil>

**Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)**

<https://www.RDT&E>

**Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P])**

<https://policy.defense.gov>

Joint Strategic Plan, FY 2018-2022, the following outlines some of the specific responsibilities assigned to both the DOS and USAID and captures the cooperation and collaboration woven into the relationships between the two.

- DOS
  - Leads and unites the free world around American values to uphold liberty
  - Strengthens U.S. allies and alliances
  - Counters threats and adversaries
  - Creates enduring advantages at home by opening markets abroad
  - Helps developing nations establish investment and export opportunities for American businesses
  - Preserves peace through international cooperation on global security challenges such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, human trafficking, and the spread of pandemics (including HIV), humanitarian crises, and narcotics trafficking
- USAID
  - Provides humanitarian assistance with relief that is timely and effective in response to disasters and complex crises
  - Promotes global health through activities that save lives and protect Americans at home and abroad
  - Supports global stability—work that advances democracy and good governance, and helps to promote sustainable development, economic growth, and peace
  - Catalyzes innovation and partnership by identifying new and innovative ways to engage with the private sector
  - Empowers women and girls and protecting life through support for women’s equal access to opportunities and implementation of the “Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance” policy

An essential tool in implementing the Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018-2022 is the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). Adapted to individual countries, the ICS emerges from the strategic planning process as a four-year strategy led by the individual Chiefs of Mission. Each ICS establishes a common set of Mission Goals and Objectives for operating within each country and provides a shared roadmap for the way ahead. A look at the ICS process and at some specific strategies are available at <https://www.state.gov/f/strategies/ics/index.htm>.

The emphasis on civilian power brought about by the 2010 QDDR, the 2010 PPD-6, the Joint Strategic Plan 2014 the 2015 QDDR., the Joint Strategic Plan 2018-2020, and subsequent guidance has had a significant impact on SOF activities. The highlights provided here are for the purpose of demonstrating the upward trend in the development of strategic thinking and planning capabilities within the IA process. The evolutionary strategic path, outlined by those documents, played no role in the first edition of this guide in 2009. Yet a little more than a decade later, the increasing roles and missions for civilian power now engage a wider range of IA resources in greater numbers and with the necessary skill sets to achieve more significant effects across a range of greater strategic challenges. Civilian power, as seen in diplomacy and development, can now be applied to address issues of grievance and instability that tend to nurture conditions ripe for terrorist, criminal, insurgent activities, and exploitation by state threats from Russia, China, and Iran who seek to sow political, economic, security, and criminal disruption.

They are also likely to render any operational environment a far more crowded place in which to operate.


#### **Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs**

<https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/>

The Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs “serves as the day-to-day manager of overall regional and bilateral policy issues.” The office asserts influence through six regional bureaus:

1. Bureau of African Affairs
2. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
3. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
4. Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
5. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
6. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

U.S. Embassies around the world report to and through these six bureaus to senior leadership within the State Department. Please note that the six regional bureaus approximately align with the DOD’s Geographic Combatant Commands. However, there are notable exceptions “on the seams” in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia that require careful coordination between DOS Regional Bureau and DOD Geographic



Original map created by DOD Updater Private and modified by Joint Special Operations University to depict Department of State Regional Bureau boundaries. Wikimedia Commons/CC BY-SA 4.0, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:GCCMAP\\_2019.png](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:GCCMAP_2019.png).

Combatant Commands. Later in this guide, you will discover that the USAID is now similarly aligned by region.

These alignments are important because each of the Three Pillars of National Security is now structured through Geographic Combatant Commands (DOD) or Regional Bureaus (Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and USAID). These parallel structures help facilitate relationship building, regional focus, formation of Common Operating Pictures, and Unity of Effort.

Additionally, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs hosts the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. This bureau develops and implements U.S. policy at the United Nations and for various other multilateral international organizations. It operates from diplomatic missions in Geneva, Montreal, Nairobi, New York, Rome, and Vienna.

### Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)

<https://www.state.gov/t/pm>

The PM serves as the DOS principal link to the DOD. PM's mission "integrates diplomacy and defense, and

forges strong international partnerships to meet shared security challenges." It performs critical IA functions by providing policy guidance on international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade. The Office of State-Defense Integration (PM/SDI), as described below, is of particular importance to the synchronization of the defense, diplomacy, and development pillars of national security. The DOS-DOD relationship, facilitated through PM, orchestrates the concept of smart power in the following ways:

- provides the Secretary of State with a global perspective on political-military issues;
- supports formulation of regional security policy and conducts bilateral political-military dialogues;
- promotes regional stability by building partnership capacity and strengthening friends and allies through security assistance programs;
- regulates U.S. arms transfers and defense trade;
- provides diplomatic support to the DOD for basing, military exercises, and overseas operations;

- contributes to defense and political-military policy and planning;
- reduces threats from conventional weapons through humanitarian demining and small arms destruction programs.

PM works through various offices to achieve the highest levels of DOS-DOD effectiveness and efficiencies.

1. Office of Congressional and Public Affairs (PM/CPA). The PM/CPA is responsible for ensuring effective communication and interaction between the Assistant Secretary and the staff of PM and the Congress, foreign and domestic media, and the general public. CPA is responsible for managing the PM Bureau's Congressional affairs, public affairs, and public diplomacy functions.
2. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). The DDTC is concerned with controlling the export and temporary import of defense articles and defense services covered by the U.S. Munitions List (USML). The USG regard the sale, export, and re-transfer of defense articles and defense services as an integral part of safeguarding U.S. national security and furthering U.S. foreign policy objectives.
3. Office of Global Programs and Initiatives (PM/GPI). GPI merges strategic approaches with programmatic support to promote international cooperation on a variety of global security issues. It works through three divisions:
  - The Peace Operations Capacity-Building Division
  - The Operations and Initiatives Division
  - The Security Forces Capacity Building Division
4. Office of Security Assistance (PM/SA). SA has three core functions: Managing DOS Title 22 military grant assistance to include directing more than \$6 billion annually to allies and friends; managing concurrence/coordination on various DOD Title 10 authorities including joint planning; and participating in, and coordinating DOS input into DOD planning efforts.
5. Office of Security Negotiations and Agreements (PM/SNA). Its mission is to strengthen the nation's security partnerships throughout the world by coordinating, negotiating and concluding international agreements to meet U.S. security requirements. PM/SNA takes the lead in negotiating status of forces agreements (SOFA), defense cooperation agreements (DCA), cost-sharing special measures agreements (SMA), and facilities access agreements, transit and overflight arrangements. Taken together, these and other agreements make possible the deployment and movement of U.S. forces and materiel overseas and provide legal protections for U.S. service members operating overseas.
6. Office of State-Defense Integration (PM/SDI). PM/SDI facilitates collaboration and cooperation between the DOS and DOD through a variety of programs and functions. These include the Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD) and Military Advisor (MILAD) programs; DOD visits to DOS for military education, pre-deployment briefings and senior leader engagements; DOD requests for DOS participation in military exercise and other initiatives. POLADs advise U.S. military combatant and component commanders, as well as the leadership in OSD, the Joint Staff, and throughout the DOD enterprise.
7. Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers (PM/RSAT). This office advances U.S. foreign policy and national security interests by its management of bilateral/multi-lateral political-military and regional security relations and the sale/transfer of U.S.-origin defense articles and services to foreign governments. It serves as the entry point for bilateral and regional political-military questions from the USG IA partners and foreign governments.
8. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA). This office works to deliver programs and services aimed at reducing the

harmful effects of at-risk, illicitly proliferated, and indiscriminately used conventional weapons of war. It addresses the risks presented by stockpiles of excess, poorly-secured or otherwise at-risk conventional weapons of war. The office pursues three objectives: enhance regional security by destroying and securing small arms and light weapons, including man-portable air defense systems, at risk of proliferation to terrorists, insurgents, and other violent non-state actors; remediate explosive hazards contamination by returning land to safe and productive use; and to promote U.S. foreign policy interests by broadening international support for conventional weapons destruction efforts.

### Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (PD)

<https://www.state.gov/r>

While influence is generated through any of the DIME-FIL elements of national power, Information-based influence plays a unique role in the employment of each of those elements. Information provides much of the context for understanding the environment in which all elements of national power function. The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs leads the comprehensive USG information and communications IA efforts targeted at audiences both at home and internationally. The QDDR (2010) designated public diplomacy as a core diplomatic mission, thus reflecting the importance of information-based influence for U.S. national security and foreign policy. The Under Secretary oversees the following bureaus and offices:

- Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). The ECA prepares and conducts educational, professional, and cultural exchange and other programs that create and sustain mutual understanding with other countries. They are designed to cultivate people-to-people ties among current and future global leaders and to build enduring networks and personal relationships that lead to the promotion of U.S. national security and values. Traditional professional, cultural, and

academic exchanges and visits continue to have strong success. Innovation and modern technology now assist in expanding audience reach and impact through virtual exchanges, alumni engagement, cultural heritage protection and preservation and rapid-response techniques to achieve U.S. foreign policy priorities. ECA enables the U.S. public diplomacy community to reach diverse audiences around the world in ways that are familiar and effective.

- Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP). The IIP advances U.S. foreign policy goals directly with foreign audiences in support of U.S. embassies, consulates, and missions abroad. In doing so, it supports people-to-people conversations with foreign publics. IIP employs multimedia and digital platforms that are appropriate to specific locales and regions. It has created some 700 spaces in more than 150 countries in which visitors and connect and learn about the United States.
- Bureau of Public Affairs (PA). It is the responsibility of PA to engage the news media, both domestic and international, in a sustained relationship to provide information about U.S. foreign policy and national security interests and to provide a broad understanding of American values. PA employs a full range of technology platforms to communicate information and messages. Some of these efforts include:
  - Strategic and tactical communication planning;
  - News conferences for domestic and foreign news media;
  - Conducting media outreach;
  - Managing the DOS website;
  - Using social media and other technologies to engage various publics;
  - Overseeing the DOS's six international Regional Media Hubs;
  - Answering public questions about foreign policy issues; and
  - Arranging town hall meetings and scheduling speakers to various groups across America.
- Global Engagement Center (GEC). The GEC is responsible for leading the USG's efforts to

counter propaganda and disinformation from international terrorist organizations and foreign countries. Working with the private sector, it relies on data science, modern advertising technologies and techniques, and top talent to achieve its goals. The GEC plays an important CVE role in executing the USG's strategy to defeat terrorist organizations and disrupt their abilities to spread ideology and recruit new members. The work of the GEC focuses on:

- Science & Technology
- Interagency Engagement (among others, DOD, IC, USAID, and the U.S. Agency for Global Media [USAGM])
- Global Partner Engagement
- Content Production. Among other tasks is to “inject factual content” into the information space to CVE

These bureaus work together and with the broader IA influence infrastructure to build strong relationships between the people and government of the United States and the citizens of the rest of the world. The primary mission of American public diplomacy is to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics.

Some of the specific tasks in this effort include communications with international audiences, cultural programming, academic grants, educational exchanges, and international visitor programs. The 2010 QDDR established five strategic objectives for the influence responsibilities carried out by the Under Secretary:

1. Shape the narrative
2. Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships
3. Counter violent extremism
4. Better inform policymaking
5. Deploy resources in line with current priorities

### **Information, Influence, Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Credibility & Social Media**

One of the challenges of the 21st Century operational environment has been the persistent requirement to

conduct continuous, full-spectrum information and influence-based operations in support of both direct and indirect national security activities. Traditional distinctions among public affairs (focusing on news media), military information support operations, and psychological operations (focusing on indigenous populations) have given way to the reality that anyone with a smart-phone (and there are billions of such devices) is transformed into a “reporter” or opinion leader with the capability to communicate immediate personal observations supported by instantaneous photographs and video of events. Unfortunately, it is too often the case that efforts to address the complexities of the information and influence environment are distracted by debates over definitional terms and operational responsibilities.

As mentioned earlier, the importance of operating successfully in contemporary information and influence environments was made clear in the 2010 QDDR when public diplomacy was declared to be a “core diplomatic mission.” The then-serving Under Secretary of State, Ms. Tara Sonenshine, described her job in a speech on 28 June 2012 as “working at the intersection of communications and international policy.” This description speaks to the need to have public diplomacy initiatives, supported by the wider USG IA influence establishment, align with U.S. strategic national security and foreign policy objectives.

As expressed in an earlier National Strategy for Counterterrorism, “in some cases we may convey our ideas and messages through person-to-person engagement, other times through the power of social media, and in every case through the message of our deeds.” Thus, it is essential that the gap between what we say and what we are doing (the so-called say-do gap) is kept as narrow as possible. Influence concepts such as community diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and development diplomacy offer fresh approaches on how to establish relationships with indigenous and partner populations while providing links between information and influence campaigns and the effects brought about by the three pillars of defense, diplomacy and development.

Stories with a precise beginning, middle, and end, have yielded to detailed narratives that can reach back centuries for their resonance. Frequently, to our

collective frustration, our adversaries have demonstrated an incredibly sophisticated understanding of information and influence dynamics.

Any discussion of the IA process must include the global information and ideas environment in which all national security operations take place. For example, successive National Strategies for Counterterrorism have acknowledged an information environment “which often involves unique challenges requiring specialized CT approaches.” After all, every player present—adversaries, affected populations, IGOs, NGOs, etc.—has its own perspective, perceptions, and narratives to explain what they are experiencing and what they are doing. It has become more difficult than ever to speak with one voice, but no less important to do so. Even as the special operations warrior is interacting within the USG IA enterprise and with officials from the HNs, PNs, IGOs, and NGOs, there are evaluators present in the form of the local, national, and international news media. There are also those countless numbers of citizen journalists empowered by their mobile and smart phones who are able to assert their own influence by presenting interpretations framed by street-level grievances. No situation is immune from the critic with a perspective, grievance, or agenda.

Regardless of the measurements of success defined by the USG IA process or accepted by other participants, modern journalists—to include those who inhabit the realm of social media—tend to define their own standards and to judge performance through their own filters. Expectations rarely align precisely, making the management of expectations an on-going challenge.

Thus, it should not be surprising to discover that a persistent gap exists between what the USG IA community and its international partners know to be happening and what the various domestic and international publics believe is going on. News and social media scrutiny introduce an important variable into the IA navigation process that cannot be controlled or ignored.

The achievement and sustainment of credibility in the national security effort are essential. Since it is clearly not possible for the special operations warrior to speak personally with each citizen of the HN, U.S., or other countries, communicating credibly through the news media, social media, and other stakeholders is a task essential to establishing the legitimacy of any

national security initiative. An awareness and understanding of information and its implications remain an important influence product.

The information, communication, and influence challenge is to keep as narrow as possible that gap between what is being reported by the news media or discussed by various influential opinion leaders and what is happening within the AO. Accuracy and candor by both the communicator and the news media are essential requirements. This is because support—especially from the indigenous population—is essential to the successful accomplishment of CT and other national security operations. If the narrative developed by the news and social media persists in inaccuracies or negativity, either because of the flow of events or individual bias, public support will surely wane.

It has long been understood that the explanation and communication support of foreign policy and military activities is best achieved by consistency of message. To achieve this goal, the Country Team is supported by the work of the Public Affairs Officer who is then backed up by the DOS Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the wider USG strategic communication community.

All USG Public Affairs programs are part of a collective IA effort that seeks to provide accurate information to the news and social media while providing context and meaning through carefully crafted and coordinated strategic messaging. Looking back, The National Framework for Strategic Communication, signed by President Obama and submitted to the U.S. Congress under the provisions of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, acknowledged that there is a “need to clarify what strategic communication means and how we guide and coordinate our communication efforts.” Interestingly, in December 2012, DOD announced that it was dropping the term “strategic communication,” but not the effort to develop the most credible and effective communication initiatives. However, the term, “strategic communication”, continues to be used in other areas of the USG Interagency influence structure and internationally by NATO (supported by the Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence), the UN, and others. Thus, it would be wise not to become distracted from

the need for effective messaging simply because of discomfort with a definition.

Given the uncertainty over the precise meaning of strategic communication, the National Framework for Strategic Communication described the process as the “synchronization of our words and deeds as well as deliberate efforts to communicate and engage with intended audiences.” This attempt at a definition is particularly useful for the special operations warrior as it reminds all players that the say-do gap must also be kept as narrow as possible to prevent the loss of credibility in the eyes of the HN population, government, regional audiences, PNs, IGOs, NGOs and other stakeholders in the international security effort.

More precisely, the negative consequences of even the best-intentioned efforts cannot be explained away by denials of responsibility, clever marketing slogans, or other persuasive techniques. Above all, it is necessary to be aware of what is being said about the efforts of the USG, HN, PNs, IGOs, and NGOs within an AO. An awareness of what is being said does not imply acceptance of the content or the credibility of the sources; but it does allow for the development and implementation of appropriate influence initiatives that affirm, challenge, or ignore that content depending on the circumstances.

Unity of effort for the USG influence effort originates within the White House. Deliberate communication and engagement efforts are worked through various relevant components of the National Security Staff. Within the wider USG IA community, the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs serves as the central coordination hub for IA public diplomacy efforts. That individual works with functional and regional bureaus within the DOS to coordinate and create integration among policy, communication, and engagement objectives.

A variety of organizations and programs within DOS, DOD, and other USG agencies play critical roles within the IA process to ensure the most credible and influential public diplomacy and strategic communication effects. Some of these include the following:

- The Global Engagement Center (GEC). The GEC has become a major tool for IA engagement as it hosts representatives from throughout the USG

IA enterprise to include DOD, the IC, USAID, and other organizations included on this list, especially the U.S. Agency for Global Media.

- The DOS Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, which provides long-term strategic planning and performance measurements <https://www.state.gov/r/ppr/>
- Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP)
- Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)
- Bureau of Public Affairs
- Public Affairs Officers on Country Teams
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
- Bureau of Consular Affairs (DOS)
- U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), formerly the Broadcasting Board of Governors

The distribution of shared strategic messages and public affairs guidance assists all USG departments, agencies, and organizations to breed consistency into their unilateral and collective information programs. The ultimate goal is to sustain a single-voiced relationship with the news and social media and with other relevant national and international audiences. Communication resilience, being able to stand up to challenges to IA credibility, is also an essential task.

It is a difficult challenge, one made even more so by the introduction of scores—perhaps hundreds or thousands—of HN, PN, IGO, and NGO voices and agendas that are competing for exposure in any given AO. Consider first the number of narratives that exist within the DOD and then multiply that number unknowable times to account for all the other engaged partners. It is important to remember that each partner serves a variety of stakeholders who provide both active and passive support. The interest of each stakeholder must be accounted for within the many disparate media relations and strategic communication programs that are in play.

The information and influence environment is made even more complex by the presence of sophisticated competitor and terrorist propaganda initiatives that, as a minimum, skew the truth while frequently attracting sympathetic news and social media coverage. As a result, extremists have become quite skillful

in shaping narratives in ways to animate grievances and attract new recruits. Thus, the difficult challenge of synchronizing all the information agendas within the USG IA process is just a first step toward establishing and sustaining a credible agenda internationally where both friendly voices and enemy propaganda compete for finite airtime, column inches, and public attention through social media and other platforms.

Experience teaches that pursuing complete strategic message control in such an environment is usually a waste of time. Some participants such as the HN, PNs, and some IGOs may be willing to coordinate some messages to improve their effectiveness. However, those other players must also serve constituencies that are not relevant to the USG agenda and who must be addressed separately to meet the communication and influence goals of other participants.

IGOs and NGOs frequently present special challenges as many operate sophisticated Web sites and frequently issue their own reports on their own progress and that of others within the AO. Those within the USG who are used to the comfort of speaking with one voice are often shaken by what those assessments claim and the degree of instant credibility they are often afforded by the national and international news media. Especially if they appear to contradict official USG positions.

When such reports are not supportive of U.S. and partner security operations within the AO, or are inconsistent with ongoing USG strategic messaging, they are frequently cited by the news media as evidence of policy failure by the USG and its various partners.

During the summer of 2004, a dispute between Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières—MSF) and the coalition operating within Afghanistan temporarily caused the NGO to withdraw its representatives from the country. The squabble focused on what the NGO felt was an unacceptable threat to its personnel because of the similarities in appearance between vehicles they were using and those driven by the coalition. MSF believed that the vehicles used by their representatives had become indistinguishable from the military's and thus placed them in increased and unacceptable danger.

A similar episode took place in the summer of 2008 when aid workers from Refugees International were

murdered by Taliban forces near Kabul, causing the NGO to leave the country.

In both cases, and others, the announcement of NGO withdrawals led to flurries of reports in which the news media, many reporting from far outside the country, amplified the circumstances and drew conclusions about the poor state of security in the country that may or may not have been accurate.

Considering these and other cases, those USG personnel involved with public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations should be attentive to the chorus of potentially conflicting voices present in the AO and prepare contingencies for addressing their impact on public perceptions.

But information and influence initiatives should also actively engage the environment, pursuing what an Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs once called the “Strategic Imperatives for 21st Century Public Diplomacy:”

1. Shape the narrative
2. Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships
3. Combat violent extremism
4. Ensure better-informed policy making
5. Deploy resources in-line with current priorities

### **Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB)**

<https://www.state.gov/e/eb>

Led by the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, EB reflects a shared awareness of the importance of the Economic Component of DIME-FIL as an influencer in foreign policy. The EB mission is to promote economic security, both domestically and internationally. It serves as a hub for USG IA economic policy seeking to promote national security by ensuring successful achievement of U.S. foreign economic policy goals. To this end, it also works with the EU, G-8, G-20, World Trade Organization (WTO), and other IGOs to engage the international community on issues of common interest.

The EB coordinates within the USG IA community with the Department of the Treasury and international partners such as the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, EU, and Persian Gulf States to deny terrorists access to

the international financial system. EB efforts are spread across seven areas of interest: Commercial & Business Affairs (EB/CBA); Economic Policy Analysis & Public Diplomacy (EB/EPPD); Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions (EB/TRS); International Communications and Information Policy; International Finance and Development; Trade Policy and Programs; and Transportation Affairs. EB also plays a significant role in public diplomacy as it works through its network of relationships to advance American economic interests in the name of shared growth. One of its key relationships is with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

### Foreign Service Institute (FSI)

<https://www.state.gov/m/fsi>

The FSI is the primary training base for the USG's Foreign Service officers and support personnel as they prepare themselves to advance U.S. foreign affairs interests overseas and in Washington, D.C. The FSI program of instruction contains more than 800 courses (including training in some 70 foreign languages) available to the Foreign Service community, IA departments, agencies and organizations, and the military services. The George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center supports an enrollment of some 225,000 enrollees annually from the DOS, more than 40 other USG agencies, and the military services. Courses range from a half-day to 2 years and focus on developing cultural, leadership, and management skills within the U.S. foreign affairs community and their families. The FSI serves as an important forum for gathering lessons learned and imparting them to its enrollees. It is organized into five schools like a university to include The School of Language Studies, The School of Applied Information Technology, The School of Leadership and Management, The School of Professional and Area Studies, and the Transition Center.

### U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN)

<https://www.usun.state.gov>

Established in 1947 under the provisions of the United Nations Participation Act, the U.S. Mission to the UN represents the U.S. at all meetings of the UN as part of a comprehensive effort to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives. It further engages the UN Secretariat and the member nations in consultations and negotiations to gain support for U.S. positions and initiatives. The mission staff consists of some 150 people who manage issues involving political, economic and social, legal, military, public diplomacy, and management issues at the UN. The U.S. delegation provides a continuous flow of information to DOS and U.S. embassies throughout the world and develops recommendations on how to proceed on issues before the UN. Of particular interest is the U.S. Mission's Military Staff Committee (MSC) (<https://usun.state.gov/about/6631>). It serves as the representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the UN Military Staff Committee, which includes military representatives of the Permanent Five (P5) members of the UN Security Council. Additionally, the MSC advises the U.S. Permanent Representative and staff on military and security aspects of UN peace-keeping operations.



A female Syrian pastry shop co-owner prepares a local pastry called mana'eesh at her shop recently opened with the support of USAID | June 2019. Photo by USAID

## Development: The Third Pillar

### Interagency Development and Stabilization Efforts

It may well be that the clearest synergy among the three pillars of national security and foreign policy is in the development venue. Security (defense) is necessary for development to take place; diplomacy serves as an enabler for defense and development to occur; and development creates the sustainable HN stability and resilience that, ideally, lead to disengagement for the United States and self-reliance for the HN and the surrounding region.

#### U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

<https://www.usaid.gov>

The USAID plays critical roles both strategically and operationally in the USG IA process. The agency's history reaches back to the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Post-World War II Europe. USAID is an independent USG agency, operating under the policy direction of the Secretary of State. Its purposes are to advance U.S. foreign policy interests into expanding democratic and free market environments while simultaneously seeking to improve the lives of people living in the developing world. The 2010 QDDR set as one of its strategic goals "rebuilding USAID as the preeminent global redevelopment institution." During



Syrians celebrate as electricity returns to over 200,000 residents of Raqqa through a project funded by USAID's Syria Essential Services program and completed in cooperation with the Raqqa Civil Council's Energy Committee on 23 April 2019. Photo by USAID

the years since, USAID has moved successfully to fulfill that need and achieve that goal.

USAID provides assistance in different forms to improve security and to mitigate grievances that can lead, in particular to the instability that results in political violence, insurgencies and terrorism. Among their Lines of Effort are:

- Agriculture and food security
- Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
- Economic growth and trade
- Education
- Environment and global climate change
- Gender equality and women's empowerment
- Global health
- Transformation at USAID
- Water and sanitation
- Working in crises and conflict U.S. Global Development Lab

As noted elsewhere, the QDDR's emphasis on the three pillars of national security and foreign policy resulted in the assertion that "development stands alongside diplomacy as the twin pillar of America's civilian power." USAID's mission statement highlights its role in leading the "U.S. Government's international development and disaster assistance through partnerships and investments that save lives, reduce poverty, strengthen democratic governance, and help people emerge from humanitarian crises and progress beyond assistance." USAID's objective is to "support partners to become self-reliant and capable of leading their own development journeys." Achieving that goal means "reducing the reach of conflict, preventing the spread of pandemic disease, and counteracting the drivers of violence, instability, transnational crime, and other security threats." Other priorities include:

1. "Promote American prosperity through investments that expand markets for U.S. exports; create a level playing field for U.S. businesses; and support more stable, resilient, and democratic societies."

2. “Stand with people when disaster strikes or crisis emerges as the world leader in humanitarian assistance.”

Consequently, USAID serves as an active member of the U.S. Embassy Country Team (frequently called the Mission Director) and remains a highly visible presence throughout any AO.

To facilitate its work with DOD resources, USAID has, over the years, developed specific policy guidance for cooperation with the DOD. Its stated goal is to establish the basics of USAID-DOD interaction in the areas of joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication. Included among the specific principles are:

- The recognition that USAID and DOD each lead a pillar in the defense-diplomacy-development national security framework, along with DOS. USAID is the lead agency for development.
- USAID also acknowledges DOD’s priorities or defending the homeland, building security globally by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression, and remaining prepared to win decisively against any adversary should deterrence fail.
- Cooperation with DOD falls into three areas: communication, coordination, and collaboration.
- USAID can and has served as a bridge between DOD and NGOs in an AO.
- Cooperation with DOD begins with policy and strategy development.
- Cooperation in each phase of the planning process underpins effective USID-DOD Cooperation.

Drawing upon the strategic guidance contained in the ICS, USAID prepares and implements specific development strategies under its Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). These specific strategies provide adaptive approaches to the development challenges contained in specific AOs. They can be viewed at <https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/planning/country-strategies-cdcs>.

Along with other initiatives, such as the creation of the CSO, USAID works with a large number of IA partners within DOS and from other USG organizations, HN structures, IGOs, and NGOs. Additionally, USAID maintains relationships with thousands of U.S. private

companies, and hundreds of U.S. based private voluntary organizations. USAID maintains five Functional Bureaus: Bureau for Resilience and Food Security; Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment; Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance; Bureau for Global Health; and the U.S. Global Development Lab. The five Geographic Bureaus, and the Field Offices that report to them, are aligned in ways that, while not exact, closely resemble the DOD’s Geographic Combatant Commands:

- a. Bureau for Africa (USAFRICOM)
- b. Bureau for Asia (USINDOPACOM)
- c. Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (USEUCOM)
- d. Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (USSOUTHCOM)
- e. Bureau for the Middle East (USCENTCOM)

There is also the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs that performs activities consistent with those carried out by the broader geographic bureaus. USAID also maintains four Headquarters Bureaus to provide leadership, guidance, and support to the USAID enterprise. These include the Bureau for Foreign Assistance; Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs; Bureau for Management; and Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning.

Once again, the reenergized focus on the role of USAID is part of the emphasis on the importance and utility of civilian power throughout the diplomacy and development pillars of national security and foreign policy as outlined in the 2010 and 2015 QDDRs and the DOS-USAID Joint Strategic Plan for FY 2018-2022

Consistent with the emphasis on the three pillars of National Security, a 2018 joint report by the DOS, USAID, and the DOD sought to assess recent stabilization lessons and to chart a way forward. Titled *A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas* (<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/06/283334.htm>), it begins:

“Increasing stability and reducing violence in conflict-affected areas are essential to realize America’s national security goals and advance a world in which nations can embrace their sovereignty and citizens can realize their full potential ... Protracted conflicts provide fertile ground for violent extremists and criminals



Larry Bartlett, Senior Advisor for the Syrian Transition Assistance Response Team, and Ambassador William V. Roebuck, discuss with members of the Civil Administration of Manbij the safety and stability of the city on the two-year anniversary of their liberation from ISIS in Manbij, Syria, on 9 August 2018. Photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant Iza-bella Sullivan

to expand their influence and threaten U.S. interests. These conflicts cause mass displacements and divert international resources that might otherwise be spent fostering economic growth and trade.” [Foreword from Secretary of State, USAID Administrator, and Secretary of Defense]

The review was led by the State Department’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F) and the CSO; the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI); Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM); Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning (PPL) in the USAID; and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (SHA); and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI).

Other engaged organizations included the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Bureau of Near-Eastern Affairs; Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to the Counter-ISIS Coalition; the USAID Bureau of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs; Bureau of Middle Eastern Affairs; Office of Civil-Military Cooperation; USSOCOM; and the Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

International inputs were provided by Australia, the European Union, Germany, the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Bank, United Kingdom, and the UN.

The inclusion of this extensive list of diverse players is motivated by the need to demonstrate the wide variety of partnerships that find themselves with a role to play in this study of the challenges of stabilization. The full report is available at the internet web link included above. A listing of several of its lessons learned and visions for future initiatives is helpful in understanding the increasingly JIIM nature of international security engagement expressed through the IA community and with various other international and domestic partners:

From the report, some of the key “Lessons for Effective Stabilization” include:

- Set realistic, analytically backed political goals.
- Establish a division of labor and burden-sharing among international donors and local actors that optimizes the strengths of each.
- Forward deploy USG and partnered civilians and establish local mechanisms that enable continuous engagement, negotiation, targeted assistance, and monitoring.
- Start with small, short-term assistance projects and scale up cautiously.
- Reinforce pockets of citizen security and purposefully engage with security actors.

- Seek unity of purpose across all lines of effort.
- Employ strategic patience and plan beyond stabilization for self-reliance.

Having absorbed these and other lessons learned, the report shifts focus into the future by outlining a “Framework for U.S. Stabilization” efforts. Some of these include:

- Establish strategic engagement criteria and priorities to guide stabilization.
- Define department and agency roles and responsibilities for stabilization to improve performance.
- Build the capacity of a U.S. expeditionary civilian workforce to meet stabilization objectives and establish policies to allow for co-deployment.
- Promote conflict-sensitive approaches to justice and security sector assistance.
- Institutionalize learning, evaluation, and accountability in our approach.

Of particular interest in the framework is the concept of the Stabilization, Transition, and Response Teams (START) that are intended to support Chiefs of Mission and Combatant Commands in their efforts to “coordinate, plan, and implement a U.S. Government stabilization response in conflict areas.” The predecessor concept to the START was the Civilian Response Corp (CRC) that was discussed in detail in earlier editions of this IA Guide. The START is a refinement of the earlier concept that is based on lessons learned and an understanding of the shortcomings identified. The immediate intent is to establish a “much smaller and dedicated set of stabilization specialists who can rapidly deploy and have the support systems to do so.” Some specific elements seek to “streamline roles and procedures; establish and enduring human resources, training, and operational support platform; provide expanded authorities to deploy civilians with and alongside DOD operational and tactical elements; and, when necessary, recruit and deploy further qualified surge personnel.”

The value of the START and its predecessor concepts lies in its ability to place a full range of necessary IA expertise, resources, and experience on the ground where needed to affect conditions that lead to grievances, unrest, terrorism, insurgencies, and general

instability. A complete national security effort must address issues of stabilization within post-conflict environments and under-governed and ungoverned spaces. START is yet another evolutionary tool to address those challenges.

Various initiatives, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), sought to establish an environment that is secure and stable enough for the operation of international and Afghan civilian agencies to provide development support. Beyond reliance on options such as PRTs to drive stability and development programs, USAID sees its mission as going beyond stabilizing environments to deliver services in less secure or under-secure areas of Afghanistan and elsewhere. Obviously, much of this effort takes place in coordination with military forces, notably SOF. More specifically, USAID information materials speak about USAID—SOF “shared space coordination” that focuses on the following concerns:

- a. Counterinsurgency and Stabilization—Clear, Hold, Build Continuum
- b. Counter—Extremism
- c. Illicit Power Structures
- d. Conflict Prevention and Mitigation
- e. Development and Civil Affairs
- f. Disaster Prevention and Management

Other shared-space operations have included:

- a. Afghanistan—Village Stability Operations
- b. Pakistan—Civil Affairs and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in Semi & Non-Permissive Areas
- c. Maghreb through the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism (TSCTP) Efforts
- d. Haiti—Earthquake Relief.

As discussed in chapter 1, the USAID has taken on the role of proponent for the development pillar of national security and foreign policy. However, as with all IA initiatives, USAID is joined by the CSO and a wide variety of other partners from within DOS, DOD, DOC, DOE, USDA, and other USG IA resources who all work together to reduce instability and other conditions in failing and post-conflict states that could contribute to the development and sustainment of violent

extremism, terrorists and their networks, violent crime, trafficking, and various human catastrophes.

The development pillar is tasked to develop initiatives that create, sustain and synchronize an expeditionary, innovative, and IA civilian capability for the USG to provide the skill sets and resources for post-conflict situations and to stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition. The Nine Principles of Development are:

1. Ownership (host-nation and indigenous population investment in the effort)
2. Capacity building
3. Sustainability
4. Selectivity
5. Assessment
6. Results (measures of effectiveness)
7. Partnership (USG IA elements; PNs; HN resources; IGOs, NGOs, private sector)
8. Flexibility
9. Accountability

As noted earlier, Former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton emphasized what she called the employment of smart power ... leveraging the various diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, cultural expertise, and other resources that reside throughout the USG to meet the foreign policy and national security goals of the United States.

Because of the roles and responsibilities civilian power plays in delivering smart power, it is almost inevitable that SOF will encounter and perhaps assist members of the development IA and its efforts within a variety of AOs. For instance, the withdrawal of military forces from Iraq was matched by an expansion of USG civilian capacity within the country.

Under an earlier IA system, the organizations below, among others, were engaged in stabilization and reconstruction initiatives. As the soft, indirect, or civilian power model has taken shape and matured over the years, it is safe to assume that many, if not all, of these will continue to play critical roles:

- a. DOS
- b. USAID
- c. DOD (various Security Force Assistance & Security Cooperation Initiatives)

- d. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
- e. DOJ
- f. Joint Chiefs of Staff
- g. Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SOLIC&IC)
- h. U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
- i. DOJ—International Criminal Investigative Training Program-ICITAP
- j. DOS—International Narcotics and Law Enforcement’s Civilian Police Programs
- k. DOS—Office of the Director General, Diplomatic Readiness Initiative
- l. DOS—Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration
- m. DOS—Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
- n. DOS—Foreign Services Institute
- o. CIA
- p. USAID—Office of Democracy and Governance
- q. USAID—Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
- r. USAID—Office of Transition Initiatives
- s. Department of the Treasury
- t. Food Agricultural Service (FAS)—U.S. Department of Agriculture
- u. Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action
- v. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations

Organizations on the ground such as PRTs and village support operations (VSO) platforms have played important roles as IA initiatives on the ground in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in other forms elsewhere. While the names of such organizations will inevitably change over time and location, the basic principles of face-to-face needs assessments, gathering of necessary resources, and coordinated work with indigenous populations and partners from the USG IA structure, allied and PNs, HN organizations, IGOs, and NGOs will continue to evolve and play decisive roles in building stability and confronting CT and CbT challenges.

IA cooperation among the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the DOS Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and the DOS Policy Planning (S/P) has resulted in a watch list of countries who are particularly

vulnerable to failure or have begun to demonstrate troubling weakness and inability to function.

Central to the USAID/CSO/IA efforts is the coordinated, strategic application of resources to address conditions within those various watch list countries. What has emerged is what has been characterized as the first strategic doctrine ever produced for civilians engaged in peace building missions.

The coordination of the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and the U.S. Army has resulted in a “Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction” (fig. 3) that establishes guiding principles for stabilization and reconstruction. These serve as a “practical roadmap to peace.” (USIP description of the initiative).

The application of these principles enables the defense, diplomatic, and development (3-D) capabilities and resources of the USG to act in support of individuals and institutions who seek peaceful resolution to conflict and restore conditions in post-conflict states. Figure 3 identifies the desired end states, which are expanded further in the complete document entitled “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction” ([https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guiding\\_principles\\_full.pdf](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guiding_principles_full.pdf)) from which the chart is extracted. This understanding of the need for measures of effectiveness is an important component for ensuring the effectiveness of IA cooperation.

One indication of a growing awareness of the need to enable the coordination and collaboration among the DOD, DOS, and USAID is the creation of the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), established by Congress in December 2011. The idea is to create a funding source, administered and funded jointly by the DOS and DOD, which allows for the efficient employment of defense, diplomatic, and development initiatives in response to rapidly developing security threats or opportunities. The vision is that “pooled DOD and DOS funds would be used to develop IA responses to build the security capacity of foreign states, prevent conflict, and stabilize countries

in conflict or emerging from conflict.” (extracted from Global Security Contingency Fund [GSCF]: Summary and Issue Overview, Congressional Research Service [CRS], 1 August 2012). The goal is to cut the request, justification, approval, and execution timeline to achieve as much immediacy of action as possible.

According to the Congressional Research Service Report, “the GSCF provides resources for training and other support to enable foreign military and security forces to conduct security and counterterrorism operations and participate in coalition operations, as well as for justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization programs.” While funds originate from both DOS and DOD budgets, the GSCF is placed within the DOS budget with the Secretary of State in the lead for execution. The GSCF has emerged as a responsive funding mechanism to address persistent shortcomings in harmonizing defense, diplomacy and development efforts. As identified by the CRS report, these are:

- a. Provide the State Department with a flexible funding account to respond to emerging needs and crises
- b. Develop mechanisms to promote greater IA cooperation in planning security and stabilization programs



Members of Mosul Dam Task Force along with VIP guests pose for a photo at the Mosul Dam after the Change of Authority ceremony in Mosul, Iraq, on 15 June 2019. The Change of Authority ceremony hands authority of operations from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to the Iraq Ministry of Water Resources. Photo by U.S. Army Reserve Specialist Deandre Pierce




Figure 3. Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction)

- c. Clarify and rationalize security roles and missions
- d. Create a 'unified' budget system for national security missions along functional rather than agency lines

Updated information emphasizes the assistance provided by the GSCF to countries facing major security challenges to improve capabilities to include conducting border and maritime security, internal defense, and counterterrorism. The GSCF has participated in 14 projects such as the East Africa Peacekeeping; Ukraine Institutional Transformation; Philippines Maritime Domain Awareness and Law Enforcement; and Lake Chad Basin Border Security.

### Coordination of Humanitarian Efforts Within the AO

Because so many HN, IGO, NGO, and military organizations, and resources can be operating simultaneously

in any given AO, coordination and establishment of objectives and unity of effort are always challenging. USAID has the mission lead, to the extent possible within a sovereign nation, for coordinating humanitarian assistance efforts on behalf of the USG.

NGOs have traditionally seen independent action as their best path to security and success. The perception of neutrality therefore is essential to the NGOs. Consequently, it is often counterproductive to enlist NGO assistance in providing military forces with their assessments of local needs and the security situation on the ground. Information exchange is not a task NGOs typically assign themselves.

Working through a coordination mechanism such as that which USAID provides is the most workable approach. If nothing else, the consequences of alienating the NGO community are unacceptably high. Tension and distrust also distract from essential mission tasks.

Part of this reluctance to cooperate is for security reasons. Once NGOs are compromised and linked to unpopular governments or unwanted international assistance, they can become targets. Their effectiveness is also diminished as the local population could become less likely to approach them for assistance for fear of reprisals.

For a variety of reasons, recent years have seen some shift in the attitude of many NGOs, resulting in a greater synchronization of efforts. Increasingly the flexible, situationally aware, highly skilled NGO staffs on the ground are doing much of the actual work of humanitarian response in coordination with HN authorities, IGOs, other NGOs, and international military forces.

Various mechanisms for coordinating collective humanitarian responses to wars and natural disasters have evolved. Given the diversity of the participants and the complexity of the operational environments, coordination measures predictably operate under different names, but frequently perform very similar functions.

Thus, the careful establishment and management of IA coordination hubs are essential to minimizing the duplication of effort and limiting the risks of excluding those wishing to participate.

### **Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)**

<https://www.state.gov/j/cso/>

Another consequence of an empowered USAID is the elevation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to the CSO. This step is, in part, to achieve the QDDR goal of “embracing conflict prevention and response within fragile states as a core civilian mission.” The CSO mission is to “anticipate, prevent, and respond to conflict that undermines U.S. national interests.” It accomplishes this mission through two complementary ways: data-driven analysis and the forward deployment of stabilization advisors to conflict zones. The objective of these efforts is to inform U.S. strategy, policy, and programs on conflict prevention and stabilization.

CSO focuses on three primary lines of effort: political instability; security sector stabilization; and countering violent extremism. It collaborates with USAID regional and functional bureaus and with IA partners

to include the DOD. Stabilization advisors are assigned to geographic combatant commanders (GCC) requiring specialized expertise.

1. **Political Instability.** CSO seeks to forecast future zones of instability by mapping country conditions, analyzing local dynamics, and assessing risks/threats. It employs the Instability Monitoring Assessment Platform (iMAP), which collects, visualizes, and analyzes data on political instability and conflict trends around the world. CSO also builds local partner relationships and support their efforts to develop and implement stabilization programs. Specific examples of CSO engagement include peace-process negotiations, mitigating election violence, sanctions assessments, and policy decisions.
2. **Security Sector Stabilization.** The proliferation of militia groups and the breakdown of national armies persists as a major destabilizing factor in failed and failing states. CSO helps stabilize such environments by identifying, mapping, and analyzing militia influence, and supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. These activities assist in developing policies on detention, prosecution, and rehabilitation.
3. **Countering Violent Extremism.** CVE efforts are focused on reducing the effectiveness of recruitment and radicalization programs designed attract violent extremists in vulnerable counties and regions. CSO works closely with the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism to provide research, analysis, monitoring, and evaluation of such programs. CSO assists in identifying at-risk individuals, vulnerable communities, and CVE influencers.

Most generally, CSO seeks to break cycles of violent conflict and mitigate crises in all forms. The bureau assists in conflict prevention and to support post-conflict nations with recovery. Specific tasks include conflict prevention; crisis response and stabilization;

and addressing the underlying grievances and other causes of instability and violence.

CSO engages partners from the Stabilization Leaders Forum; The Council on Stabilization; and the Resolve Network and its work in research the drivers of violent extremism and sources of community resilience. It also seeks collaboration with appropriate organizations throughout the defense, diplomatic, and development pillars of national security. Its engagement with DOD includes integrating people, ideas, and products into military staffs, plans, and operations. CSO personnel have deployed with military forces and have served with them overseas. They also regularly participate in military exercises and share analysis and information with their DOD partners.

CSO activities are likely to bring them into contact with SOF who often share the area of operations and who are involved with missions that can benefit from CSO resources and analysis.

## Chapter 4. Overseas Interagency Structures

It is understandable for the special operations warrior overseas to feel somewhat isolated and detached from USG activities back in Washington, D.C. However, it is helpful to recall that the departments, agencies, organizations, programs, and agendas that are active in the USG IA process back home—and discussed in this guide—are likely to be represented somewhere in the AO and must be accounted for. Each of these takes direction from and reports to the U.S. ambassador in country.

Consequently, the distance between the USG IA process in Washington, D.C. and the AO is not as great as it first appears. For instance, it is also important to remember that the DOS serves as the lead USG department for combating terrorism overseas (chapter 6), which brings a significant portion of the IA process immediately into play. CT is not a DOD activity alone. Responsibility for the USG role in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere centers principally on the ambassador and the country team.

Because of their core activities, expertise, resources, and experience, SOF have a particular interest in maintaining strong relationships with the country team and the agencies represented there. As with military organizations, country teams are tailored to the conditions present in a particular country and to the foreign policy objectives pursued. It is essential to remember that SOF interaction with the country team is not limited alone to DOD representatives within the embassy.

### The Country Team

Led by the U.S. ambassador, also referred to as the chief of mission (COM), the country team serves as the multi-functional face of the USG IA process overseas. The country team is made up of USG representatives who are placed on the ground to ensure the successful delivery of the programs administered by their parent departments, agencies, and organizations. Figure 4

outlines a typical Country Team Organization. Thus, it is through Country Team cooperation, coordination, and collaboration that the various elements of national power (DIME-FIL) are brought to bear on specific challenges to include defense, diplomatic and development initiatives focused on national security objectives within any given country.



Figure 4. Typical Country Team Organization

As already noted, under each COM's discretionary authority, the organization of country teams varies to suit the COM's approach, the various U.S. programs in a specific country, and the particular senior officers

of the represented agencies who are present. The 2010 QDDR and subsequent documents go so far as to describe ambassadors as the “Chief Executive Officers of IA missions.” Unlike many other IA functional groupings, it is in the structure and roles of the country team that we can find specific leadership identified. The country team is one IA organization that moves beyond reliance on lead agencies to specified, designated leadership through the COM.

The various members of the country team bring to the mission their own respective organizational cultures, procedures, expectations, situation awareness, expertise, resources, and levels of experience. In a sense, each represents its own agency tribe. Thus, there exists a strong tendency toward stove-piping efforts, with individual country team members frequently remaining within their tribal comfort zones by exchanging information with and responding to directions from their leadership back in the U.S.

Ideally, the COM will be successful in breaking down the stovepipes and in flattening the IA workflow to bring about greater lateral coordination and collaboration among participating departments, agencies, and organizations. After all, those representatives operate within the same U.S. embassy, sit around the same country team table, and are assumed to be focused on the same established strategic goals.

The work of U.S. embassies around the world focuses on assisting U.S. citizens traveling and living abroad; interviewing foreign nationals who seek to travel to the U.S. for tourism, education, or business reasons; interacting with government officials in the host country, businesses, media, educational institutions, and non-governmental organizations; conducting analysis of the political and economic conditions within the HN and providing assessments on issues that affect U.S. national interests; assisting American businesses with establishing relationships and selling goods and services; and conducting a multi-faceted program of public diplomacy designed to foster awareness and understanding of the U.S. and its role in the world.

As the workflow adapts to the conditions within a specific country, it is also important to recall yet again that IA is a process and not a collection of fixed organizational charts with specific responsibilities that are

managed by a structured chain of command. As policy guidance, strategy, planning, and operational decisions move from the senior levels of the NSC through the layers of the USG IA process to the country team, there is a real danger of losing track of the goals, intentions, resources, measures of effectiveness, and sensitivity to adjustments that may become necessary to improve the effectiveness of the IA effort.

The COM must translate the IA policies, strategies, and plans into productive action on the ground. From a narrow and practical perspective, the country team can serve as a partner for the special operations warrior, assisting with access to those within the IA process who can provide assistance and support for SOF missions that contribute to the fulfillment of the country team’s strategic objectives.

### **U.S. Ambassador/Chief of Mission (COM)**

Contrary to some misperceptions, the COM is not simply the senior spokesperson for DOS interests as they compete with other country team agendas. In fact, the COM is the leader of the country team, which essentially serves as the cabinet for the COM. The COM’s authority is defined by the President, and the COM serves as the President’s personal representative.

Continuing a tradition begun by President John F. Kennedy in May 1961, each incoming COM receives a letter from the President defining the nature and parameters of his/her responsibilities. In making clear the authority under which every ambassador functions and the essential role of the USG IA process in embassy activities, President Kennedy and successive presidents have written, “You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other United States agencies which have programs or activities in [specific country].” These include orchestrating the efforts of more than 30 government agencies toward achieving a wide range of diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, financial, information and law enforcement objectives [DIME-FIL]. Once again, this assignment of personal responsibility is rather unique within IA structures and relationships.

The status of the COM was codified in Section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (PL 96-465):

“Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country—

1. shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander); and
2. shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country, and shall insure that all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission.”

The primacy of the COM’s authority does not mean that other members of the Country Team are prevented from maintaining relationships with their parent organizations. In fact, such contacts are useful for maintaining situation awareness, just as long as the COM, his deputy, and fellow country team members are kept updated.

As the President’s personal representative, the COM is responsible for providing clarity of purpose and for ensuring the implementation, management, and evaluation of foreign and security policies within the AO. Thus, the COM interacts on a continuous basis with members of the country team to facilitate mission activities, monitor and place in context on-going events within the host country, and animate proposals to achieve U.S. strategic objectives in the most effective and efficient manner.

### Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM)

The DCM is responsible for the management of embassy operations and works with the COM to guide the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals through the functioning of the country team. As with all deputy positions, the DCM acts in the absence of the principal and thus exercises the authority and responsibilities of the COM at those times. The DCM is also known as

the Chargé d’Affaires and serves as COM when there is no Ambassador.

Figure 5 portrays a notional operational IA environment. The specific structure and departments, agencies, and organizations, making up any specific country team will vary based on the country in question and the types of active U.S. programs underway. The country team block summarizes the complexity of the USG IA process. The participation of the others shown, many of whom could be inadvertently operating at cross purposes, renders the challenge even more difficult.

It is always a wise course of action for the special operations warrior entering an AO for the first time or returning after a period of absence to come to an early understanding about how things work and how they got to be that way. The answer may not always be satisfactory, but it is important to be aware so as not to seek changes that are unworkable, unwanted, or not needed in the first place.

### The Interagency Components within the Country Team

Executing the work output of the USG IA process takes place within the AO, closest to the immediate challenges and threats, and farthest away from the policy and decision makers who set the USG IA enterprise into motion. Any shortcomings in the USG IA process are present and often magnified. The special operations warrior should understand the makeup of the country team and recognize the critical areas of expertise that reside within each functional area. All are important, but some have a greater impact than others on the SOF mission.

#### Agricultural Attaché

<https://www.fas.usda.gov>

The Agricultural attaché is a Foreign Service officer from the DOA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Attachés operate from some 93 offices covering 171 countries. Agricultural attachés provide direct management of FAS programs within the country to distribute needed food supplies and provide technical assistance. They coordinate with USAID and other agencies in support of broader USG assistance and stability programs designed to improve living conditions for the local population. FAS also works through local agricultural experts who assist in problem identification, the




Figure 5. The Operational Interagency Environment

development of effective solutions, and the execution of programs designed to address those problems.

#### Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT)

The SDO/DATT is designated by the Secretary of Defense as the principal DOD official in the U.S. embassies. The DATT ensures unified DOD representation within U.S. embassies. The SDO/DATT is also the COM's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer (defense attaché) assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission, and the point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. All DOD elements assigned, attached to, or operating from U.S. embassies are aligned under the coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT except for the Marine Security Detachment, which is under control of the regional security officer (RSO). In most embassies

the defense attaché and Security Cooperation Offices remain as separate units with distinct duties and statutory authorities, but both report to the SDO/DATT.

#### Defense Attaché Office (DAO)

The in-country representation of each of the DOD service chiefs is carried out through the DAO by each of the service attachés. The DAO reports to the SDO/DATT, in some embassies, when appropriate, through a deputy for Defense Attaché Affairs. In some cases, the DAO also manages security assistance (SA) programs where no designated Security Cooperation Office is present within the embassy. The DAO is staffed through the Defense Attaché System (DAS) and under management of DIA. As the development of military capacity is a core SOF activity, this office provides a crucial link to the HN security sectors whose effectiveness will ultimately bring about the successful outcomes sought by the country team's strategic objectives.

### Drug Enforcement Attaché

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operates some 90 foreign offices in 69 countries. The drug enforcement attaché performs a variety of functions both to enable USG counterdrug operations and to build HN capacity through relationship building, training, and mentoring. The attaché serves as an IA point of contact for those assisting in counterdrug operations within the AO. Relationship building and cooperation with foreign law enforcement officials is a central component of the broad DEA mission. This effort involves developing sources of information, interviewing witnesses, and working undercover to address drug trafficking at its roots. Additionally, DEA also seeks justice for American citizens who have become victims of crimes directed at them by drug operatives.

### Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Attaché

The ICE, Office of International Affairs, stations ICE attachés in offices co-located with U.S. embassies and senior ICE representatives co-located at separate U.S. consulates. They are responsible for supporting domestic operations by coordinating investigations with foreign counterparts; disrupting criminal efforts to smuggle people and materials into the U.S.; and building international partnerships. The attachés work closely with the ICE HSI, the CBP and other investigative agencies to conduct complex inquiries into a variety of customs threats and other criminal behavior. Because of its multiple collaborative relationships, ICE acknowledges what it calls its “unique dual reporting structure”: to the HSI leadership and to the Ambassador. ICE attachés also conduct liaison with HN officials to provide training, assist with infrastructure building, and support regulatory and compliance functions within the AO. They also establish relationships with the HN Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their local law enforcement counterparts.

### Legal Attaché

Legal attachés are assigned by the FBI to oversee its various initiatives, to include CT programs, around the world. The specifics of the effort are contained in chapter 6, in the section on the USG counterterrorism components under FBI-counterterrorism.

### Narcotics Control Officer (NCO)

The narcotics control officer is an asset of the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs who is assigned to the U.S. embassy to serve as liaison to the HN and to carry out a number of tasks in support of U.S. counterdrug programs. Responsibilities include collecting information, strategic and operational planning, and training. The narcotics control officer assists in the development of the U.S. embassy counterdrug strategies and contingency plans targeting drug producers and traffickers. The NCO also seeks to harmonize USG and HN counterdrug priorities while assessing risks and evaluating progress. Specific areas of focus include combating crime and corruption; addressing illicit drug challenges; supporting rights and justice; and establishing and sustaining partnerships.

### NCOIC, U.S. Marine Corps Security Guard Detachment (MSG)

Working under the guidance and operational control of the RSO and in coordination with the Diplomatic Security Service, the MSG is responsible for providing for the security of embassy facilities and the protection of classified information. The Marines also support the protection of visiting dignitaries and assist the RSO in developing security plans for the external defense of embassy property. That external mission is often carried out by HN assets, reinforced by the MSG.

### Public Affairs Officer (PAO)

The Country Team’s PAO performs traditional responsibilities as spokesperson, coordinator of international education and visitor programs, and facilitator of information exchanges. The office is also responsible for coordinating public diplomacy initiatives so essential to presenting an accurate narrative of U.S. efforts within the country. The public diplomacy role causes the PAO to perform front-line duties in the effort to challenge and defeat the ideological foundations of terrorists and their networks.

### Regional Security Officer (RSO)

This officer is a representative of the Diplomatic Security Service and responsible for creating a secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and the protection of diplomatic personnel and facilities. The RSO serves as the personal advisor to the ambassador

on all security issues and coordinates the mission's security program. They coordinate security efforts with other Diplomatic security personnel, U.S. Marine Security Guards, local security guards, and local security investigators. Of special interest to the special operations warrior is the role of the regional security officer as the liaison between the Country Team and the host government law enforcement community. As an effective local, regional, and national police force is essential for effective governance, the development of a credible HN law enforcement capacity is a critical mission for the regional security officer and the Country Team.

### **Resident Legal Advisor (RLA)**

RLAs are assigned through the DOJ's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training. They focus primarily on creating stability in the HN by providing assistance to rule of law programs within HN justice institutions and law enforcement agencies. RLAs seek to build justice sector capacity to increase effectiveness in dealing with terrorism, organized crime, corruption, and other criminal activity. In addition to building relationships with the USG, RLAs also assist HNs to develop regional crime-fighting relationships and justice reform.

### **Security Cooperation Organization (SCO)**

The SCO is responsible for conducting the in-country management of security cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA) programs to the HN. The SCO reports to the SDO/DATT or, in some embassies, through the Deputy for Security Cooperation when appropriate. To accomplish this mission, the SCO maintains relationships with HN counterparts while coordinating with other members of the country team, the regional military commander, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DSCA, and the military departments. Programs include equipment transfers, a wide variety of in-country and U.S. training opportunities, and other defense-related resources and services under the terms of Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs). The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) manages the financial resources to support approved LOAs. The SCOs are tailored and named differently throughout the world. Many are referred to as Military Groups (MILGPs) and are tailored in structure and mission to

meet the requirements of the HN. Within U.S. policy constraints, the MILGP can conduct training, support the introduction of new equipment, mentor the reform of HN security sector institutions, and provide advisory support to HN security forces.

### **Treasury Attaché**

Depending on the country, the Treasury Department can field more than one attaché team. The first of these is the Treasury attaché, sometimes referred to as the financial attaché. These representatives are responsible for representing the department on issues within the traditional purview of Treasury. In some embassies, attaché offices are present from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC attachés are focused primarily on counter-narcotics issues and are responsible for managing OFAC sanctions within their areas of responsibility.

### **USAID Representative**

Chapter 3 discusses the broad range of responsibilities and programs that reside within USAID. The USAID Representative—often called the mission director—and staff on the ground are responsible for direct management and resourcing of a wide variety of activities in the areas of agricultural, health, education, economic, and institutional reform. USAID also assists in reinforcing the unity of effort by coordinating with and frequently overseeing the activities of some, but by no means all, NGOs in the AO. The USAID mission director is an important contact for implementing the tools designed to assist development efforts in providing stability, resilience, and a generally high quality of life for people in those countries in which they operate. As mentioned often in this guide, this function plays a major role in efforts aimed at building and sustaining stability within countries and regions.

SOF who are pursuing various core activities frequently require access to the IA representatives who serve on the country team. Predictably, such interactions will not be restricted to military personnel such as the DATT or defense attaché. They are likely to also involve IA relationship building with USAID, DEA, RLAs, and law enforcement representatives such as the FBI, HSI, and RSO. The increasing involvement of conventional forces in the security assistance mission also

mandates regular coordination with those organizations as they appear and conduct operations.

SOF can enter an AO under a variety of conditions and assistance needs. The most obvious, of course, is through the SDO/DATT assigned to the embassy who provides assistance. However, SOF may also be engaged in a specific HN to assist in building law enforcement capacity at the request of the various law enforcement representatives. Additionally, disasters or humanitarian assistance missions may cause the USAID representative to advocate for a SOF presence.

While the COM is personally responsible to the President for the successful functioning of the country team, he or she exercises no control over U.S. military personnel operating under the command of a GCC. To improve coordination, agreements have been negotiated, formalized, and put in place to define the relationship between the COM and the GCC and how both can work together to accomplish U.S. national security objectives.

Typically, the DOS, working through the COM, assists with the entry of U.S. military forces into the HN by negotiating the specific goals of the effort, terms of the military's presence, tasks to be accomplished, length of stay, and/or measures of success leading to a withdrawal.

Beyond that, it should be clear that unique SOF capabilities frequently result in greater direct coordination and interaction with the country team than by conventional military organizations.



## Chapter 5. Beyond the U.S. Government Interagency Community

**B**eyond the complexities of the USG IA process, experienced both in Washington, D.C. and within the country team, SOF must also account for and interact with representatives of the HN government and a mosaic of interorganizational structures such as PNs, IGOs, and NGOs. Predictably, each is traveling on its own agenda-driven path.

The USG IA process exists to coordinate the activities of disparate departments, agencies, and organizations with the goal of achieving assigned U.S. national security objectives. By contrast, there is no pretense or expectation that any similar mechanism exists on the ground overseas to bring about such effects once the SOF community steps outside the USG IA environment and the country team.

Obviously, representatives of the HNs, PNs, IGOs, and NGOs are not part of the USG IA process. However, their mere presence and activities within the operational environment inevitably have a major impact on the establishment and sustainment of the unity of effort required to meet both U.S. and partner security objectives. More than ever, knowing and understanding those working alongside you become at least as important as an awareness of active or potential competitors or adversaries.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the interorganizational environment in the form of HN, PN, IGO, and NGO activities to help the special operations warrior gain a general awareness of the other players present on the ground. It is not an exhaustive survey of the environment. In fact, the specific IGOs and NGOs introduced here reflect only a small slice of the total participants. However, they do represent many of the more familiar players and offer a glimpse into the characteristics that are often shared among interorganizational actors likely to be encountered by SOF.

SOF personnel soon learn that introductions around the table at the beginning of a meeting represent more than polite hospitality. They are essential to identify the various players and their organizations while beginning to understand their agendas, capabilities, and limitations. Each of these other players possesses skills, resources, and experiences relevant to the tasks at hand.

Again, however, it is necessary to remember that each organization applies its talents guided by what are often to us unfamiliar and seemingly inconsistent policies, strategies, plans, procedures, and organizational cultures. As with the USG IA components serving the USG country team, HN officials, PNs, IGOs, and NGOs likewise bring with them their own unique stove-pipe relationships and ways of getting things accomplished.

It is frequently the case that some decisions can be made by local organizational representatives operating at the tactical level, but more complex issues must be addressed in national capitals or in whatever country houses the headquarters of each IGO and NGO. Quite simply, many organizations operate either tactically or strategically, but do not field an operational level decision maker to provide immediate guidance to their personnel or to help deconflict disputes.

These dissimilarities are not disqualifiers; in fact, such differences are inevitable and, one could argue, helpful if properly understood and exploited. The immediate tasks become to identify who is on the ground, establish contact, identify goals and resources, and attempt to synchronize efforts to achieve the best-possible level of unity of effort.

Success in relationship building is largely personality dependent, based on the ability of those present and engaged to reach consensus on desired end states and to synchronize multi-functional and multilateral activities to achieve those end states.

Experience teaches that shared goals and objectives are not necessarily the same as a commonly accepted vision of a desired end state. Success will likely have many different definitions and metrics. In fact, sometimes the best one can hope for is a shared objective and an agreement to exchange information.

As with non-DOD USG departments, agencies, and organizations, no command relationships exist with the HNs, PNs, IGOs, and NGOs. Negotiation skills and the abilities to listen and adapt emerge as premium personal traits. Once established, the relationships will be inevitably softer and less direct than are familiar to the special operations warrior. Respectful coordination and, when possible, accommodation of HN, PN, IGO, and NGO agendas are most useful in achieving success. Alienation is never helpful.

As a practical matter, the combining of the USG IA process with the effective inclusion of international partners and other outside organizations limits friction, reduces duplication, and introduces efficiencies into the operational environment. The base reality remains that no one can do it all alone. Ideally those best suited to specific tasks are given the responsibility to manage those tasks.

Consistent with this principle, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, notes that “In COIN, it is always preferred for civilians to perform civilian tasks.” Though not always possible, this is a solid principle for guiding USG IA coordination, especially in an operational setting. The guidance becomes even more relevant when dealing with the HNs, PNs, IGOs, and NGOs.

Efficiencies are also gained by applying the right mix of skill sets and resources to a specific challenge. It is not always true that the introduction of more personnel and resources inevitably results in a better outcome. Regardless of the task at hand, ensuring quality work is generally more helpful than merely having more people performing the same tasks in the same ways as previously.

Ideally, cooperation among all the parties will result in a unity of effort through which USG, HN, PN, IGO, and NGO efforts emerge as more than a collage of random, uncoordinated acts. The inclusion of HN, PN, IGO, and NGO resources assists the common effort in working smarter in a specific direction (or on several paths heading in the same general direction) toward

the achievement of a desired end state. However, even a cursory reading of the agendas and goals of the various IGOs and NGOs reveals considerable overlap and redundancy. Thus, the harmonization of such efforts remains a persistent challenge, especially when there are literally hundreds or thousands of such organizations of varying size and impact who could be present in any given operational environment. Individually and collectively, they represent a stern challenge for the special operations warrior trying to make sense of it all.

Note that, with few exceptions, most of the IGOs and NGOs that SOF encounter are engaged in what is known as soft power that is designed to improve living conditions and quality of life as part of broader efforts to address grievances that lead to instability, unrest, terrorism, insurgency, and wider conflict. Thus, they can become valuable partners for the SOF enterprise.

It is important to remember that SOF operate with the whole of American culture as a backdrop. By that is meant the values, interests, behavior, perspectives, expectations, goals, and all of the various characteristics of culture that are included in any of the myriad of definitions of “culture”. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communist Eastern Europe some 30 years ago, discussions with both government officials, military leaders, and private citizens admitted to the importance of American culture in helping them to understand what it meant to be an American. In addition to movies, music, blue jeans, and other cultural elements, America’s prosperity and willingness to sacrifice and help others were influential in building relationships with other nation-states and with local officials and populations.

Working in tandem and efficiently harnessing the dynamics of IGOs and NGOs with similar values and goals can generate significant positive effects. There are many case studies available to review. For instance, the early development of the Afghan National Assembly in Kabul relied on programs managed by the UN, USAID and as many as seven or more individual countries. It would seem that so many different voices would create more confusion than progress. And, yes, there was some inevitable friction. However, the variety of perspectives provided a diverse set of options that allowed the responsible Afghan leadership to learn about,

understand, and then employ those elements that they thought best for their needs.

Influence by the U.S., other countries, IGOs and NGOs also resulted in dramatic changes to Afghan life economically and technologically. The widespread introduction of cell phones fit nicely into traditional Afghan society that is firmly based on personal human interaction. Mobile phones helpfully extended the reach of those relationships. As they often do, American private sector companies assisted in these efforts. The Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI) was then able to exploit the capabilities of mobile phones to send text messages in multiple languages encouraging the Afghan people to vote in national elections in 2004, 2005, and later. Also, when UN election workers were kidnapped during the 2004 Presidential Election Cycle, MOI text messages, sent out regularly in various languages, helped to recover the victims safely.

In March 2020, U.S. Army Europe, working under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Humanitarian Assistance Program, delivered medical supplies and equipment to support response measures dealing with the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Lombardy Region of Italy. These efforts were carried out in coordination with the U.S. Embassy Country Team, the Italian Government, and Lombardy regional authorities. This specific effort to deliver hospital beds, mattresses, stretchers, wheelchairs, linens and other supplies was part of the general response of Italian national authorities and efforts by various IGOs and NGOs.

The complex dynamics of national and organizational cultures—ours and others—are engaged on a continuous basis in a world continuing to adapt to the complexities of globalization. Inevitably, that process produces important consequences for the accomplishment of SOF tasks. Understanding the cultures, functioning, expectations, and roles of IGOs and NGOs is essential to reducing friction and building operational efficiency.

### Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

Intergovernmental Organizations are, as the name specifies, groupings of national governments under different interorganizational banners. They come together to address specific issues such as international security,

military cooperation, trade, human rights, movements of peoples, and other shared concerns. They generally set up some sort of management protocols that guide how the organizations are structured and how they carry out the work for which they have come together. Without endorsing any specific IGO, the DOS Office of Global Criminal Justice has listed on its web page a collection of IGOs and, later, NGOs that play major roles in conflict resolution, human rights, transitional justice, and international law. Each of these IGOs plays important roles in creating stable environments that address grievances, govern responsibility and build credibility in the eyes of the populations. In a narrow sense of interest to SOF, effective governance discourages disruptive instability to include the presence of terrorist organizations, helps to build resilience to mitigate the effects of terrorism and other forms of violence, and restores order after terrorist attacks and other forms of violence take place. Once again, the presence of specific organizations on the DOS website in no way constitutes endorsement of these IGOs. These include:

#### International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)

<https://www.interpol.int>

INTERPOL is a structured IGO with 194 members under the direction of a General Assembly, Executive Committee, General Secretariat, and National Central Bureaus. The General Secretariat is located in Lyon, France and maintains an around-the-clock operations center staffed by representatives from the member countries. INTERPOL views itself as a platform for cooperation and enables members to share and access data on crimes and criminals, offering a variety of technical and operational support. These include areas such as forensics, analysis, and assistance in locating fugitives. Members communicate across a secure communication network.

INTERPOL supports four official languages: Arabic, English, French, and Spanish. Each member country maintains a National Central Bureau, which serves as the point of contact for international police issues and the exchange of information. The U.S. National Central Bureau is located within the DOJ and is staffed jointly by representatives of numerous U.S. law enforcement agencies.

INTERPOL has identified terrorism, cybercrime, and organized crime as the most pressing criminal activities today. It also conducts research and development activities focused on criminal trends and visioning the future international criminal environment.

In 2005, INTERPOL and the UN issued the first INTERPOL–UN Security Council Special Notice regarding individuals and organizations suspected of maintaining associations with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups.

### Organization of American States (OAS)

<https://www.oas.org>

The OAS is the oldest regional organization, dating back to the First International Conference of American States, held in Washington, D.C., from October 1889 to April 1890. From that gathering emerged the International Union of American Republics. The OAS came into being in 1948 with the signing of the Charter of the OAS in Bogota, Colombia. The OAS has 35 member countries, including all of the independent states in the Western Hemisphere. It features four official languages: English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. The OAS has traditionally viewed its main pillars of effort as democracy, human rights, security, and development.

Major policies and goals are outlined during the meeting of the General Assembly, which gathers annually at the foreign minister level. Regular activities are overseen by the Permanent Council that functions through the ambassadors appointed by the individual member countries. The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security is tasked with coordinating OAS actions against terrorism, illegal drugs, arms trafficking, anti-personnel mines, organized crime, gangs involved with criminal activity, WMD proliferation, and other security threats. The Secretariat is also responsible for developing confidence-building measures and other initiatives to ensure hemispheric stability and security.

The OAS has granted Permanent Observer Status to 69 states and the EU.

### Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

<https://www.osce.org>

The OSCE consists of 57 countries from Europe, Central Asia, and North America. It also maintains relationships with Asian Partners for Cooperation

(Afghanistan, Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and Japan) and Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Israel, and Tunisia). The OSCE calls itself the “world’s largest regional security organization.” It came into existence as a result of the 1 August 1975 Helsinki “Final Act” to serve as a forum for east–west dialogue during the era of Détente between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. OSCE has field operations in Southeastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus Region, and Central Asia. The OSCE seeks to address the politico-military, economic-environmental, and human dimensions of conflict. It serves as a forum for political negotiations and decision making in areas of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Efforts include activities in arms control, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, minority group integration, democratization, policing strategies, economic-environmental initiatives, and CT.

### United Nations (UN)

<https://www.un.org/en>

Founded in 1945 at the end of World War II, the New York-based UN now consists of 193 countries. There are 30 organizations that make up the UN system and that work to address the peacekeeping, humanitarian, and other goals of the organization. The organization describes four purposes:

1. Keep peace throughout the world
2. Develop friendly relations among nations
3. Help nations work together to improve the lives of poor people, by conquering hunger, disease and illiteracy, and by encouraging respect for each other’s rights and freedoms
4. Serve as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve these goals

Specific issues of current interest include climate change; sustainable development, human rights, disarmament, terrorism, humanitarian and health emergencies, gender equality, governance, and food production.

For instance, as with many IGOs, the UN is active in the area of countering international terrorism. In 2006, the UN adopted the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which “sent a clear message that terrorism in all its forms is unacceptable.” The strategy consists

of four pillars: “These address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, and ensuring the respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.”

The UN is also involved with developing CT capacity within its member countries through the training of national criminal justice officials and the development of technology to assist in the effort. These approaches rely heavily on the effective application of the rule of law. In July 2005, the UN Secretary General established a Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force to coordinate CT efforts throughout the UN System. Chief among the initiatives is an online system for the exchange of CT information. The UN also plays a role in blocking terrorist funding networks through its coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

#### UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

<https://www.ohchr.org>

The OHCHR is the lead UN organization on human rights. It plays a central role in safeguarding the integrity of the three interconnected pillars of the UN: peace and security; human rights; and development. It provides technical expertise and capacity-development support to governments, which are primarily responsible for the protection of human rights, to fulfill their obligations. Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, with offices in New York City and elsewhere. It features three divisions:

1. Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures, and Right to Development Division (TESPRDD)
2. Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division (CTMD)
3. Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division (FOTCD)

It collaborates across a wide range of organizations to include governments, parliaments, judicial authorities, police and prison officials, national human rights institutions, NGOs, and other civil society structures.

- UN Office on the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/>
- The Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect is, in reality, a single office supporting two separate special advisers who report directly to the UN Secretary-General. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide is responsible for raising awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, to warn when there is risk of genocide, and to alert and mobilize for appropriate actions to be taken. The Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect leads the conceptual, political, institutional and operational development of the “Responsibility to Protect” initiative. The two special advisers are centralized in a joint office to maximize efficiency and resources. They share responsibilities for early warning, assessment, convening, learning, and advocacy on issues within their individual mandates. In their roles, they serve as key figures in preventing genocide, building resilience to the contributing causes of genocide, and mitigating the consequences of genocide.
- The IGOs that follow are included because of their direct relevance many of their direct relevance to various SOF core activities and because they are representative of the kinds of IGOs SOF are likely to encounter. Note the similarity of goals and activities among these IGOs, regardless of geographical region or thematic focus. Also realize that these international organizations, by their very nature, frequently provide venues for competition among members as they seek to establish influence over specific IGO agendas.

#### African Union (AU)

<https://www.au.int/>

The AU was established on 9 July 2002, by bringing together the separate countries of the continent. It is the successor organization to the Organization of African Unity. Current membership stands at 55 countries. It has developed several governing institutions to include the Pan African Parliament and the African Court on

Human and Peoples' Rights. Its main administrative capital is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Among the AU goals are to bring about political, social, and economic integration; develop common African positions on issues; achieve peace and security; and promote good governance through reform of governmental institutions and the respect for human rights. The population of the African Union now stands at more than one billion people.

The AU has established partnership relationships with organizations regionally and beyond. Some of these include:

- Africa-Arab Partnership
- Africa-South America (ASA) Summit
- Africa-India
- Africa-Turkey
- China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC)
- Africa-United States
- Tokyo International Conference on African Development (FICAD)
- Africa-Australia

### Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

<https://www.asean.org>

ASEAN is a regional IGO and is particularly important to U.S. interests as it represents a vast region with long-standing relationships with American government and commercial activities. It was established, on 8 August 1967, in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN or Bangkok Declaration. The five founding members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar [Burma], and Cambodia joined later. Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste hold observer status. The ASEAN region covers some 1.7 million square miles and is home to more than 650 million people. ASEAN represents a collective effort to promote economic growth, social progress, and cultural development.

In 2003, ASEAN identified three pillars to assist in achieving its goals: The ASEAN security community, the ASEAN economic community, and the ASEAN socio-cultural community. 1994 saw the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that includes the ASEAN countries plus others with an interest in the

region. These include the U.S. and the Russian Federation. ARF's goals are to promote confidence building, establish preventive diplomacy protocols, and develop conflict resolution strategies.

### European Union (EU)

<https://europa.eu>

As with ASEAN, the EU is a region of particular importance to the U.S. It consists of 28 European countries forming a political and economic partnership. More than 500 million people live within the borders of the EU, an area in excess of 1.7 million square miles. Three of its major bodies are the European Parliament (representing the people of Europe), the Council of European Union (representing the governments of Europe), and the European Commission (representing the shared interests of the EU). Among other issues, the EU is involved with free trade, borderless internal travel, a common currency, and joint action on crime and terrorism.

A major emphasis focuses on securing the external borders of the EU while allowing free trade and open travel. This arrangement is known as the Schengen Area and is intended to facilitate the free movement of EU citizens and of others who are in the EU legally. The EU makes use of an extensive shared database that enables police forces and judicial officials to exchange information and track suspected criminals and terrorists. The European Police (EUROPOL) is housed in The Hague, Netherlands, and maintains extensive intelligence information on criminals and terrorists. EUROPOL is staffed by representatives from national law enforcement agencies (e.g., police, customs, and immigration services). They monitor issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, financial crimes, and radioactive/nuclear trafficking.

Once again, the EU plays a prominent role in addressing the threats posed by international instability and the violence and terrorism that emerge from such conditions. In recent years, countries of the EU have had considerable direct experience with the consequences of local instability that migrates elsewhere. The European Union Counterterrorism Strategy features the following four components:

1. Prevent people from turning to terrorism and stop future generations of terrorists from emerging.
2. Protect citizens and critical infrastructure by reducing vulnerabilities against attack.
3. Pursue and investigate terrorists, impede planning, travel and communications, cut off access to funding and materials, and bring terrorists to justice.
4. Respond in a coordinated way by preparing for the management and minimization of the consequences of a terrorist attack, improving capacities to deal with the aftermath, and taking into account the needs of victims.

### Global Coalition Against Daesh

<https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/>

A newer and rather unique member of the community of IGOs is the Global Coalition Against Daesh. Founded in September 2014, it came into existence to address the myriad of national security and humanitarian challenges posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). ISIS is also known as Daesh, the Arabic acronym for the same organization. Its goal is to degrade and defeat Daesh along multiple Lines of Effort. It consists of 79 countries from around the world who are united in this common effort to dismantle Daesh networks and counter its global ambitions. More specifically, it is focused on Daesh's financing and economic infrastructure; preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters across borders; supporting local and regional stabilization; restoring public services; and countering the group's propaganda. It represents, within a single IGO, the balance of kinetic and non-kinetic efforts to defeat a transcendent international threat.

### International Monetary Fund (IMF)

<https://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>

The IMF is based in Washington, D.C. and is the host to 189 member countries. It was created in July 1944 as countries sought a framework that would avoid the recurrence of the economic conditions that led to the Great Depression of the 1930s and its severe, long-term consequences. It is a specialized agency of the UN with its own charter, governing structure and finances. The IMF promotes stability of international currencies and exchange protocols. It also works to stimulate international job growth through economic development and, when necessary, assistance to countries with severe debt and other financial threats. The IMF maintains surveillance of financial and economic trends throughout the world and within individual countries. It also makes loans to countries in need and provides technical assistance to encourage self-sufficiency in the operation of the world's interconnected financial systems. It works with the World Bank, WTO, and others to achieve its goals. These include fostering global monetary cooperation, securing financial stability, facilitating international trade, promoting high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reducing poverty



Italian, Norwegian and Dutch Special Operation Forces hoist a simulated casualty during the International Special Operations Training Centre's NATO Special Operations Medic Course in Stetten, Germany on March 19, 2019. Photo by U.S. Army Specialist Patrick Orcutt, Special Operations Command Europe

around the world. The activities of the IMF serve as resources for developing economic stability through cooperative interaction with countries and international organizations.

### **International Organization for Migration (IOM <https://www.iom.int/>)**

The IOM was established in 1951 and is a leader in managing and assisting in the mass movement of peoples. The issue of migrating refugees, internally displaced persons, and economic and climate refugees has become particularly important in recent years and has resulted in destabilization and controversy in many areas. IOM reports 165 member countries and eight more in observer status. It has offices in more than 100 countries and is instrumental in working toward the humane and orderly movement of people by providing direct services as well as advice to affected governments and the migrants themselves. Specific areas of effort include international migration law; policy debate and guidance; protection of migrants' rights; and migrant health care.

### **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) <https://www.nato.int>**

Though often characterized as a military alliance, NATO has long described itself as a political organization employing defense and other instruments of power to ensure international security. It has long featured a well-developed civil-military activities component with extensive practical experience, particularly in recent years.

NATO was founded in April 1949 under the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed in Washington, D.C. Its original membership consisted of 12 countries, a number that has now grown to 29. Among its primary missions are collective defense, crisis management, fighting terrorism, and working with partners, who now number 40 partner countries and partner organizations such as the UN, EU, OSCE, and the AU. With more than 70 years of established success, NATO serves as a useful example of an international relationship environment (an IGO) in which SOF has and continues to conduct its range of core activities along the competition continuum.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty establishes the principle of collective defense: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." The provisions of Article 5 have been invoked only once. That was in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001.

For the duration of the Cold War, NATO's focus was framed by a strict notion of geographical boundaries that caused the alliance to limit its efforts to security issues and places "in area." With the changing nature of the international security environment and the threats that inhabit it, NATO has moved beyond its traditional limits and thus has acted "out of area" in places like Afghanistan and through its partnerships with other international security organizations.

For instance, NATO is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and supports its efforts by flying airborne early warning Intelligence flights. NATO's Counterterrorism Policy Guidelines emphasize awareness, capabilities and engagements. NATO operates a Terrorism Intelligence Cell at NATO Headquarters and maintains a coordinator who oversees NATO's CT efforts.

The Alliance now operates 25 Centers of Excellence (COE) ([https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/structure/coe\\_catalogue\\_20190118.pdf](https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/structure/coe_catalogue_20190118.pdf)) that are located in a variety of functional areas in an effort to develop innovative ideas to build NATO's capabilities among all member nations. Those of particular interest to SOF include:

- a. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence
- b. NATO Counter-Intelligence Centre of Excellence
- c. NATO Counter-IED Centre of Excellence
- d. NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence
- e. NATO Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre of Excellence
- f. NATO Defense Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence
- g. NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence
- h. NATO Human Intelligence Centre of Excellence




Figure 6. United Nations Disaster Management Team-India

- i. NATO Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Centre of Excellence
- j. NATO Military Medicine Centre of Excellence
- k. NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence
- l. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
- m. NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence

#### Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) <https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention>

The OPCW was established to implement the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention whose purpose is to guide the international community to achieve its goal of the elimination of chemical weapons and the threat of their use. The organization is guided by two fundamental principles:

1. The convention's multilateral character.
2. The equal application of the Convention to all states.

193 countries are committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention, meaning that 98% of the world's population live under its protection. So far, 96 percent of chemical weapons stockpiles have been declared and destroyed through various verification protocols.

#### UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>

The first UN peacekeepers were deployed in 1948 to monitor agreements between the new state of Israel and the surrounding Arab states. Over the years, the UN has undertaken more than 70 peacekeeping missions, involving peacekeepers from more than 120 countries. During the early years, especially during the Cold War, UNPKO were limited in their scope, usually involving themselves with the enforcement of ceasefires and ensuring stability on the ground. Military observers and lightly armed troops employing confidence-building measures typically were the norm. A more recent trend has been toward involving UNPKO in operations of greater complexity. Tasks include government institutional reform; security sector reform; human rights monitoring; and DDR programs involving former combatants. There has also been a greater emphasis on addressing internal strife and civil wars. The required skill sets have also become more diverse. There exists a persistent need for individuals with civilian or nonmilitary skills such as administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, de-miners, election observers, civil affairs and governance specialists, humanitarian workers, and strategic communicators.

### UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT)

<https://in.one.un.org/page/Disaster-Management/>

In coordination with the HN, the UNDMT operates through a resident coordinator who is tasked with establishing such a team in countries that have a history of disasters or national emergencies. The UNDMT facilitates information exchange and the discussion of initiatives designed to mitigate the impact of catastrophic events. Plans enable the team to respond quickly to needs at national, regional, and district levels; install long-term recovery programs and future preparedness; and provide the necessary advice, technical resources, and supplies to manage the crisis. The team provides a focus for coordination, facilitating the exchange of information and the arrival at consensus on responding to disaster-related challenges.

In general terms, UMDT pursues strategies in capacity building; knowledge management; advocacy and policy; and humanitarian action. UMDT works with HN governments, civil organizations, communities and others to assist them in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a full range of disasters. Efforts include climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction as part of its resilience-building focus.

As an example of its contributions, the UNDMT in India (fig. 6) is made up of representatives from the following UN agencies: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); International Labor Organization (ILO); Development Program (UNDP); Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); Population Fund (UNFPA); High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); Children’s Fund (UNICEF); World Food Program (WFP); World Health Organization (WHO); and the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

### UN Development Program (UNDP)

<https://www.undp.org>

The UNDP (UN Development Program) is the UN’s global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. UNDP is on the ground in 170 countries and territories. It is focused on building stability by eliminating poverty while helping countries develop strong governance policies, skills, partnerships, and institutions so that they can sustain essential progress. Its strategic

vision has been documented in the document, “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

The broad development context is established as:

- Eradicate poverty in all its forms and dimensions;
- Accelerate structural transformations; and
- Build resilience to shocks and crises.

To function effectively within these areas, the UNDP works through these lines of effort:

- Keeping people out of poverty;
- Governance for peaceful, just and inclusive societies;
- Crisis prevention and increased resilience;
- Nature-based solutions for development;
- Clean, affordable energy; and
- Women’s empowerment and gender equality.

### UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

<https://www.unmas.org/en>

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was established in October 1997. It serves as the UN System organization responsible for addressing all components of mine action to include eliminating threats posed by mines, explosive remnants of war, and improvised explosive devices. In the field, it provides mine-action support to areas affected by war, peacekeeping operations, and other humanitarian emergencies.

UNMAS has worked in Afghanistan through the UN Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan (UNMACCA), which maintains coordination with and receives policy guidance from the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The MOFA serves as the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) coordination hub for demining issues. In fact, the idea of mine action as a humanitarian responsibility began in Afghanistan in 1988/9. UNMAS also works with the Afghan Government’s Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) within the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA). The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan began in 1989 with considerable assistance from partner NGOs. UNMACCA seeks to reduce human suffering and remove obstacles to development and reconstruction through all of the pillars of mine action: advocacy, demining (survey, marking, and clearance), stockpile destruction, mine

risk education (MRE), and victim assistance (VA). The mine program is funded through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund.

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is one of the largest in the world because of the scope of the mine problem within the country. During the past two decades, some 12,000 hazard areas have been cleared throughout Afghanistan. The UNMACCA works through Area Mine Action Centres (AMACs) in Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar, Kunduz, Gardez, and Kandahar.

### **UN World Food Program (WFP)**

<https://www1.wfp.org/>

Characterized as the world's largest humanitarian agency, the UN's WFP affects more than 90 million hungry people in some 83 countries every year. Much of the effort is focused on the world's refugees and displaced persons. Over the years, the WFP has developed the capacity to react quickly to crises and is able to move into unstable situations to provide relief. It relies on a system of aircraft, ships, helicopters, trucks, and pack animals to assist in delivering supplies to those in need. WFP estimates that, at any given time, some 5,000 trucks, 20 ships and 92 aircraft are delivering food and other assistance to those in need.

As part of the international effort to provide assistance to those in conflicted-affected countries and elsewhere, the WFP partners with more than 1,000 national and international NGOs to gain maximum benefits.

### **UN World Health Organization (WHO)**

<https://www.who.int>

Established in April 1948, the WHO is the lead agency for coordination and management of health issues within the UN system. It is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, and works through some 7,000 people working in 150 country offices and six regional offices. It focuses on specific health issues, research agendas, public health standards, technical assistance to countries in need, and health policy development. Its involvement on the ground in countries around the world has as its priorities: promoting general social, economic, and governmental development; fostering health security; strengthening health systems;

harnessing research and information flow; enhancing partnerships with HN authorities and other IGOs and NGOs; and improving the performance of international and national healthcare systems. The WHO maintains an extensive agenda of health topics and assistance programs that result in a strong local presence, particularly within struggling countries and territories. The WHO makes significant contributions to the general quality of life for populations and contributes in major ways to the stability of countries and regions.

### **World Bank**

<https://www.worldbank.org>

Though not a bank in the traditional sense, the organization is made up of 188 members who provide technical and financial assistance to developing countries. Its collective mission is to reduce the impact of global poverty while seeking to improve living standards around the world. It also seeks to promote shared prosperity. The World Bank works through two component development institutions, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). It also includes three other members of the World Bank Group: the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Collectively, the World Bank structure provides low-interest loans and no-interest credit and grants to encourage reform and development of education institutions, health systems, infrastructure, communications initiatives, and other pressing challenges to improve the quality of life and stability of developing nations. Clearly, the World Bank can and does play a major role as a partner in the development pillar of U.S. foreign policy.

### **World Bank International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)**

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are/ibrd>

As one of the two components of the World Bank, the IBRD It is the largest development bank in the world. It is concerned with middle income and creditworthy poor countries who are struggling to improve their situations. It was established in 1944 to assist in the rebuilding of Europe after World War II and became

the first World Bank Group institution. It is structured as a cooperative that is owned and operated for the benefit of its membership. IBRD issued its first bonds in 1947 and has since established itself as a major presence within the world's financial markets where it raises most of its funding. Its purpose is to encourage sustainable growth through loans, financial guarantees, risk management services, and advisory assistance. It is owned collectively by its 189 member countries.

#### **World Bank International Development Association (IDA)**

<https://ida.worldbank.org/>

The IDA is made up of 173 shareholder countries and focuses on the very poorest countries in the world. It was established in 1960 and seeks to address world poverty through interest-free credits and grants to stimulate economic growth within the most challenging environments. Assistance programs are designed to improve equality and upgrade living conditions. IDA serves as a major source of assistance for the 75 poorest countries, 39 of which are in Africa. It serves as the major source of donor funds for those countries. Since its establishment, IDA has issued loans, credits and grants in excess of \$238 billion. As with the other components of the World Bank, the IDA plays a significant role in establishing and sustaining conditions of stability in places where it works.

#### **World Trade Organization (WTO)**

<https://www.wto.org>

Established on 1 January 1995, the WTO serves as the only global international organization that focuses on the rules of trade between nations. Though a relatively young organization, having been established in January 1995, it traces its roots to the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round of International Trade Negotiations and earlier negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO currently hosts The Doha Round of negotiations, known as the “Doha Development Agenda”, which were launched in 2001. The broad purpose of the WTO is to assist trade to flow as freely as possible while mitigating any negative consequences of that trade. Special attention is paid to social and environmental concerns. To accomplish its goals, the WTO performs three basic roles: a forum for

negotiations, the keeper of the sets of rules that emerge from negotiations, and a venue for the settlement of trade disputes. The WTO is made up of 164 countries.

#### **Additional Selected IGOs**

##### **Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)**

<https://www.apec.org>

##### **Financial Action Task Force (FATF)**

<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/><https://www.fatf-gafi.org/>

##### **International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)**

<https://www.ifrc.org>

##### **International Organization for Migration (IOM)**

<https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home.html>

##### **Organization of American States/Inter-America Committee Against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE)**

<https://www.oas.org/en/sms/cicte/default.asp>

##### **UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)**

<https://www.unicef.org>

##### **UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**

<https://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home>

##### **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)**

<https://ochaonline.un.or>

#### **Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)**

NGOs are independent, mostly privately funded and managed organizations whose purposes are to improve the human condition by applying their collective skills while gathering and distributing needed resources. Given earlier discussions in this guide about the increasing role of civilian power, it should be obvious that engagement with NGOs represents an important component in the development efforts of U.S. Foreign Policy, specifically through the USAID.

Typically, NGOs are on the ground when U.S. and PN military forces arrive and are likely to remain after the outside military assistance has departed. Once again, each NGO brings its own set of goals,

expectations, cultures, procedures, and experiences to the effort. That reality should sound familiar from earlier discussions on the dynamics of the USG IA functioning and those of other relationship-based organizations. Some NGOs pursue very aggressive public agendas and conduct sophisticated public relations programs to promote their organization, raise funds, and shape public opinion. Those who do so introduce an important complicating variable for those involved with public diplomacy, public affairs, and information operations.

The NGOs identified in the pages that follow are a frequent presence in countries in which SOF operate. Because of the huge numbers of NGOs registered around the world, this list is by no means exhaustive. Various estimates place the number of NGOs around the world in the millions! Obviously, a much smaller number form the most effective and influential. Again, this is not a complete list, but it is representative of the kinds of NGOs who are likely to have an established presence in an operational environment. As a rule, NGOs don't want to be seen or characterized as partners of SOF or other military forces. They may share goals, but typically do not see themselves as full or even partial members of the team—they maintain their independence.

Though an incomplete gathering, the following organizations do provide a sense of the variety of NGOs and the focus of NGO interests toiling within an AO. Some may not seem relevant to military operations, but they do share space with military forces as both pursue their own objectives within the AO. If possible, the harmonization of those objectives is an essential early step in any operation. Frequently, awareness of specific NGOs and their purpose only emerges from direct contact.

As mentioned earlier, an essential skill for SOF involved in such situations is the ability to conduct negotiations across cultural and organizational boundaries. That principle is central when dealing with NGOs. As with the IGOs, the DOS Office of Global Criminal Justice has listed on its web page a collection of NGOs who play major roles in conflict resolution, human rights, transitional justice, and international law. Once again, the inclusion of any NGO on this list does not imply official endorsement by any organization within

the USG. Each NGO plays important roles in creating stable environments that discourage the presence of terrorist organizations, build resilience to mitigate the effects of terrorism, and restore order after terrorist attacks take place. As perceived injustices are often at the root of popular grievances, the following include a heavy emphasis on NGOs who pursue an agenda of providing fair treatment and justice:

#### **Amnesty International (AI)**

<https://www.amnesty.org>

Amnesty International advocates for victims of injustice, wars, and the lack of respect for human rights. It investigates specific situations and exposes the facts so as to influence the outcome on behalf of the innocent. They seek compliance with international laws and agreements by governments and commercial organizations. They take strong advocacy positions on issues such as armed conflict, arms control, climate change, corporate accountability, death penalty, detention, disappearances, discrimination, freedom of expression, international justice, refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, and the universal declaration of human rights.

#### **Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA)**

<https://www.cja.org>

CJA pursues its over-arching goal of to “bring human rights abuses to justice” through litigation, transnational justice initiatives, and policy development and advocacy. It seeks to address human rights issues such as Genocide, Torture, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, Sexual and Gender-based Violence, and Arbitrary Detention. Through litigation it seeks justice for war crimes, fugitive war criminals, human rights abusers, mistreatment against human rights defenders and journalists, and state violence against groups and individuals. It also partners with local prosecutors, investigators, and victim advocates to seek post-conflict justice, prosecution of war criminals, and others. CJA also is active in policy development for human rights laws within the U.S. and elsewhere and policies affecting the denial of safe havens, prosecution of atrocity crimes, and the protection and rehabilitation of victims.

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**<https://www.hrw.org>

Human Rights Watch investigates and reports on abuses that happen around the world. It is made up of individuals from more than 70 nationalities who are country experts, lawyers, journalists, and others who work to protect those most at risk: vulnerable minorities and civilians in wartime, refugees, and children in need. They target governments, armed groups and businesses in their quest to enforce laws, policies and practices. They refuse all government and corporate support, but partner with other organizations to protect activists, hold abusers to account, and bring justice to victims. They perform three functions:

1. Investigate with an eye to creating clear records of abuse.
2. Expose injustice through extensive social media and other activities that often attract the attention of international news media.
3. Affect change through new or reworked policies, laws enforced, and justice served.

**Humanitarian Law Center (HLC)**<https://www.hlc-rdc.org>

Established in 1992 during the breakup of the former-Yugoslavia and in the midst of violence and documented human rights abuses, the HLC is a human rights-based NGO that has focused on the crimes and responsibility in post-Yugoslavia societies. It has focused on the crimes committed across the former-Yugoslavia with emphasis on armed conflict in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, later, in Kosovo. It has sought to promote the rule of law and acceptance of the legacy of mass human right violations during those times of upheaval. It has worked to establish criminal responsibility for those committing the acts, serving justice and preventing recurrence. It has pursued documentation; justice and institutional reform; education; memorialization; and outreach.

**International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)**<https://www.ictj.org>

The ICTJ tackles the challenges of transitional justice that seeks to heal fractured communities and restore confidence in the rule of law. They work in countries

that have “endured massive human rights abuses under repression and in conflict.” The focus on victims, civil society groups, and national and international organizations to address the needs of victims and prevent the recurrence of atrocities. They have had a presence and worked in more than 40 countries during recent decades. They distinguish themselves from similar NGOs by saying that they are directly involved “trying to put the pieces of a broken society back together again on foundations of justice and the rule of law.” Some of their goals include: fighting impunity and seeking accountability; establishing accountable institutions and restoring confidence in them; facilitating peace processes and conflict resolution; addressing the underlying causes of conflict; and seeking reconciliation.

**International Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP)**<https://www.icmp.int>

ICMP maintains that it is the only international organization whose primary role is to address the issue of missing persons. It pursues two lines of effort to ensure both the cooperation of governments and others in addressing the issue and, secondly, to provide technical assistance in locating, recovering, and identifying missing persons. The organization has worked in more than 40 country to assist in locating persons lost through armed conflict, human rights abuses, disasters, organized crime, migration, and other causes. They also assist in developing laws and policies that protect the rights of families of missing persons. ICMP operates a specialized Online Inquiry Center (OIC) and Identification Data Management System that analyzes all data associated with missing persons. It also operates a DNA human identification facility. ICMP also assists with fieldwork and has been involved in the excavation of more than 3,000 mass and clandestine gravesites and the application of modern forensics techniques to facilitate identification.

**International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent**<https://www.icrc.org>

Henry Dunant founded the Red Cross in 1863. The pioneer organization became the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movements that are committed to assisting the victims of war and internal violence. The history of the ICRC parallels

the development of modern humanitarian law and the development of the rules of warfare. During World War I, national societies of the Red Cross provided ambulances to assist the wounded. At that time, the Red Cross also opened the International POW Agency, expanding its influence in the development of the rules of war. In the wake of World War II, the ICRC assisted in the drafting of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two additional protocols in 1977. Today the ICRC is a major presence in providing healthcare, economic security, and water and habitat assistance all over the world. It remains a leader in promoting International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Humanitarian Diplomacy, and Mine Action. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, the ICRC employs some 12,000 people working in 80 countries. Specific programs targeted on victims of war and natural disaster include visiting detainees; protecting civilians; safeguarding healthcare; ensuring access to basic healthcare; and building respect for the law.

#### **International Republican Institute (IRI)**

<https://www.iri.org>

Since its founding in 1983, the IRI has performed democracy-development work in more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Europe, Latin American, and the Middle East. It has offices in more than 40 countries around the world. Its mission statement establishes the goal to “link people with their governments, guide politicians to be responsive to citizens, and motivate people to engage in the political process.” IRI describes itself as a problem-solving organization that works in a variety of areas to include: linking political parties and people; building citizen-centered governments; bringing citizens together; amplifying marginalized voices; ensuring that elections count; and putting data to work. They are currently operating 564 programs in 85 countries.

#### **National Democratic Institute (NDI)**

<https://www.ndi.org>

The NDI works to support and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness, and accountability in government. Since its establishment in 1983, it has worked with local partners in 156 countries and territories. Its work is designed to uphold the principles contained in the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its purpose is to ensure better governance through the engagement of all stakeholders to the political process. To do so, it focuses on citizen participation; debates; democracy and technology; democratic governance; elections; gender, women, and democracy; political parties; peace and security; democratic resilience; and political inclusion of marginalized groups.

#### **National Endowment for Democracy (NED)**

<https://www.ned.org>

The NED is a private, non-profit organization that focuses on growing and strengthening democratic institutions. The foundation distributes more than 1,600 grants to various NGOs who are conducting projects in some 90 countries. Much of its focus is on developing institutions that provide stability, structure and resilience. Among others, these include political parties, trade unions, free markets, and business organizations. The NED played major roles in the turbulent years of the 1980s and 1990s during the major geopolitical changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. During the decades that have followed, the organization has generated important effects in other areas around the world.

#### **No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ)**

<https://www.npwj.org>

The NPWJ is an international non-profit organization that seeks the protection and promotion of human rights, democracy, rule of law and international justice. It pursues three primary programs: International Criminal Justice; Gender and Human Rights; and Middle East and North Africa Democracy with a special emphasis on Iraq. It brings significant experience in “conflict mapping” by which it tracks events during a conflict by gathering and analyzing data about decisions taken and their effects. They seek information from a variety of sources and then try to portray a coherent picture of on-going events. They maintain a persistent focus on the violation of international law. Specific examples include Kosovo (1998 and 1999); Sierra Leone 2000-2004; Afghanistan 2005-2009’ and Kenya in 2008. Specific programs include International Criminal Justice; Gender and Human Rights; Middle East & North Africa (MENA) Democracy; and LGBTI.

**Justice Rapid Response (JRR)**<https://www.justicerapidresponse.org>

JRR is focused on the investigating, fact-finding, and systematic inquiries of reports of mass atrocities. They provide expertise at national, regional, and international levels to establish accountability and deliver credible justice. They maintain a stand-by roster of criminal justice and related professionals who respond to requests from parties who have become aware of human rights violations. They work in collaboration with the Institute for International Criminal Justice (IICI). International law establishes the responsibility for every country to investigate and prosecute atrocities. However, those most likely to experience such situations are also those are often the countries with the fewest resources to address them. JRR was created to fill that space between responsibility and capability. It began its operations in 2009 and has carried out more than 152 missions.

These remaining NGOs represent a sampling of NGOs frequently encountered:

**Africare**<https://www.africare.org>

Established in 1970, the U.S.-based Africare organization is the oldest and largest African-American led organization in the field of development. Its matrix of work employs their core expertise in community engagement, capacity building, locally-driven behavior change, and innovative public-private partnerships in combination with technical specialties in agriculture and health to pursue progress in economic development; nutrition; water; sanitation & hygiene; women's empowerment; and youth empowerment.

**Catholic Relief Services (CRS)**<https://www.crs.org>

The CRS was founded in 1943 by the Catholic Bishops of the United States in anticipation of the end of World War II and the relief care that would be required by its survivors. Over time the

CRS effort expanded and has now reached more than 130 million people in more than 100 countries on five continents. Its purpose is to develop and implement innovative solutions to persistent problems such as poverty, hunger, drought, disease and emergencies. Its operations and policies of inclusiveness are typical of religious-based NGOs. Areas of focus include disaster response, disease eradication, antipoverty programs, and building societal infrastructures.

**Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Every-where (CARE)**<https://www.care.org>

As with many NGOs, CARE was founded in 1945 to provide help to the survivors of World War II. It has partnered with USAID for more than 60 years with programs in over 84 countries. Specific efforts have included humanitarian aid, health, economic development, governance, gender, climate change, food security, and water infrastructure. A significant portion of their relationship involves shared problem solving.

Care also works with the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA); USAID Office of Food for Peace (FFP); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); DOS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL); DOS Bureau of Near Eastern



A U.S. Navy physician aboard the USS Bataan (LHD 5) describes a Haitian woman's injuries to visiting members of Doctors Without Borders while examining patients at the Lifeline Christian Ministries Mission medical clinic in Grand Goave, Haiti. Photo by U.S. Navy Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kristopher Wilson/released

Affairs (NEA); Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI); Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria; World Bank; and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

Care also maintains similar arrangements with other countries as well as with an extensive network of corporate “humanitarian partners.” Its worldwide reach enables it to respond quickly to the needs of the survivors of war and natural disaster. On a sustained basis, CARE focuses on developing self-help skills particularly by working through poor women. This approach is based on the organization’s firm belief that, equipped with appropriate resources, women have the power to help whole families and communities to address poverty and other persistent problems. It is concerned with improving educational opportunities, providing access to clean water and sanitation, encouraging economic development, and protecting natural resources. CARE describes itself as “facilitating for lasting change” by strengthening capacity for self-help; providing economic opportunity; delivering relief in emergencies; influencing policy decisions at all levels; and addressing discrimination in all its forms.

#### **Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)**

<https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org>

Originally established in 1971 by French doctors and journalists, MSF today provides aid to people in more than 70 countries affected by violence, neglect, and catastrophe brought about by armed conflict, epidemics, malnutrition, exclusion from healthcare, or natural disasters. MSF maintains offices in 21 countries and works through various organizations such as MSF Supply, MSF Logistics, and Foundation MSF. MSF is vocal in its public statements and reports about situations it encounters, communicating through what it calls “bearing witness and speaking out.” It is very clear in maintaining its independence, to include through its funding. In 2015, MSF raised some \$335 million, all of which was through private contributors such as individuals, foundations, and corporations. Private support is central to its strong position of neutrality. MSF does not take sides and seeks independent access to victims of violence as mandated under international humanitarian law. That policy has major implications

for SOF warriors. MSF received the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize for its work.

#### **Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM)**

<https://www.oxfam.org>

OXFAM works to address the conditions that cause poverty, not merely to distribute material goods and supplies. Its focus is on solving the consequential problems brought on by poverty. It probes questions that concern the root causes of poverty and about how to realign power relationships that sustain conditions of poverty. OXFAM works within four areas of effort: saving lives; programs to overcome poverty and injustice; campaigning for social justice; and public education. As with other NGOs and IGOs, it seeks solutions through the path of advocacy of basic human rights. OXFAM brings with it 75 years of experience. It has relationships with more than 3,500 partner organizations in 90 countries. During the years 2017-2018, OXFAM spent \$1.25 billion and reached more than 22.2 million people through its long-term development and humanitarian assistance programs. It is very open about its goal to “raise public awareness” through international “campaigns” for fair trade, universal healthcare and education, agricultural reform, climate change, and arms control.

#### **Refugees International (RI)**

<https://www.refugeesinternational.org>

Based in Washington, D.C., RI is dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced persons around the world. It began its efforts in 1979 as a citizen’s movement to protect refugees in Indochina. The organization estimates that there are more than 68.5 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world who are fleeing from the conditions of war and persecution. RI also reports the existence of tens of millions more displaced by events tied to climate change. In addition to the human cost, those conditions also contribute to international instability. RI accepts no government or UN funding. RI’s basic services include providing food, water, healthcare, shelter, access to education, and protection from harm. Displacement of people is increasingly caused by weather-related disasters, environment disruption, and climate change.

**Save the Children (SC/USA)**<https://www.savethechildren.org>

Working through the International Save the Children Alliance, SC/USA defines its area of influence as encompassing more than 120 countries with some 64 million children and several millions more local parents, community members, local organizations, and government agencies. It divides its focus among six continents. SC/USA responds to war and natural disasters as well as addressing the consequences of political, economic, and social upheaval. Save the Children assists in rebuilding communities by providing food, medical care and education, and by working with local infrastructure to develop long-term recovery programs. In addition to devastation wrought by natural disasters and civil disorder, Save the Children works to mitigate the scourges of poverty, hunger, illiteracy and disease.

**World Vision**<https://www.worldvision.org>

World Vision is a Christian-inspired NGO supporting some 100 million people through the work of 46,000 people within nearly 100 countries organized by region (Europe and the Middle East, Asia and Pacific, Africa, Central, and South America). It also conducts child poverty relief programs in the United States. Its efforts focus on children and the development of strong families by addressing the broad conditions of poverty and providing assistance in response to disasters. It works with community-based, transformational development, emergency relief, promotion of justice, local church-based partnerships, and public awareness. Its earliest involvement in Afghanistan came in 1956 as it worked through the Kabul Christian Church. After the fall of the Taliban government, World Vision established a comprehensive program that began operating in 2002. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, World Vision works to provide clean water, irrigation, health clinics, and pre- and post-natal care. The organization relies on some 40,000 staff members, 97 percent of whom work in their home countries.

**World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (WANGO)**<https://www.wango.org>

Based in the U.S., the WANGO is interesting as it represents an effort to organize the diverse NGO community

to increase its collective effectiveness. There are other such organizations pursuing similar agendas. Its first stated purpose is to “unite NGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing world peace, as well as well-being at all levels—individual, family, tribal, national, and world.” WANGO also promotes itself as attempting to give greater voice to smaller NGOs beyond their national borders, including NGOs from developing countries and countries with economies in transition. WANGO supports its membership with NGO listings for networking, training seminars and conferences, and various publications. Collective organizations such as WANGO provide a valuable tool to identify NGOs that may be of assistance in a specific region with an essential task. They provide information that SOF can use to gain an understanding of NGOs they encounter or to identify NGOs with required resources and capabilities. Thus, an understanding of NGOs, how and where they function, and the nature of their goals is obtainable from such NGO collectives.

**Additional Selected NGOs****Academy for Educational Development (AED)**<https://www.aed.org>**American Council for Voluntary International Action (Interaction)**<https://www.interaction.org>**American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)**<https://www.afsc.org>**American Refugee Committee (ARC)**<https://www.arc.org/site/PageServer>**Church World Service (CWS)**<https://www.churchworldservice.org>**International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH)**<https://alliancetoendhunger.org/>**International Medical Corps (IMC)**<https://www.imcworldwide.org>**International Rescue Committee (IRC)**<https://www.theirc.org>**Mercy Corps**<https://www.mercycorps.org>

**Partners for the Americas (POA)**

[https://www.partners.net/partners/Default\\_EN.asp](https://www.partners.net/partners/Default_EN.asp)

**Project Hope (HOPE)**

<https://www.projecthope.org>

**Salvation Army World Service Office (SA/WSO)**

<https://www.sawso.org>

**Stop Hunger**

<https://www.stophunger.org>

**U.S. Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees  
(USA for UNHCR)**

<https://www.usaforunhcr.org>

**Private Military Companies (PMCs)**

Distinct from the parties engaged within any specific conflict environment is the presence of armed security forces paid for and deployed by various organized military formations, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector businesses. These PMCs, private security companies, and, in some cases, mercenaries especially populate areas of operations in which instability and contested influence dominate. Predictably, these are those places in which SOF are likely to be present. Common to all of these enterprises is the shared motivation to provide their individual and collective skills to their employers in return for commercial gain.

PMCs establish contractual relationships with governments and military formations to provide services such as security, logistics support, training, force protection, convoy protection, capability development, and intelligence support. PMCs have been a persistent and familiar presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places in support of U.S. military operations for several decades. They have been particularly effective in providing additional resources and capabilities to support SOF in a variety of areas of operations.

Understanding the structures, roles, resources, and skill sets provided by PMCs helps to convert these into force multipliers for SOF. Additionally, learning to recognize and build relationships with the private security organizations working for IGOs, NGOs, and private sector commercial enterprises can assist in expanding the effectiveness of SOF.



## Chapter 6. Countering and Combating Terrorism

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**W**hile counterterrorism has long been a concern for SOF and the wider USG national security IA community, it has held a position of increased importance and focused effort since the September 2011 attacks on the United States. Over time, the post-9/11 CT mission has evolved and the broader CbT mission has expanded as the U.S. has sought to address the so-called “root causes” of terrorism with an eye toward eliminating or, more likely, mitigating their influence.

This guide was originally envisioned more than a decade ago as dealing only with the narrowly defined topic of combating terrorism overseas. Though this current version seeks a wider discussion about the roles of SOF within the international security IA process, CT and CbT remain important SOF Core Activities. This chapter discusses that portion of the USG IA enterprise that concerns itself primarily with CT and CbT. Again, however, this does not mean that IA partners engaged in CT and CbT are not active in other areas of national security. Emphasizing the members of the U.S. Counterterrorism Team, this chapter takes a look at many of the various organizations that have evolved since the September 2001 attacks on the United States.

After nearly two decades of war, Terrorism presents itself differently today. No longer do threats come mostly from small cells of zealots acting on the basis of ideology spread through networks. More than ever, terrorism serves as a tool for both non-state and state actors. Specifically, non-state political dissidents, violent extremists, and transnational criminal organizations (TCO) employ terrorist tactics in their pursuit of various political and economic objectives. TCOs employ terrorism to establish and sustain their power bases and influence over their neighborhoods and regions. Western Hemisphere drug cartels are examples of such behavior. Terrorists now adapt various business models to develop profit centers to fund their political

agendas. Taliban participation in drug trafficking, something they rejected during the 1990s, illustrates that point. Meanwhile, state actors such as Iran, Russia, and China include terrorist tactics within their Gray Zone activities and their waging of Hybrid Warfare.

While the members of the Counterterrorism Team are mentioned here, others are discussed in detail in chapters 2, 3, and 4 or in other areas of this guide. This is because the current threat environment has become so diverse that elements of the National Security Inter-agency play roles in a variety of threat environments, no longer CT or CbT solely. As with all aspects of the national security IA enterprise, the basic principles discussed elsewhere apply equally to CT and CbT activities.

- No single department, agency, or organization of the USG can, by itself, effectively locate and defeat terrorist networks, groups, and individuals and prevent their return.
- Beyond the USG IA process, it is not possible for individual countries and coalitions, to “go it alone” against the extensive and ever-changing threats posed by terrorists and their networks. Or against Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) who increasingly employ terrorist tactics to intimidate and control as part of their business models.
- Interagency and relationship-based operations are designed to create and sustain stability by addressing those conditions that give rise to terrorism in the first place; defeat terrorist threats where and when they emerge; and prevent the recurrence of terrorist activity once its defeated.

This final point takes us into the realm of effective governance at all levels. These include tribal and clan leaders; elected or appointed neighborhood representatives; community councils to include collections

of elders; religious leaders; commercial enterprises; mayors and their equivalents; regional officials; and central governments. All play essential roles in contributing to a shared quality of life.

Guiding questions concern the relationship between central governments, down through layers of regional authorities, to the leadership who are in face-to-face contact with the people. How and where is a credible government presence positioned to be most responsive? How do the agencies of government at all levels work together to provide available resources to where they are most needed? Who sets the priorities for distribution and by what standards? How are trust and credibility distributed throughout a country's structure of governance? What oversight is in place to minimize or prevent corruption?

Within any system of governance, some forms of grievances are inevitable. These range from simple annoyance over late trash pickup to perceptions of mistreatment based on race, ethnic heritage, or religious traditions; economic inequality among peoples, tribes, and neighborhoods; non-existent or sub-par educational opportunities; inadequate healthcare; corruption; and so forth. Social media and its ability to spread awareness and orchestrate support for aggrieved parties has complicated the challenges of governance by shaping expectations and reducing the times available to respond credibly.

Effective governance ensures the safety and security of people while providing necessary goods and services. Distrust of the governance process at any level can transform simple annoyances into grievances of varying intensities that lead to protests, outrage, and insurrection. Criminals and terrorists view such conditions as ideal for asserting their influence. SOF bring with them the traditions, skills, and experience necessary to address such underlying causes of instability and play leading roles within the various interagency structures and process that are described within the rest of this chapter.

### **Department of State (DOS)**

<https://www.state.gov>

The DOS serves as the designated USG lead in fighting terrorism overseas. Therefore, a major slice of USG CT components resides within the DOS. Many of these

DOS components are presented in the following pages. Moreover, as indicated in the earlier discussion of Civilian Power and in chapter 3, DOS structures its capabilities to serve as the proponent for the Diplomatic Pillar of National Security and Foreign Policy. Meanwhile, the USAID acts as the lead agency for activities undertaken as part of the development pillar. Note in the pages that follow the number of organizations that address both hard power and soft power tools for both CT and CbT DIME-FIL activities. As always, an exhaustive list is not possible. However, this chapter, as with the others, provides sufficient background about the IA process and specific partner organizations engaged in CT and CbT responsibilities.

Though under the lead of the IC, the National Counterterrorism Center is included in this chapter because of its primary mission.

### **National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)**

<https://www.nctc.gov>

Established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and defined by Executive Order 13354 on 27 August 2004, the NCTC has as its mission to “lead and integrate the national counterterrorism (CT) effort by fusing foreign and domestic CT information, providing terrorism analysis, sharing information with partners across the CT enterprise, and driving whole-of-government action to secure our national CT objectives.”

The NCTC works through the Directorate of Intelligence; Directorate of Terrorist Identities; Directorate of Operations Support; and Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning. It brings IA, WOG support to five Mission Areas: Threat Analysis; Information Sharing; Identity Management; Strategic Operational Planning; and National Intelligence Management.

The NCTC hosts analysts and other personnel from more than 20 departments, agencies, and organizations and provides information sharing through more than 30 networks in an effort to identify those individuals and groups who pose threats to the U.S. The NCTC draws on the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) and the NCTC Online (NOL), which is a data library of CT information with a worldwide reach.

The NCTC, along with the DNI, serves as the principal information and intelligence hub for IC coordination and as a critical resource for the entire IA enterprise. In that role, the NCTC serves as the lead organization for CT intelligence and strategic operational planning for CT activities while conducting business from a continuously functioning operations center that is staffed with representatives from throughout the IC and other organizations such as the Capitol Police.

The NCTC produces a range of analytic and threat information products for the President, cabinet officials, senior policymakers, and leadership from the intelligence, defense, law enforcement, homeland security, and foreign affairs communities. Various groups working under the NCTC include the Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group, and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Counterterrorism Groups. By law, the NCTC conducts strategic and operational planning that incorporates all the elements of national power to ensure the best-possible effects.

While the individual members of the IC carry on their traditional functions in support of their parent department, agency, or organizations, intelligence of mutual interest concerning both international and homeland security terrorism issues and events is exchanged and acted on through the IC IA process.

Another IA structure that has come into existence is the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force:

### Countering Violent Extremism Task Force (CVE)

<https://www.dhs.gov/cve>

The CVE Task force was established as an IA forum to animate the original 2011 USG CVE Strategy. That strategy was updated on 28 October 2016. Task forces membership includes representatives from DHS, DOJ, FBI, NCTC, and various other IA partners to carry out the mission to “manage the synchronization and integration of a whole-of-government effort to empower local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States.” As part of its work, the task force seeks to enhance engagement with stake holders; build expertise; and counter narratives. Its focus is primarily on domestic CVE efforts. The CVE task force pursues four lines of efforts to implement the CVE strategy:

1. Research and Analysis
2. Engagement and Technical Assistance
3. Interventions
4. Digital Strategies and Communications.

As before, it’s important to have an awareness of the implementing strategies that are directly relevant to the CT and CbT challenge. Those strategies primarily concerned with the development pillar, an important component of the CT and CbT missions, were addressed in chapter 3.

### National Strategy for Counterterrorism

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf>

The most recent National Security Strategy for Counterterrorism (October 2018) identifies four desired end states while establishing strategic objectives and describing the lines of effort necessary to achieve them. Note the inclusion of both homeland and overseas CT concerns and the emphasis on partners and relationships in what follows. The end states as envisioned are:

- a. The terrorist threat to the United States is eliminated.
- b. Our borders and all ports of entry into the United States are secure against terrorist threats.
- c. Terrorism, radical Islamist ideologies, and other violent extremist ideologies do not undermine the American way of life.
- d. Foreign partners address terrorist threats so that these threats do not jeopardize the collective interests of the United States and our partners.

The Strategic Objectives to achieve these end states are:

- e. The capacity of terrorists to conduct attacks in the homeland and against vital United States interests overseas is sharply diminished.
- f. The sources of strength and support upon which terrorists rely are severed.
- g. Terrorists’ ability to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize to violence in the homeland is diminished.
- h. Americans are prepared and protected from terrorist attacks in the homeland, including

through more exacting border security and law enforcement actions.

- i. Terrorists are unable to acquire or use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and other advanced weaponry.
- j. Public sector partners, private sector partners, and foreign partners take a greater role in preventing and countering terrorism.

The Lines of Effort to achieve the strategic objectives and end states are:

- k. Pursue terrorist threats to their source.
- l. Isolate terrorists from financial, material, and logistical sources of support.
- m. Modernize and integrate a broader set of United States tools and authorities to counter terrorism and protect the homeland.
- n. Protect United States infrastructure and enhance preparedness.
- o. Counter terrorist radicalization and recruitment.
- p. Strengthen the counterterrorism abilities of international partners.

### Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security

[https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy\\_to\\_Combat\\_Transnational\\_Organized\\_Crime\\_July\\_2011.pdf](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf)

The threats posed by the activities of transnational organized crime (TOC) continue to present themselves with greater complexity and result in increased volatility and instability. Criminal networks frequently threaten U.S. security by taking advantage of corrupt elements within other national governments. The end-state sought by this strategy is to “reduce transnational organized crime from a national security threat to a manageable public safety problem in the United States and in strategic regions around the world.” To achieve this end-state, the strategy mandates five policy objectives:

1. Protect Americans and our partners from the harm, violence, and exploitation of transnational criminal networks

2. Help partner countries strengthen governance and transparency, break the corruptive power of transnational criminal networks, and sever state-crime alliances
3. Break the economic power of transnational criminal networks and protect strategic markets and the U.S. financial system from TOC penetration and abuse
4. Defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threat to national security by targeting their infrastructures, depriving them of their enabling means, and preventing the criminal facilitation of terrorist activities
5. Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and public-private partnerships to defeat TOC

The strategy calls for the creation of an Interagency Threat Mitigation Working Group (TMWG) to identify TOC groups, prioritize their threat potentials, and coordinate the most efficient application of all relevant elements of national power to combat them.

This focus on transnational criminal organizations is significant because terrorists and insurgents are becoming increasingly reliant on criminal networks to generate funding and provide logistical support for their own activities. Thus, the nexus between terrorists and criminals represents a strategic threat that demands strong IA attention. There is a PCC responsible for overseeing the IA implementation of the Strategy to Combat TOC in coordination with other PCCs.

The TOC Strategy works in concert with the National Security Strategy, National Drug Control Strategy, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, International Strategy for Cyberspace, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, U.S.-Mexico Merida Initiative, Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime, National Strategy for Maritime Security, Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan, and other global security assistance, counterdrug, and capacity-building initiatives.

This attention is appropriate because criminal organizations serve as agents of instability in undergoverned and ungoverned spaces, thus creating the




Figure 7. USG CT Components. The DOS website refers to this cluster as the “U.S. Counterterrorism Team.”

conditions that facilitate the growth of terrorist and insurgent threats. TOC are able to penetrate political processes through the bribery of corrupt government officials and establish parallel economic and social systems, infiltrate financial and security sectors, and create their own systems of governance, security and rule of law.

### The U.S. Counterterrorism Team

The State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism serves as the lead in “developing coordinated strategies and approaches to defeat terrorism abroad and securing the counterterrorism cooperation of international partners.” It works with the following members of the USG and others, as appropriate, to meet those responsibilities:

- White House
  - Homeland Security

- National Security
- Department of State
  - Secretary of State
  - Bureau of Consular Affairs
  - Bureau of Diplomatic Security
    - Anti-Terrorist Program
    - Overseas Advisory Council
    - Rewards for Justice Program
  - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
  - Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
  - Bureau of Intelligence and Research
  - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
  - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
  - Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
  - Foreign Service Institute

- Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
- U.S. Mission to the United Nations
- War Crimes Rewards Program
- Department of Defense
  - Defense Intelligence Agency
- Treasury Department
  - Office of Foreign Assets Control
- Department of Justice
  - Counterterrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement
  - Federal Bureau of Investigation—Counterterrorism
- Department of Homeland Security
  - U.S. Coast Guard
  - Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
  - Directorate for Preparedness
  - Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
  - Policy Directorate
  - Research and Technology—Centers of Excellence
  - Transportation Security Agency (TSA)
  - U.S. Secret Service
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
  - World Fact Book
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- National Counterterrorism Center
- Agency for International Development (USAID)

### DOS CT Bureau

<https://www.state.gov/j/ct/>

“The DOS CT Bureau works to strengthen partnerships, civilian capacity, and information sharing around the world to counter evolving terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism. The bureau designs, manages, and oversees foreign assistance to build the civilian capabilities of foreign government partners to counter terrorism and violent extremism, in an effective and sustainable fashion. The bureau seeks to build law enforcement and judicial capabilities to mitigate attacks, disrupt terrorist transit, and arrest, investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate terrorists in accordance with the rule of law. To bolster these efforts, The bureau seeks to promote the leadership of other countries to build capacity in third countries in their regions. The bureau

also seeks to strengthen partnerships and initiatives involving government and non0governmental actors to counter sources of violent extremist messaging, narratives, and recruitment.”

It works closely with the Department of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security Council, and all the other members of the USG CT Team to enhance both international and homeland counterterrorism efforts.

The DOS CT Bureau pursues these responsibilities through the following directorates:

- Homeland Security and Multilateral Affairs Directorate.
- Operations Directorate.
- Programs, Policy, and Budget Directorate.
- Regional Affairs Directorate.

The various IA partners and programs engaged in CT and CbT include:

### DOS CT Bureau Programs

<https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm>

#### Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA)

<https://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm>

Created in 1983, the ATA has served as the primary provider of antiterrorism training to partner law-enforcement agencies around the world. During those decades, the ATA has trained some 90,000 law enforcement officers from 154 countries. All engagement is guided by the core principles of the rule of law and the respect for human rights. Training topics include investigations, border security, protection of critical targets, leadership and management, regional coordination and cooperation, critical incident response and management, and cyber security. The ATA is designed to encourage and nurture cooperative initiatives between U.S. law enforcement agencies and similar organizations within those partner countries cooperating in efforts to deal with terrorism. Programs focus on training for bomb detection, crime scene investigation, airport and building security, maritime protection measures, and VIP protection. More broadly, ATA seeks to increase capacity to protect national borders, secure critical infrastructure, protect national leadership, and respond to and resolve terrorist incidents. Rule of law and respect for human rights are recurring

themes in all ATA programs. While providing training and equipment resources, the ATA also helps to build and strengthen bilateral relations so important to the broader CT effort. These relationships serve to increase the security of Americans living and traveling overseas and play an important role in international CT efforts.

### **Countering the Financing of Terrorism Finance (CFT)**

The CFT serves as one of the primary tools available to designate terrorist organizations and individuals, including targeting their financial assets, blocking their financial transactions, and preventing others from providing them with material or financial support. Such steps expose and isolate organizations and individuals, impose serious sanctions upon them, and enable coordinated actions against them by the USG and international partners. These actions include anti-money laundering (AML) efforts directed at targeted organizations and individuals. CFT initiatives also work to enable partner agents to meet standard of proper financial behavior as established by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the UN, and other international organizations. As part of CFT, CT works within the IA environment with the DOJ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance, and Training and Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section; the FBI; the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; the Internal Revenue Service; and the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) to implement and achieve these objectives, along with non-governmental organizations and the private sector.

### **Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF)**

The CTPF is designed to build networks of partnerships around the world where terrorist networks seek to establish a foothold. These efforts include working closely with civilian partnerships organizations and initiatives. Working with similar initiatives from within DOD, CT seeks to build the capacities of criminal justice personnel to arrest, investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate terrorist suspects, recruiters, and financiers. As always, due process and the rule of law guide CTPF programing and training. CTPF funding is also used to expand partnerships with non-security and non-governmental actors to counter radicalization and

recruitment to violent extremism, especially in regions threatened by ISIS and similar organizations.

### **Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)**

The FEST is the USG's only IA, on-call, short-notice asset that is available to respond to terrorist incidents worldwide. When requested by the U.S. Chief of Mission, the FEST deploys to assist, assess, and coordinate USG crisis response activities. See page 6-24 (Foreign Emergency Support Team [FEST]) for additional information within the context of the interagency dynamic.

### **Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)**

<https://www.thegctf.org>

Founded in September 2011, GCTF is a multilateral body designed to promote civilian cooperation and best practices to counter terrorism. It is made up of 29 countries and is further partnered with the European Union. It includes a strategic-focused Coordinating Committee that works expert-driven working groups reflecting strategic priorities. These include the criminal justice sector and rule of law; countering violent extremism; and capacity building in the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia. One of its goals is to strengthen the international structures for addressing contemporary terrorism by developing long-term relationships and approaches. Three different organizations have emerged from the efforts of the GCTF. These include the Geneva-based Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) to support local, community-level initiatives building resilience against violent extremism; Hedayah, based in Abu Dhabi, which serves as both a CVE center of excellence and a training hub; and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) in Malta, which provides members of the law enforcement and judicial sectors with the tools and training to address the challenges of terrorism and transnational criminal activity. The UN is also a partner with the GCTF as it works through the UN Office of Counterterrorism to implement its UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

### **Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)**

The TSWG is an IA initiative that coordinates USG technology efforts under the provisions of the National Combating Terrorism Research and Development

(R&D) Program. Its mission is to “identify, prioritize, and coordinate IA and international R&D requirements and to rapidly develop technologies and equipment to meet the high-priority needs of the combating terrorism community.” It works with various members of NATO, major non-NATO allies, and other friendly countries. CT co-chairs the TSWG along with the Office of the ASD(SO/LIC). The TSWG develops new products and capabilities to support the operations of first responders, military forces, and other federal, state, and local security officials.

### **Terrorist Screening and Interdiction Programs (TSI)**

The TSI is a program designed to detect terrorists and secure borders. It relies on the bilateral sharing of screening information on individuals so as to identify, disrupt, and deter terrorist travel. It is available to domestic counterterrorism efforts and to appropriate international partners.

### **Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)**

The TSCTP was established in 2005 as a long-term initiative to improve the capabilities of partner countries to address terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism. It is carried out jointly by DOS, USAID, and the DOD to assist partners in West and North Africa. Areas of support include:

- Enabling and enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries and law enforcement to conduct counterterrorism operations;
- Integrating the ability of North and West African militaries and law enforcement, and other supporting partners, to operate regionally and collaboratively on counterterrorism efforts;
- Enhancing border security capacity to monitor, retrain, and interdict terrorist movements;
- Strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement’s ability to detect, disrupt, respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity;
- Monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism (such as that related to kidnapping for ransom); and
- Reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism.

### **Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT)**

First established in 2009, PREACT is a U.S. funded initiative designed to develop the capacities of military, law enforcement, and civilian sectors in East Africa. Its strategic objectives include:

- Reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks;
- Developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner countries;
- Enhancing border security;
- Countering the financing of terrorism; and
- Reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism.

## **Other Counterterrorism Organizations & Programs**

### **Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism** <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list>

#### **Terrorist Designation Unit**

<https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm>

The Secretary of State exercises the authority to publicly identify terrorists and terrorist organizations. Once defined, these identifications, or designations, trigger specific requirements about how U.S. individuals and businesses interact with anyone on the designation list. The Public Designations Unit evaluates candidates for inclusion, submits them to the Secretary of State for review and approval, and then monitors to ensure that sanctions placed against a specific individual or group are enforced appropriately. The Foreign Terrorist Organizations List focuses on travel related to terrorist organizations, criminalizes material support to terrorist organizations, and assists in freezing the financial resources of terrorist organizations located in U.S. financial institutions. The maintenance of the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) also assists in efforts to identify and take action against terrorists and terrorist organizations.

Any organization can find its way to the TEL if the Secretary of State determines that it:

- Commits or incites to commit a terrorist act;
- Prepares or plans a terrorist activity;

- Gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or
- Provides material support to further the terrorist activity.

Once designated, other IA partners get involved to include the Attorney General and Department of Justice and the IC.

### Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)

<https://www.state.gov/m/ds>

The DS serves as the security and law enforcement arm of the DOS and has as its mission the responsibility to create a secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. It prepares and executes programs to protect U.S. embassies and personnel overseas (through the regional security officers) and to secure facilities and information systems. DS personnel serve as the Secretary of State's Protective Detail, work in the Dignitary Protection Division, and operate the Protective Liaison Division to coordinate security with the diplomatic corps stationed within the United States. In addition to protecting people, property and information, DS is skilled in international investigations, threat analysis, cyber security, CT, and security technology.

The criminal investigative branch of DS also conducts investigations of passport and visa fraud as a way of preventing access by suspected terrorists to the U.S. and PNs. DS operates from offices in U.S. cities and in foreign countries within which it establishes close working relationships with local law enforcement organizations. The Regional Security Officers who serve on the Country Teams come from DS. Both the ATA and the Rewards for Justice Program are the responsibility of the DS. Among other IA components, the DS works closely with the DHS's Document and Benefit Fraud Task Force and the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. DS also has responsibility to provide protection for the Secretary of State and for defined foreign government officials visiting the U.S. who do not receive protection from the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) or the FBI.

### Intelligence and Threat Analysis (ITA)

<https://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8584.htm>

The ITA serves as the coordinative interface between the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the IC on all

matters of international and domestic terrorism. ITA places particular emphasis on monitoring threats against the Secretary of State, senior U.S. officials, visiting dignitaries, foreign diplomats living inside the U.S., and foreign missions within the U.S. for whom DS has security responsibilities. ITA threat assessments are used to inform policy development and operational decision making by DOS and DS senior leadership. Working closely with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, ITA provides threat warnings and other essential information to the public through the Consular Information Program. As part of this process, the ITA maintains the Security Environment Threat List (SETL). ITA conducts trend analysis and develops case studies of terrorist incidents, political violence and criminal violence that affect the security of Americans overseas. It also provides its analysis to other intelligence organizations, U.S. law enforcement agencies, and U.S. businesses in the U.S. and throughout the world. ITA annually produces a report entitled *Political Violence Against Americans*, which provides a narrative and statistics about terrorism and acts of political violence against Americans.

### Rewards for Justice Program

<https://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8651.htm>

<https://rewardsforjustice.net/english/>

Originally established by the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, the Rewards for Justice Program was expanded under the terms of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (commonly known as the Patriot Act). Currently this DOS-managed program (Bureau of Diplomatic Security) offers awards for information that solves or prevents terrorist acts or leads to the capture and conviction of those responsible. The Secretary of State has the authority to offer rewards for specific cases. More than \$150 million have been paid to credible informants over the years, with notable successes in arresting those involved with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and of certain high-value targets in Iraq. Information can be provided to any FBI office, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, or through the regional security officers in U.S. embassies overseas. Information gathered through the program is shared with PNs who are also at risk. Besides its official State Department web page, the Rewards for Justice Program

features a separate web page through which it provides information on acts of terror and a list of the most-wanted terrorists.

### **Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)**

<https://www.osac.gov>

The OSAC is a Federal Advisory Committee operating under a USG charter that came into being in the wake of increased terrorist threats to U.S. businesses and organizations operating internationally. It is intended to promote security cooperation between U.S. private sector interests around the world and the DOS through the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The program currently has more than 3,500 U.S. companies, educational institutions, faith-based institutions, non-governmental organizations, and other organizations with international interests participating. That amounts to some 16,000 OSAC “constituents.” The OSAC “council” is made up of 34 private sector and four public sector organizations. The OSAC seeks to orchestrate security cooperation between its members and the DOS. As part of its activities, the council operates committees on Security Awareness and Innovation, Country Councils and Outreach, and Threats and Information Sharing. A system of country councils scattered around the world provides interface between U.S. embassies and consulates and the local communities to exchange security information.

### **Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions (TFS)**

<https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/index.htm>

Working with and through the IA process, the Office of Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions works to, among other things, create, modify, or terminate unilateral sanctions regimes on countries such as Iran, Syria and Cuba as required by the international security situation; develops strategies for sanctions protocols against specific countries; builds international support for combating terrorist finance; and provides foreign policy guidance on business, export, import and licensing issues to the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security. TFS carries out its responsibilities through two offices: Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation (EB/TFS/SPI) and the Office of Threat Finance Countermeasures (EB/TFS/TFC).

### **Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA)**

<https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/about-us.html>

The Bureau of Consular Affairs “provides services that protect U.S. citizens and their interests abroad, ensures U.S. border security, facilitates the entry of legitimate travelers, and fosters economic growth.” The visa program the bureau administers requires screening for possible terrorists and other undesirables while preserving access to those welcome to travel to the U.S. Because of the nature of its responsibilities, the Bureau of Consular Affairs is a major IA participant in any AO. It also contributes to public diplomacy campaigns through its interactions with local nationals.

### **Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)**

<https://www.state.gov/j/drl>

The DRL has the responsibilities to promote democracy, ensure the respect and protection of human rights and international religious freedom, and advance labor rights around the globe. Such values are specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in various other regional and global agreements. Each of these responsibilities addresses the challenges of ensuring justice, addressing grievances, and creating stability in ways that create environments inhospitable to terrorists and their networks. As part of its international outreach, the U.S. employs a variety of tools to advance its national security agenda to include bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, foreign assistance, reporting and public outreach, and economic sanctions. Among other activities, DRL works with U.S.-based NGOs who coordinate the activities of those working on the ground throughout the world. DRL is involved with developing the capacity of civil and governmental institutions to promote human rights and bring about stability. DRL also participates in technical assistance projects, coordinates with local business and labor leaders, and conducts evaluation of its funding assistance programs.

### **Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)**

<https://www.state.gov/j/inl>

The INL provides advice to the President, Secretary of State, bureaus within the DOS and other departments, agencies, and organizations that make up the USG

IA process. Its strategic objectives include countering international crime, illegal drugs, and instability overseas. To those ends, counter-narcotics and anticrime programs support stability and CT efforts by promoting the modernization of foreign criminal justice systems and their evolving operational capacities. Thus, INL policies and programs that are designed to address international narcotics trafficking and crime have an impact on the funding of terrorists and terrorist organizations through the development of working relationships among international law enforcement agencies both regionally and globally.

INL is committed to preventing the production, trafficking, and abuse of illicit drugs. The Office of Anti-Crime Programs works in the fields of anti-corruption, anti-money laundering/CT financing, border security/alien smuggling, intellectual property rights/cybercrime, and international organized crime. INL operates regional offices for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Africa and the Middle East; Europe and Asia; and the Western Hemisphere. Functional offices focus on anti-crime programs, aviation criminal justice assistance and partnership, and policy, planning, and coordination. The Office of Anticrime Programs fields the following teams that address a range of initiatives and threats to include the International Law Enforcement Academies Team; Anticorruption Team; Transnational Organized Crime Team; Cybercrime and Intellectual Property Rights Team; Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Terrorist Financing Team; Border Security/Alien Smuggling Team; and the Environmental Crime/Wildlife Trafficking Team.

### **Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO)**

<https://www.state.gov/p/io>

Established in 1949, the IO serves as the USG's primary tool for interaction with the UN and a variety of other international agencies and organizations. It serves as the activity hub for the extensive U.S. multilateral engagement programs on global issues such as peace and security, nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, economic development, climate change, and global health. The IO maintains diplomatic missions in New York City, Geneva, Vienna, Rome, Paris, Montreal, and Nairobi. Specific organizations include the UN Agencies for Food and Agriculture in Rome; the

UN Education, Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the International Civil Aviation Organization; and the UN Environmental Program. Besides pursuing issues of interest, IO seeks to increase the effectiveness of multilateral relationships by advocating for more transparent, accountable, and efficient international organizations.

### **Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)**

<https://www.state.gov/t/isn>

The ISN leads the USG IA efforts to block the spread of WMD. These include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. ISN also engages the international community through bilateral and multilateral relationship-building. To achieve its goals, ISN promotes international consensus on WMD proliferation through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; leads the development of diplomatic responses to specific bilateral and regional WMD proliferation challenges; develops and supports strategic dialogues with key states or groups of states who are engaged in WMD issues and initiatives; addresses WMD proliferation threats posed by non-state actors and terrorist groups by improving physical security, using interdiction and sanctions; plays a central role in the Proliferation Security Initiative; and works closely with the UN, G-8, NATO, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other international institutions and organizations to reduce and eliminate the threat posed by WMD. ISN pursues these goals through three complementary lines of effort:

1. Strengthening nonproliferation regimes. ISN relies on bilateral and multilateral relationships to prevent the proliferation of CBRN weapons and of destabilizing conventional weapons. It promotes high standards of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards internationally. ISN further seeks to ensure the non-proliferation of materials involved with civil-nuclear cooperation programs.
2. Shaping the security environment. ISN conducts its shaping activities by promoting regional security and deterrence protocols, targeting on implementing

- counterproliferation policies and activities, enforcing WMD-related sanctions, and using economic and other tools to address countries identified as possible violators of non-proliferation agreements.
3. Counter-threat programming. ISN develops and manages capacity-building and other programs to reduce proliferation risks, improve export controls, counter nuclear smuggling, keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists, improve nuclear safety and security around the world, and address urgent threat-reduction and weapons-elimination challenges worldwide.

#### **Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (ISN/WMDT)** <https://www.state.gov/t/isn/offices/wmdt/index.htm>

The WMDT works with foreign partners to establish, strengthen, and maintain their capabilities to deter, detect, defeat, and respond to terrorist attempts to acquire or use chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear materials (CBRN). Specific initiatives to meet these responsibilities involve the establishment of relationships with international organizations and individual partner countries in an effort to develop and implement complementary programs to deal with the threats posed by various sources of WMDT. It also oversees the Foreign Consequence Management Program (FCM) that engages various partners in the development of the capacities to respond to CBRN incidents. This includes providing training, equipment and other resources. WMDT also possesses a response capability to respond to catastrophic international CBRN incidents.

#### **Smuggling Response Team (SRT)** <https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c26798.htm>

The WMDT Smuggling Response Team provides guidance and oversight to the Nuclear Trafficking Response Group (NTRG) and the Forensics Engagement Working Group (FEWG). Additionally, it facilitates USG cooperation with foreign partners responding to nuclear trafficking incidents overseas; helps to develop policy countering the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials; assists in building foreign partner capacity to

counter nuclear and radioactive materials; and conducts diplomacy to promote counter nuclear-smuggling tools.

#### **Nuclear Trafficking Response Group (NTRG)** <https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c26798.htm>

The NTRG was established in 1995 to coordinate USG responses to incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials overseas, including radiation alarms. The goals of the NTRG are to work with foreign governments to secure smuggled nuclear material including facilities where diversions occurred, prosecute those involved and develop information on smuggling-related threats (e.g., potential links between smugglers and terrorists). The NTRG is chaired by the DOS and includes representatives from the nonproliferation, law enforcement, and intelligence communities.

#### **Forensics Engagement Working Group (FEWG)** <https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c26798.htm>

The FEWG is an IA working group that coordinates and facilitates USG outreach, engagement, and policy development on nuclear forensics. The group is chaired by the DOS and includes participants from the nonproliferation and law enforcement communities.

#### **Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)** <https://www.state.gov/g/prm>

PRM is focused on the very difficult soft-power mission of providing aid and sustainable solutions for refugees, victims of conflict, and stateless people around the world through repatriation, local integration, and resettlement within the United States. More specifically, the PRM mission is to “provide protection, ease suffering, and resolve the plight of persecuted and uprooted people around the world on behalf of the American people by providing life-sustaining assistance, working through multilateral systems to build global partnerships, promoting best practices in humanitarian response, and ensuring that humanitarian principles are thoroughly integrated into U.S. foreign and national security policy.”

It provides assistance through a complex network of multinational organizations to include the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and the UN Relief and Works Agency for

Palestine Refugees in the Middle East. With a staff of some 130 civil servants and Foreign Service staff, PRM does not provide aid directly to refugees, but works through international organizations to manage contributions to the agencies and monitor the programs that are U.S. funded to ensure compliance with USG goals and policies. Working through local officials, IGOs and NGOs, the PRM seeks three durable solutions: repatriation; local integration; and resettlement. This engagement can provide an important assist to the SOF Warrior addressing the challenges of population migration, refugees and displaced persons while seeking to work with IGOs and NGOs they encounter within their operating environments.

### Department of Justice (DOJ)

<https://www.justice.gov>

### Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-Terrorism

<https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism>

The FBI, the lead federal agency for combating domestic terrorism, works both domestically and internationally to combat terrorism and other related threats to national security. The FBI serves as the lead USG investigative agency for a domestic terrorist incident. As an IA player, the FBI works closely with the law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic communities to meet their domestic responsibilities to neutralize terrorist individuals and cells within the U.S. and to assist in dismantling terrorist networks worldwide.

The FBI's National Security Priorities include Terrorism (international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and WMD); Counterintelligence; and Cyber Crime (computer intrusions, internet fraud, and identity theft). Their criminal priorities, which often complement FBI CT efforts, include public corruption; civil rights; organized crime; white-collar crime; and violent crime and major threats.

The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) operates with the FBI's Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) to co-locate IA representatives from the law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, defense, public safety, and homeland defense communities. The harmonization of international

and domestic counterterrorism efforts is essential to the formation of an effective counterterrorism defense.

The NJTTF setup allows for immediate access to FBI and participating agency databases and assures the rapid exchange of information and the working of issues and operational requirements. Information flows into the NJTTF from a variety of sources, including more than 100 JTTFs that are scattered throughout the U.S. The DOJ/FBI-led JTTFs retain their IA identity and incorporate investigators, linguists, SWAT members, and other expertise from a cross-section of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. JTTFs are domestically focused and combine federal, state, and local resources. Today more than 4,000 people from more than 500 state and local agencies and 55 federal organizations work within the JTTF system. Members of the USG IA infrastructure include, among others, the DHS, DOD, Immigration and ICE, and the TSA.

The FBI provides an important bridge linking international and domestic counterterrorism programs. It maintains 56 offices in major U.S. cities and 380 smaller sub-offices that provide coverage to the continental United States and in support of operations in more than 200 countries, territories, and islands. FBI officers working in more than 60 offices worldwide are identified on the U.S. Embassy Country Teams, discussed in chapter 4, as "legal attachés." Their responsibilities include sharing information, identifying threats to national security, disabling those threats if possible, investigating crimes and incidents, and identifying, tracking and apprehending terrorists and terrorist organizations. In addition to working with local authorities to meet its responsibilities, the FBI also conducts training for local law enforcement within their geographic areas of responsibility.

The FBI is involved in a joint collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security, and state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies in operating the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative. This process encourages public input to gather, document, process, analyze, and share SAR information. Additionally, the FBI maintains a Terrorist Screening Center, Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), and National Security Branch (discussed next).

The TEDAC acts as the single IA organization to receive, analyze and exploit all IED evidence relevant to U.S. CT efforts. These include working with the military, IC, and law enforcement communities to gather and share forensic data and intelligence about Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. At the time of this publication, TEDAC had received more than 100,000 IED submissions from some 50 countries. Agencies and organizations involved include the FBI Laboratory Division, Department of Justice, DOD, and international partner organizations. TEDAC works through a Biometrics Analysis Unit, Evidence Management Unit, Explosives Unit, Intelligence Unit, Scientific Analysis Unit, and Technical Exploitation Unit.

#### **Federal Bureau of Investigation–Most Wanted Terrorists**

[https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted\\_terrorists](https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists)

In coordination with the IA Rewards for Justice Program, the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) (<https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-branch/tsc>) maintains a Terrorist Watch List of those terrorists wanted worldwide. The list is the product of a comprehensive database of identifying information about those known or reasonably suspected of being engaged in terrorist activity. Photos on Web sites and other media communicate the identity of these individuals and seek additional input and tips about their location and habits to assist in their capture and prosecution. Generally, the individuals posted on various websites have been indicted by Federal Grand Juries for the crimes indicated. The list serves as a valuable asset in supporting screening agencies to positively identify known or suspected terrorists trying to obtain visas, enter the country, board aircraft, or engage in other activities. The TSA relies on the list as an important source of information to be shared with both domestic and international agencies.

The TSC is a multi-agency center that is led by the FBI. Its watch list is an important tool in the USG’s counterterrorism early warning and interdiction network.

#### **Combating Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF)**

<https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence>

Efforts by foreign state and non-state actors to influence American political processes and shape public opinion are not new threats. However, the increased sophistication of technology and communication systems have allowed outside influencers to access Americans and their institutions through the internet and social media in ways not possible even a decade ago. Public awareness of the threat has increased significantly with cases of outside interference in recent U.S. elections and those of other countries. The goal of such influence campaigns is to “spread disinformation, sow discord, and, ultimately, undermine confidence in U.S. democratic institutions and values.” The FBI established the Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) in late 2017 to address these threats. Members of the task force include representation from the Counterintelligence, Cyber, Criminal, and Counterterrorism Divisions. As needed, other FBI divisions are included, as are relevant USG IA and international partners. The task force pursues three lines of effort:

1. Investigations and Operations;
2. Information and Intelligence Sharing; and
3. Private Sector Partnerships.

#### **National Security Division (NSD)**

<https://www.justice.gov/nsd>

Under the terms of the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2006, the President established the position of Assistant Attorney General for National Security with responsibilities for the NSD. This step brought together CT, counterespionage, FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act), and other expertise from throughout DOJ into a single organization.

The NSD combats terrorism and other threats to national security by enabling greater cooperation and ensuring greater unity of purpose among prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, intelligence attorneys, and the IC. Areas of interest include Intelligence Operations and Litigation, CT to include the Antiterrorism Advisory Council, Counterespionage, Oversight, Law and Policy, Foreign Investment, and Victims of Terrorism. The Division is organized into the Counterterrorism

Section (CTS); Counterespionage Section (CES); the Office of Intelligence; Operations Section; Oversight Section; Litigation Section; the Law and Policy Office; the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism; and an Executive Office.

Specific responsibilities of the NSD include the following:

- Promote and oversee a coordinated national CT enforcement program that engages the USG IA community to include the 93 U.S. Attorneys' Offices
- Oversee and support the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council
- Consult, advise, and collaborate with prosecutors nationwide on international and domestic terrorism investigations, prosecutions, and appeals
- Share information and advice to international prosecutors, agents, and investigating magistrates
- Develop training for prosecutors and investigators on relevant tactics, laws, policies, and procedures.
- Provide guidance on interpretation and application of new terrorism statutes, regulations, and policies
- Serve as the DOJ representative on IA boards, committees, and other groups focused on national security
- Establish and maintain the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism
- Ensure the rights of victims and families are honored and respected

### Counterterrorism Section (CTS)

[https://www.justice.gov/nsd/counter\\_terrorism.htm](https://www.justice.gov/nsd/counter_terrorism.htm)

The CTS is “responsible for the design, implementation, and support of law enforcement efforts, legislative initiatives, policies and strategies relating to combating international and domestic terrorism.” The section works through investigations and prosecutions in its efforts to prevent and disrupt acts of terrorism anywhere in the world. Among its responsibilities:

- Investigate and prosecute international and domestic terrorism cases
- Investigate and prosecute terrorist financial matters

- Coordinate with USG agencies such as the DOS, DOD, DHS, Treasury Department, FBI and the IC to prevent terrorist attacks through detection and analysis and to provide relevant information to those operating in the field
- Conduct training and information programs on law, policy, procedure and guidelines for foreign and domestic law enforcement personnel, intelligence officials, private sector security practitioners, and the general public
- Assist the Anti-Terrorism Task Force Coordinators within the U.S. Attorneys' Offices
- Participate in the foreign terrorist designations process in coordination with other DOJ agencies, the DOS and the Treasury Department
- Provide staffing to the FBI's SIOC
- Share information and provide assistance to international investigators and prosecutors to assist in identifying and moving against international threats
- Provide legal advice to U.S. federal prosecutors on relevant federal statutes

### International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)

<https://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap>

One example of a USG IA initiative, primarily employing civilian power, that is engaged throughout the world with local officials is ICITAP. Founded in 1986, the organization works with foreign governments to develop law enforcement infrastructures that reduce the threats of transnational crime and terrorism, combat corruption and protect human rights. Teams work through field offices attached to a U.S. Embassy. The DOS, USAID, and DOD, serve as partners for ISITAP and provide funding for its activities.

The organization is nested within the Criminal Division of DOJ. It frequently teams up with the DOJ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training. Working together, the two organizations have been successful in developing strong relationships with law enforcement institutions around the world. These partnerships have contributed to DOJ success in achieving one of its primary missions: to support the U.S. national security strategy in combating

international terrorism and transnational crimes such as human trafficking, organized crime, public corruption, money laundering, narcotics, cybercrime, and intellectual property violations.

ICITAP personnel provide expertise in organizational development; basic police services; community policing; terrorism and transnational crime; public integrity and anticorruption; specialized and tactical skills; marine and border security; academy and instructor development; criminal justice coordination; criminal investigations; forensics; corrections; and information systems.

Assistance programs generally focus on three development challenges; representative areas of focus are provided for each:

1. Emerging democracy and developing countries (Basic investigative skills; professional standards and ethics; anticorruption investigation; human rights standards and use-of-force protocols; organizational development; transnational crime investigation)
2. Post-conflict reconstruction and international peacekeeping mission (Recruitment and vetting; training academy and instructor development; budgeting, planning, payroll, and procurement; command and control structures; leadership and management skills; critical incident management capabilities)
3. Partners in combating terrorism (Border and marine security; information systems and investigative, forensic, and criminal databases; cybercrime, post-blast, and kidnapping investigations)

SOF interaction with ICITAP personnel and programs is likely because of the types of skill-set development efforts practiced by both and shared areas of operation. ICITAP is currently engaged in some 30 countries to include programs that are underway in regions such as Africa and the Middle East; Asia and Pacific; Europe and Asia; and the Western Hemisphere.

## Additional Relevant DOJ Organizations and Initiatives

**Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (ATF)**  
<https://www.atf.gov>

**Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)**  
<https://www.bja.gov/Default.aspx>

**Counterterrorism Section (CTS)**  
[https://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/counter\\_terrorism.htm](https://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/counter_terrorism.htm)

**Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)**  
<https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/foreign-terrorist-tracking-task-force-fttff>

**INTERPOL Washington–United States National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington-USNCB)**  
<https://www.justice.gov/interpol-washington/>

**Office of Intelligence**  
<https://www.justice.gov/nsd/intelligence.htm>

**Strategic Information & Operations (SIOC)**  
<https://www.fbi.gov/services/cirg/sioc>

**Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS)**  
[https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism\\_financing](https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_financing)

**Department of Homeland Security (DHS)**  
<https://www.dhs.gov>

As its title indicates, DHS has, as its primary focus, the securing the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks as well as other man-made and natural threats. The department leads a variety of agencies whose purpose is relevant to both domestic and international CT efforts. As noted several times within this guide, the distinctions between national and international security threats have become increasingly blurred and almost meaningless. The linkages are important to recognize and address on a persistent basis.

DHS came into being under the terms of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. That legislation consolidated 22 existing federal agencies and many additional federal responsibilities that were then distributed throughout the USG. Protecting the U.S. from

Terrorism is the “founding mission of DHS.” Beyond its various organizations and capabilities, DHS oversees a system of Centers of Excellence (COEs) that are engaged in the development of new technologies and the sharing of critical knowledge that serves not only DHS, but cuts across the various stovepipes that have traditionally made up the USG IA process. In fact, these initiatives have produced what amounts to a whole-of-nation commitment to national and international security threats. Expertise comes from academic institutions; industry; national laboratories; DHS operational components; Science & Technology Divisions (DHS); federal IA partners; state, local, tribal and territorial homeland security agencies; and first responders. Current COEs include the Arctic Domain Awareness Center of Excellence (ADAC); Borders, Trade, and Immigration Institute (BTI); Center for Accelerating Operational Efficiency (CAOE); Center of Excellence for Awareness and Localization of Explosives-Related Threats (ALERT); Criminal Investigations and Network Analysis Center (CINA); Coastal Resilience Center of Excellence (CRC); Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute (CIRI); Maritime Security Center of Excellence (MSC); and the new Center of Excellence for Cross-Border Threat Screening and Supply-Chain Defense.

As senior policy guidance has increasingly aligned international security and homeland security efforts, SOF and other DOD interface with DHS agencies and programs has steadily increased. One example involves close coordination with the HSI Directorate; HSI is discussed below under Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The importance of the USSOCOM—DHS relationship is reflected in the fact that a Special Operations Support Team (SOST) is permanently assigned to DHS.

As outlined by the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and the FY 2014-18 Strategic Plan, the DHS pursues the following five-mission structure:

1. Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security
2. Secure and Manage Our Borders
3. Enforce and Administer Our Immigration Laws
4. Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace; and
5. Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience.

### Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

<https://www.cbp.gov>

With its core mission as “Guardians of Our Nation’s Borders,” the CBP is one of the largest law enforcement organizations in the world. It pursues its priority responsibility to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the U.S. Relying on the work of more than 60,000 people, CBP is responsible for apprehending individuals attempting to enter the U.S. illegally; stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband; protecting agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases; protecting U.S. businesses from theft of their intellectual property; and regulating and facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing U.S. trade laws. Its efforts are guided by the Vision and Strategy 2020, The U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan. Its strategic goals include: Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime; Advance Comprehensive Border Security and Management; Enhance U.S. Economic Competitiveness by Enabling Lawful Trade and Travel; and Promote Organizational Integration, Innovation, and Agility. CBP works through its National Targeting Center (NTC), which coordinates within the USG IA process to identify threats in advance of an incident, and participates in targeting support of USG CT initiatives. It focuses on three functional areas: Border Security, Trade, and Travel. On a typical day, CBP processes one million international passengers/pedestrians entering the U.S. and 67,000 cargo containers. It also executes some 1,100 apprehensions and seizes six tons of drugs. CBP will facilitate about \$3 trillion in legitimate trade each year as it pursues its enforcement of regulations. It works through the following offices to achieve its goals: Field Operations; Border Patrol; Air & Marine; Intelligence; International Affairs; and International Trade.

### Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

<https://www.ice.gov>

As the largest investigative agency within DHS, ICE plays a major CT role by enforcing customs and immigration laws and other supportive activities. Its principal targets are illegal immigrants who could pose threats to the U.S. and the financial and material resources they rely on to facilitate terrorist or other

criminal activity. The agency employs some 20,000 employees in all 50 states and 47 foreign countries. ICE conducts its activities through two integrated operational directorates: HSI and Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). ERO enforces immigration law beyond, at, and within U.S. borders. They seek out threats to national security and uphold the integrity of the immigration system. ICE is the second largest federal law enforcement presence within the DOJ/FBI's IA NJTTF. As such, it participates in information exchanges, planning, and other work functions among the USG IA components. Among ICE tasks under "Preventing Terrorism", it operates a Counter-Proliferation Investigations Program; Illicit Pathways Attack Strategy; Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Task Force; and Joint Terrorism Task Force. ICE also is involved with countering money laundering (including a Trade Transparency Unit) and conducting financial crimes investigations; international operations (73 offices in 47 countries) in which ICE personnel work on the ambassador's Country Team; and the ICE Cyber Crimes Center.

### Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)

<https://www.ice.gov/hsi>

The HSI Directorate is an ICE asset that is responsible for investigating domestic and international activities associated with the financial crimes; money laundering and bulk cash smuggling; commercial fraud and intellectual property theft; cybercrimes; human rights violations; human smuggling and trafficking; immigration, document and benefit fraud; narcotics and weapons smuggling/trafficking; transnational gang activity; export enforcement; and international art and antiquity theft. Of particular importance is that HSI is responsible for ICE international affairs operations and intelligence functions. HSI operates from 26 main field offices within the U.S. and offices around the world as part of embassy country teams. The directorate conducts criminal investigations against terrorists and their networks as well as against transnational criminal organizations that threaten U.S. national security. The HSI Forensic Laboratory conducts a wide variety of examinations, research and analysis to include acting as the only U.S. crime laboratory specializing in authentication of travel and identity documents. The laboratory

is also an IA asset as it supports HSI investigations, the rest of DHS, and domestic and international law enforcement agencies. HSI also investigates and seeks to disrupt international cash smuggling through its National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center.

### Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP)

<https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/office-bombing-prevention-obp>

The OBP is the lead for the DHS implementation of the National Policy for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. Its efforts are focused on building the country's ability to "prevent, protect against, respond to, and mitigate the use of explosives against critical infrastructure; the private sector; and federal, state, local, tribal and territorial entities." It operates through four Lines of Effort that include Counter-IED Strategy, Integration, and Communications; Counter-IED Assessment and Planning; Counter-IED Information Sharing; and Counter-IED Training and Awareness. It works closely with the National Security Council in ways described earlier in this IA Guide.

### Office of Policy

<https://www.dhs.gov/office-policy>

The Office of Policy strengthens homeland security by developing and integrating DHS-wide planning, programs, and policies in order to better coordinate the DHS's prevention, protection, response, and recovery missions.

The Office of Policy does the following:

- Leads coordination of DHS-wide policies, programs, and planning
- Develops Strategies
- Develops Operational Plans
- Provides a central office to develop and communicate policies across multiple DHS components
- Provides the foundation and direction for DHS-wide strategic planning and budget priorities
- Bridges multiple DHS components and operating agencies to improve communication, eliminate redundancies, and translate policies into timely action
- Creates a single point of contact for internal/external stakeholders that allow for streamlined policies across DHS

**Transportation Security Administration (TSA)**<https://www.tsa.gov>

Though most familiar for its presence in some 450 U.S. airports, the TSA is further engaged through the USG IA process to assist in the security of the nation's entire transportation system of highways, railroads, buses, mass transportation systems, and ports to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA employs some 50,000 security officers, inspectors, directors, air marshals and managers to protect the nation's transportation system. TSA Strategy for 2018-2026 establishes three strategic priorities: Improve Security and Safeguard the Transportation System; Accelerate Action; and Commit to its People. It's instructive to note that the TSA emphasizes that its strategy "aligns with the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, the Biennial National Strategy for Transportation Security, Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan, and the National Strategy for Aviation Security." This reflects how the TSA places its efforts within the larger IA context for ensuring the security of the country and the safety of its citizens.

**Coast Guard (USCG)**<https://www.uscg.mil>

The more than 40,000 active-duty, 7,000 reservists, 8,500 civilians, and almost 31,000 volunteer Auxiliary members of the USCG conduct a variety of missions designed to monitor shipping traffic near and approaching U.S. shores and to secure U.S. ports, harbors, and coastline. Through its efforts, the Coast Guard advances the goals of national security, economic prosperity, and global maritime influence. It performs within five functional roles including a military service, law enforcement organization, regulatory agency, first responder, and member of the IC. Internationally, the USCG works with other countries to improve maritime security and to support U.S. diplomatic activities. The USCG's presence in ports and along shorelines, both domestically and internationally, positions it as a source of intelligence not always available through other collection means.

**U.S. Secret Service (USSS)**<https://www.secretservice.gov>

The USSS has both protective and investigative responsibilities that cause it to engage the USG IA process for information exchanges, planning coordination, and other critical activities within the CT effort. It plays a critical role in securing the nation's financial infrastructure and money supply while protecting national leaders, visiting heads of state, and various security venues. The USSS operates out of more than 150 offices within the U.S. and abroad.

**Additional DHS Organizations and Initiatives****Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)**<https://www.fema.gov>**Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (International Programs Division)**<https://www.fletc.gov>**Federal Protective Services**<https://www.dhs.gov/federal-protective-service>**Interagency Security Committee**<https://www.dhs.gov/about-ia-security-committee>**Multi-Jurisdiction Improvised Explosive Device Security Planning (MJIEDSP)**<https://www.dhs.gov/mjiedsp>**National Protection and Programs Directorate**<https://www.dhs.gov/publication/nppd-glance>**Strategy, Plans, Analysis & Risk (SPAR)**<https://www.dhs.gov/strategy-plans-analysis-risk>**United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)**<https://www.uscis.gov>**Department of the Treasury (Treasury)**<https://www.treasury.gov/Pages/default.aspx>

The Department of the Treasury's CT role focuses on ensuring the sound functioning of the U.S. and international financial systems in the face of security threats to their stability. Through participation in the USG IA

process and coordination with PNs and international organizations, Treasury targets and manages sanctions against foreign threats to U.S. financial systems while also identifying and targeting financial support networks established to sustain terrorist and other threats to national security.

#### **Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)**

<https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx>

OFAC is the Treasury agency responsible for managing and enforcing sanctions against targeted countries, terrorists, drug traffickers, and those suspected in the proliferation of WMD. As such, it serves as one of the influential tools for asserting targeted economic power. It maintains an OFAC Sanctions List that documents those sanctions currently in place and the identities of the targets of those sanctions. OFAC is linked throughout the USG IA process and with the international community through the UN and other IGOs, international mandates, and direct cooperation with PNs. The office acts to establish controls on financial and trade transactions and, when authorized, to freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction. Such sanctions are multilateral in nature and require close coordination with international organizations and allied governments. Specific sanction programs include those targeted against Iran, Syria, and Cuba. There are also non-proliferation sanctions, counter-narcotics sanctions, and CT sanctions. OFAC also deploys attachés to postings in various countries in support of the Country Team.

#### **Office of International Affairs**

<https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-International-Affairs.aspx>

The Office of International Affairs protects and supports U.S. economic prosperity by strengthening the external economic environment to enable U.S. economic growth. It works to prevent and mitigate global economic instability and manage economic challenges as they develop. It is responsible for the development and management of U.S. international financial and trade policy. It is led by the Under Secretary of International Affairs and oversees the following functional areas: International Finance; International Markets and Development; Asia; Development Policy and Debt;

Environment and Energy; Europe and Eurasia; International Monetary and Financial Policy; Investment Security; Middle East and Africa; Technical Assistance and Afghanistan; Trade and Investment Policy; Western Hemisphere; and China and the Strategic Economic Dialogue.

The office encourages international financial stability and sound economic policies that address various issues to include monitoring possible threats to the U.S. It also tracks economic and financial conditions around the world and then coordinates with financial markets, other governments, and international financial organizations to develop and promote constructive policies. The Office of International Affairs is concerned with worldwide monetary conditions, trade and investment policy, and international debt issues.

#### **Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI)**

<https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx>

TFI synchronizes the Treasury intelligence and enforcement capabilities to protect the U.S. financial system by targeting rogue nations, those supporting terrorists, those involved with the proliferation of WMDs, drug traffickers, and various other national security threats. It “develops and implements USG strategies to combat terrorist financing domestically and internationally; develops and implements National Money Laundering Strategy as well as other policies and programs to fight financial crimes.” It interfaces with the USG IA process at several nodes, to include the IC, to produce maximum effects.

#### **Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)**

<https://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome>

Most broadly, the FAS conducts activities to improve foreign market access for U.S. products, build new markets, improve the competitive position of U.S. agriculture in the global marketplace, and provide food aid and technical assistance to foreign countries. It seeks to introduce resources and guidance on the ground to encourage agricultural growth as a component of economic development. FAS representatives are present in 93 offices covering 171 countries and are participants

on U.S. Embassy Country Teams (see chapter 4). FAS overseas offices function under the management of the Office of Foreign Service Operations (OFSO). Offices are clustered by area and overseen by separate area directors to include: Europe; Africa and the Middle East; North Asia; South Asia; and Western Hemisphere. Office types include the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT); Agricultural Trade Office (ATO); Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO); Office of Agricultural Affairs (OAA); Office of Capacity Building and Development (OCBD); U.S. Mission to the European Union (USEU); U.S. Mission to the UN (UNMIS); and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). FAS participates within the USG IA process in a variety of ways, including working closely with USAID stability efforts to administer various U.S. food aid programs. FAS also serves as a link to the WTO on a variety of issues.

### Department of Commerce (DOC) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

<https://www.commerce.gov/bureaus-and-offices/bis>

The BIS assists in support of U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic security objectives through export controls, treaty compliance, and the assurance of U.S. technology leadership. It manages and enforces dual-use export controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, and to block the transfer of weapons to terrorists, those countries supporting them, and rogue states. It plays critical roles on matters of national security, economic security, cyber security, and homeland security. Its USG Interagency relationships include the NCS, DHS, DOD, DOS, Energy Department and the IC. Aspects of the BIS mission also cause the bureau to interact with international organizations and foreign countries.

### Additional IA, Intergovernmental, and Multinational structures functioning within the CT and CbT effort

#### Interagency Counterterrorism Finance Efforts

Efforts directed at identifying, tracking, and disrupting the funding of terrorist and criminal networks and related violent activities have given rise to new, restructured and more visible organizations and structures within the USG IA infrastructure. Interagency finance activities are enhanced through interaction with other

countries and IGOs who are concerned with ensuring the stability of the international financial systems and the prevention of their abuse by criminal elements, especially terrorists. Chapter 5 identifies in detail the major international players in this process. One of those IGOs, the Financial Action Task Force, is included in this discussion.

Traditionally, a distinction has been drawn between terrorists, who pursue ideological or political goals, and criminals, who are focused on economic goals such as accumulation of wealth. Recent experience teaches that this contrast is no longer as precise as assumed earlier. Terrorists have come to rely on criminal activities to fund their terrorist activities. At the same time, criminals, both domestic and TCO, have frequently turned to the employment of terrorist tactics to eliminate competing groups and create fear and instability to enable themselves to establish safe areas from which to operate. Sometimes it's difficult and potentially misleading to superficially label an incident as terrorist or criminally motivated based on initial reporting and perceptions.

In a 2010 report on Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Gretchen Peters argues that "insurgent and terror groups operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are deepening their involvement in organized crime." She goes on to state that "militant groups on either side of the frontier function like a broad network of criminal gangs." "Anti-state actors" rely on "poor governance" and "widespread state corruption" to enable them to "engage in and protect organized crime." That dynamic is still functioning as described.

Peters suggested that there is a predictable evolution from politically motivated militant group (terrorist and insurgent) to criminal enterprise. She cites FARC, groups in the Balkans, and even the Taliban as examples of her theory. She also argues that such transformation of motivation and roles offer counterterrorist and counterinsurgent actors a strategic opportunity to exploit popular skepticism and discontent through the employment of carefully prepared influence and information campaigns. These conclusions remain compelling as monitoring of groups such as Hezbollah, Mexican and other regional drug cartels continue

to merge criminal activity with terrorist violence. Such groups are also expanding their criminal activities into cybercrime and hacking as ways to build influence and profits.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank estimate that 3–5 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is laundered annually by drug traffickers, transnational criminal organizations (TCO), and others conducting some 300 different criminal acts in the dangerous nexus of terrorist and criminal activities. This percentage translates into some \$2.17–3.61 trillion per year.

As discussed earlier, the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) plays a major coordinative role in the CT Finance efforts. Organizations involved in this wider coordination include the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC) and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA). One of its bureaus is the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which supports IA and international investigations on matters of domestic and international financial crime (see below). TFI administers the Treasury Forfeiture Fund through the Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF). Areas of special interest include the designation of individuals and groups who commit terrorist acts; working with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); protecting charitable organizations from exploitation by terrorist and criminal groups; monitoring and tracking Hawala and other Alternative Remittance Systems; and conducting the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP).

The following is a list of offices and organizations that are yoked together within various IA structures to address the challenges of identifying, tracking and disrupting terrorist finance networks. Some have been discussed earlier in a discussion of its roles within its parent organization. Others are presented briefly here:

#### **Financial Action Task Force (FATF)**

<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/>

The FATF is an IGO that, since its founding in 1989 by the G-7 countries, has grown to 38 members (including two regional organizations) with several more organizations holding associate or observer status. Its primary focus is on combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Because of its broad linkage through

financial organizations around the world, the FATF plays a critical role in information exchange, policy development, and the building of consensus to act. Its international network includes the following associate members:

- Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering
- Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
- Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
- Eurasian Group
- Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
- Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America
- Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa
- Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force

The FATF pursues its mandate by setting international standards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; assessing and monitoring compliance with FATF standards; conducting studies of money laundering and terrorist financing methods, trends, and techniques; and responding to new and emerging threats. The U.S. Treasury's Office of Terrorist Finance and Financial Crimes (TFFC), a subordinate element of the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), leads the USG's participation in the FATF.

#### **Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)**

<https://www.fincen.gov/>

FinCEN's mission is to "safeguard the financial system from illicit use, combat money laundering, and promote national security through the strategic use of financial authorities and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence." It is involved with the collection, processing, securing and disseminating information and data to law enforcement and financial regulatory partners. FinCEN also has authority to regulate financial institutions. In that role, it enforces the money-laundering rules governing some 100,000 banks and other financial institutions and programs. FinCEN serves as the Financial Investigative Unit for the U.S.

and works with more than 100 similar organizations in other countries. The strategic direction for the organization is captured in the familiar phrase: “Follow the Money.” More specifically, it supports the “Strategic Threat Disruption” and “Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism Framework” objectives of the Department of the Treasury’s Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2018-2022.

#### **National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (NBCSC) (ICE/HSI/DHS)** <https://www.ice.gov/bulk-cash-smuggling-center/>

The NBCSC identifies, tracks, and disrupts bulk smuggling of cash domestically and throughout the world. As enforcement of money-laundering regulations has stiffened, terrorists and criminals have shifted to the movement of large quantities of cash into and out of the U.S. and other countries. NBCSC operates from the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center. With stricter oversight and enforcement of anti-money laundering laws internationally, the movement of money has shifted in many cases from traditional financial institutions to processes and places outside of the traditional financial industries. The NBCSC plays an integral part in tactics, techniques and procedures targeting the illegal movement and use of funds for terrorist, drugs, and other criminal activities.

#### **Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) (ICE/DHS)** <https://www.ice.gov/about/offices/homeland-security-investigations/>

As discussed earlier, HSI plays a major role in tracking all sorts of criminal activity to include financial crime both domestically and internationally.

#### **Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS)** <https://www.ice.gov/>

Working through the HSI, the Trade Transparency Unit, and other investigative assets, ICE plays a lead role in money laundering and financial crime cases. These include various domestic scenarios as well as Foreign Corruption Investigations and Trade-Based Money Laundering.

#### **Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) (FBI)**

TFOS seeks to identify previously unknown terrorist cells and organizations by focusing on their financial

support structures. In addition to pursuing domestic terrorist organizations, they work closely with international law enforcement officials in individual countries and with international law enforcement organizations.

#### **Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) Unit (DOS)**

CTF is responsible for following leads on financial matters and, ultimately, denying terrorist and their networks access to money, other resources, and forms of support. CTF orchestrates the delivery of technical assistance and training to PNs to improve their capabilities to identify, track and disrupt the flow of money and resources to terrorists. It also assists other countries to develop their own financial investigative capabilities and capacities. CTF is an IA initiative engaging the DOS, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), FBI, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), DOJ, DHS, and Treasury.

#### **Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) (DOS)**

INL employs multiple Anti-Money Laundering and Counterterrorism Financing (AML/CTF) policies, strategies, and tools to prevent, trace and recover assets acquired from criminal activity.

The Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy (DOS) works with various bureaus, offices and IA partners to:

- Coordinate efforts to build international support for actions against terrorist financing structures
- Coordinate efforts to create, modify, or terminate sanctions (as appropriate) against foreign countries
- Coordinate domestic and international efforts targeted on the Somali pirate threat
- Develop strategies employing various sanctions regimes

#### **The DOS Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB)**

Counter-Threat Finance and Sanctions (TFS), led by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, pursues a wide agenda of international engagement targeted on the financing of terrorist activities. It is made up of two offices:

1. Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation (EB/TFS/SPI)
2. Office of Threat Finance Countermeasures (EB/ TFS/TFC)

### Counterterrorism Section (CTS) (DOJ)

[https://www.justice.gov/nsd/counter\\_terrorism.htm](https://www.justice.gov/nsd/counter_terrorism.htm)

The CTS plays a major role in CT Finance activities by investigating and prosecuting terrorist finance matters taking on a variety of forms.

### Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) (Treasury).

Discussed earlier.

### Office of International Affairs (Treasury) Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) (Treasury)

### Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) (Treasury)

### Secret Service (USSS) (DHS)

### Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) (DOC)

<https://www.commerce.gov>

## Other Interagency Organizations and Initiatives with CT Implications

As we have seen, the dynamic interaction of the USG IA process requires the participation of many departments, agencies, and organizations from throughout the USG. Though placed within specific departments such as the DOS, DOD, DOJ, IC, DHS, and so forth, USG IA components rely on expertise, resources, and experience far beyond the boundaries drawn within any specific organizational chart.

Given the numbers and wide variety of participants, programs, and relationships, many volumes could be written about the challenges of navigating the USG IA process. However, for the purposes of this guide, it is most useful to identify as many participants and programs as possible and to chart their relationships to arrive at an awareness of the existing IA capabilities and complexities. Such basic understandings empower the special operations warrior at strategic, operational, and tactical levels to function credibly and effectively.

As discussed previously, the influence of these various participants is felt in their collection and assessment of information and in their development of various options as the USG IA process flows upward through the NSC/DC and NSC/PC to the President. Once a decision is taken, the various USG organizations, both standing and ad-hoc, then play important roles in overseeing the execution of policy and the evaluation of its effectiveness.

The functioning of CT efforts requires regular liaison, sometimes in the form of embedded IA liaison teams, to ensure the closest possible coordination of efforts. To improve the efficiency of its liaison mission, USSOCOM has placed a SOST within departments, agencies, and organizations of the USG. Their purpose is to provide an embedded liaison team at critical nodes of the IA process to facilitate the exchange of information, the development of courses of action, the preparation of recommendations, and the efficient execution of executive orders.

Because the IA environment is continuously evolving and changing, no exhaustive list of IA organizations and programs is possible. However, the following are the kinds of organizations that have an impact on the effectiveness of SOF.

### Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST)

[https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/NRP\\_JFO\\_SO-PAnnexes.pdf](https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/NRP_JFO_SO-PAnnexes.pdf)

The DEST is one of a collection of response and recovery assets available to the consequence management efforts of the DHS, FBI, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These could include nuclear, biological, and chemical events. The response to any specific domestic incident, whether natural or man-made, is structured to meet the challenges encountered. Personnel on the team come from FEMA, FBI, DOD, DHHS, DOE, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The goal is to provide specialized skills and capabilities, establish emergency-response facilities, and assist in incident management efforts. DESTs can support the FBI in Contingency planning; Technical support for IA crisis management; specialized expertise in nuclear weapons and their components; Radiological dispersion devices; Chemical or Biological dispersion devices; and follow-on response assets and capabilities.

The DOD is frequently called upon to provide specific assets and expertise along with other federal, state, local, and tribal agencies. For instance, the DOD provides transportation for DEST deployments. Among the organizations that are available for consequence management include Emergency Response Teams (ERTs), Federal Incident Response Support Teams (FIRSTs), Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs), Nuclear Incident Response Teams (NIRTs), and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs).

### Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)

<https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST>

Of particular importance to the Special Operations warrior is the role played by the Operations Directorate of the DOS CT Bureau. One of the DOS CT Bureau missions involves working with DOD to develop and execute overseas CT policies, plans, and operations. The Operations Directorate also acts as a hub for communicating DOD CT initiatives throughout the DOS infrastructure, both at home and abroad. Additionally, the directorate is responsible for training and leading the quick-response, IA FEST that is designed to react to events around the world on short notice.

The FEST provides crisis management expertise, time-sensitive information and intelligence, planning for contingency operations, hostage negotiating expertise, and reach-back capabilities to agencies in Washington, D.C. The FEST relies on expertise from DOS, DOD, FBI, DOE, and the IC. FESTs have deployed to more than 20 countries since the development of the organization in 1986. For instance, two FESTs deployed to Africa in 1998 in the wake of the terrorist bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya and in Tanzania. Consistent with their mission, the teams provided assistance to the ambassadors and helped manage the consequences of the attacks.

A FEST also went to Yemen in 2000 in response to the attack on the USS Cole as it anchored in the Port of Aden. Other FESTs are routinely involved with events and situations around the world such as the abductions of Americans in Ecuador and the Philippines. “Contingency” FESTs were also deployed to the Summer Olympic Games in Athens, Greece in 2004, the Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy in 2006, and to Lagos, Nigeria during a hostage crisis.

## USSOCOM Interagency Engagement

As noted repeatedly throughout this IA Guide, it is difficult—if not impossible—to imagine a SOF mission or activity that is not based on some sort of IA cooperation and coordination. One of the purposes of this guide is to assist SOF to gain an appreciation for the wide variety of non-SOF expertise, resources, and experience that reside in the USG and are available to assist SOF in mission accomplishment. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, SOF rely on building and sustaining strong, mutually beneficial relationships with a diverse collection of stakeholders. Thus, by its very nature, SOF relies on the IA process as enablers for many—though certainly not all—of those relationships. As with all IA dynamics, the process has been evolutionary. Context is always important.

As a quotation from SOCOM 2020 points out, “our vision is a globally networked force of Special Operations Forces, Interagency, Allies and Partners able to rapidly or persistently address regional contingencies and threats to stability.” This is again why it is important to understand that SOF support and integrate with JIIM.

SOCOM 2020 goes on to assert that “effective networks are best created before a crisis.” Success in that endeavor “demands unprecedented levels of trust, confidence, and understanding—conditions that can’t be surged.” This focus on networks has continued with the release of SOCOM 2035 which stresses the importance of networks in preventative and mitigation efforts.

To ensure the most efficient environment for the exchange of information, coordination of activities, and synchronization of planning, USSOCOM for several years operated the USSOCOM Interagency Task Force (IATF) that included DOD, USG IA components, and PNs. The intent of the IATF was to move beyond ad-hoc liaison relationships to the creation of a forum where interaction is continuous and sustained. Participants in the IATF changed from time to time, but the nature of the IATF structure and process allowed for the accommodation of such changes. The IATF was disestablished in early 2013, but the rationale behind its existence and the coordination and cooperation principles persist in other structures.

USSOCOM has, for several years, employed the SOST Program that positions a SOST within many

IA partners and ensures direct access to IA partners in ways that can leverage the right decision maker to ensure the most-timely response/decision. The effectiveness of the SOSTs lies in the embedded nature of their members within other agencies and their on-scene responsiveness to their IA partners. The success of the SOST initiative has resulted in an expansion of the number and dispersion of the teams to multiple components of the IA community.

Experience teaches that SOF operations do not occur in a vacuum and, in fact, rely on coordination and support provided by other DOD, non-DOD USG departments and agencies, various host and PNs, IGOs, and NGOs.

Periodic changes in the way USSOCOM establishes and sustains its relationships with specific IA and international partners are based on the command's needs and priorities and on the demands of the international security environment.

#### **Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)**

<https://www.dsca.mil/programs/combating-terrorism-fellowship-program>

The CTFP was established under the 2002 DOD Appropriations Act as a security cooperation tool in support of the global war on terrorism. It provides education and training opportunities for foreign military officers, ministry of defense officials, and foreign security officials to build individual proficiency while enabling regional cooperation. It complements other programs such as IMET, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs), Counter Narco-Terrorist (CNT) training, Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)-related training, and Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) programs. CTFP goals include the following:

- Build the CT capabilities and capacities of PNs
- Build and strengthen a global network of combating terrorism experts and practitioners committed to participation in support of U.S. efforts against terrorists and terrorist organizations
- Counter ideological support for terrorism

ASD(SO/LIC) serves as the senior policy official for CTFP initiatives while the director of the DSCA is responsible for the management and execution of all CTFP programs. In addition to courses with a general

combating terrorism focus, programs are also offered in more specific areas such as Intelligence, Maritime Operations, Legal Issues, and Special Forces.

#### **Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)**

<https://www.opic.gov>

OPIC is a self-sustaining (no taxpayer funding), soft-power USG agency established in 1971. Its purpose is to support the execution of U.S. foreign policy by assisting U.S. businesses to invest overseas while encouraging economic and market development within more than 150 countries worldwide. OPIC initiatives are focused on establishing the reform of free markets and other institutions to support good governance and political stability. Its programs ensure that reform encourages incorporation of best business practices that promote international environmental, labor, and human rights standards. For several years, OPIC has operated its Anti-Corruption and Transparency Initiative to build credibility into the functioning of markets and the creation of wealth and social responsibility. By its very nature, OPIC works with many USG IA components to affect conditions overseas in a way to support CT activities and other USG foreign policy goals. The consequences of its efforts have contributed significantly to the stabilization of targeted areas, thus assisting in CbT and CT efforts by SOF and the entire IA enterprise.

## Chapter 7. Interagency Evolution: Past and Future

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Relationship-based national security activities have evolved considerably from the narrow War Department-State Department “IA” of the early days of World War II. These activities were described in the 1940 *Small Wars Guide to the United States Marine Corps* and demonstrated in General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s interaction with, and management of, a diverse mix of allied militaries and their (often exiled) political masters. This came after General John J. Pershing’s days of leading the American Expeditionary Forces into Europe in 1917 and carving out a satisfactory command and control structure that resulted in the most efficient and effective employment of the American Army in World War I. In our modern era, especially since the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the IA evolutionary process continues at an even faster pace as threats present themselves in novel ways. Even state-on-state, near-peer competition has reappeared at levels not predicted in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s when talk of unique consequences such as a “Peace Dividend” and the *End of History* dominated the public marketplace of ideas.

As we have seen, navigating the USG IA process presents a demanding exercise in relationship-building through cooperation, coordination, and collaboration among joint, IA, intergovernmental, and multinational actors. It involves a mosaic of different capabilities, resources, experiences, organizational cultures, agendas, and ways of doing business. Experience with these complexities teaches that working the USG IA process can be confusing and frustrating. That becomes even truer when interacting with the representatives and agendas of the private sector HN, coalition and PNs, IGOs, and NGOs.

But experience also proves that the successful achievement of national security objectives is not possible without the skillful navigation of the USG IA

process. No department, agency, or organization can do it all without the assistance of an eclectic mix of partners. An understanding of the three pillars of national security and U.S. foreign policy—defense, diplomacy, and development—and the unique role of SOF in possessing skills in each of those functional areas, has proven to be an important step in effectively applying all the elements of national power where required.

Ultimately, IA engagement is about recognizing how things work and understanding how to assert influence and leadership to accomplish the immediate mission and while achieving long-term strategic national security objectives. Even with increased familiarity with IA engagement across the USG, the process remains far too situationally and personality dependent. These factors alone create friction points that must be relitigated when new individuals or organizations are added, or new IA structures are formed.

For the special operator, the functioning of the USG IA community is more than a theoretical case study. What the USG IA process produces strategically in Washington, D.C. has a direct practical impact, both operationally and tactically, on special operations missions. The major outputs generated by the USG IA processes include presidential decisions, policy guidance, strategic direction, and national security objectives. This guidance is then translated into strategies and plans among the military commands. SOF then plan and execute their USSOCOM missions.

As noted several times in this IA Guide, the specifics of IA structure, policy, and procedures will inevitably change from time to time for a variety of reasons including the preferences of different presidential administrations, the emergence of new issues, the nature of the national security threats facing the nation, and the addition or removal of actors within the process. Navigating such an environment demands clear understandings of organizational cultures and IA

dynamics across the USG. Depending on the mission, SOF can find themselves engaging USG organizations, HN, PNs, IGOs, NGOs and, not surprisingly, competitors. Determining who wields the most power and asserts the most influence in a national-level strategy meeting is just as essential as making the same assessments during encounters with village or tribal leaders. Interagency engagement, regardless of environment, inevitably involves many different ways of doing things and many strategic objectives. Harmonizing them all effectively remains the primary challenge.

In general, however, the principles guiding the functioning of the USG IA process and other relationship-based dynamics remain the same. For instance, the structure and functioning of the NSC remains familiar, even as administrations and political parties exchange power. However, there will be differences in other areas such as participants, numbers of PCCs (or IPCs), procedures, and workflow. Terminology will often change as each president's administration adds its own particular flavor to the vernacular.

This IA Guide's discussion of the various components of the USG Interagency infrastructure provides a sense of the agencies and organizations that exist at the time this fourth edition was prepared. However, individual USG departments, agencies, and organizations are continuously seeking new ways to approach the IA challenge, resulting in fresh bureaus and offices, working groups, and programs that must be accounted for. The evolution of the size, complexity, and focus of this IA Guide over more than a decade illustrates the evolutionary nature of the process. Thus, the reality of inevitable change within the USG CT IA enterprise demands flexibility, adaptability, and a strong sense of situation awareness by all participants.

Chapters 4 and 5 discussed the added complexity that comes from extending the reach of the USG IA process overseas and then interacting with many players from outside the USG IA community. Even under the best conditions, the introduction of HN, PNs, IGOs, and NGOs demands that the special operations warrior remains focused on the mission requirements while accommodating an array of differing and sometimes competing external agendas.

What is encouraging is that, in recent decades, many traditional and potential PNs have begun to

employ their own versions of WOG approaches, particularly when creating infrastructure and in responding to perceived threats to their own territorial integrity and political sovereignty from both state and non-state actors. There has developed a shared awareness internationally that all the elements of national power have complementary roles to play in preparing for and responding to multiple threat scenarios. With so much evolving HN, PN, IGO, and NGO expertise present in any given AO, it is possible to face situations in which solutions seem to be in search of problems to solve. Random problem solving may provide immediate returns, but is rarely helpful in the achievement of intermediate or long term national and international security objectives.

At such times, an individual's IA skills, chief among them the ability to negotiate, can assist in defining shared long-term goals and orchestrating the resources to address them. The objective then becomes to chart paths that ensure a unity of effort to achieve those goals as efficiently and effectively as possible.

In such an environment, it becomes tempting to make promises about forthcoming resources and funding, especially to HN officials. It is generally not wise to do so unless there is confidence that you can keep the promises you have made.

A senior IGO official was once speaking to a group of senior Afghan military and police officials in Kabul about what assistance his organization can provide. A member of the audience aggressively challenged the official on what he charged was a failure of the speaker's own IGO to make good on an earlier promise.

According to the Afghan making the point, the IGO promised—or appeared to have promised—that each family in several closely situated villages would be provided a laptop computer. The questioner wondered why the IGO never delivered any computers, providing instead a goat and sheep to each family.

Now one could argue that in a country of 80 percent illiteracy and no or notoriously unreliable electrical service, a goat and a sheep would provide a very helpful contribution to improving each family's quality of life—more so, it would seem, than a laptop computer.

Regardless, the perceived promise of laptops was not fulfilled. This outcome challenged the credibility of

the specific IGO and the effectiveness of others working to improve living conditions in that district.

The critical skills—both within and outside the USG IA process—are to learn the various cultures, identify the problems, understand the needs to be met,

and encourage as many players as possible to invest in the effort to assure success. Adaptability is essential, as few situations allow for templated solutions. The ability to negotiate cross-culturally remains an essential skill in such situations.

## The USG Interagency Community Way Ahead

Considerable effort has gone into formalizing the structure, workflow, and cohesion of the USG IA process. Even so, that process frequently remains uncertain in its purpose and direction while remaining confusing in its complexity. It would be naïve to believe that the many decades since the enactment of the 1947 National Security Act have ensured persistent IA efficiency and effectiveness.

By its very nature, the USG IA process remains a cooperative, coordinative, and collaborative system that largely depends on the relationship-building and negotiating skills of SOF and other individuals and organizations for its success. What is required for that success is for leadership to take the initiative within the midst of uncertainty and imprecise direction. Experience teaches that such steps do not always happen without various levels of personal and institutional friction.

Personal and institutional credibility are essential to functioning successfully within the IA process. Those who are the most responsive, provide the best databases, listen most closely, craft the most perceptive assessments, and present the most promising options are most likely to have the greatest positive influence.

Major strategic and operational challenges remain to cut through the stovepipes that flow vertically through the traditional management practices of individual USG departments, agencies, and organizations. The goal is to ensure inclusion of the relevant skill sets, resources, and experiences needed to address the most pressing national security challenges. Ideally, the steps taken during the functioning of the USG IA process will fit the appropriate expertise and resources to the specific problem at hand.

Predictably, the special operations warrior within the AO will face situations that do not fit traditional military problem-solving models. Even those most skilled and experienced within the SOF enterprise will face expertise limitations from time to time.

For instance, special operations warriors are not necessarily well positioned to offer the most informed advice to local mayors or community leaders on how to interact effectively with village councils and community opinion leaders to build a consensus for action in a given situation. Others within the USG and throughout the private sector, however, have those skills and experiences and can contribute if properly engaged and deployed to where they are needed. In their absence, however, such responsibilities frequently fall to the special operations warrior who is immediately available on the ground.

Thus, the broad question remains on how best to gather the necessary human and material resources and then set them on the path to achieve the nation's national security objectives. The USG IA process has progressed significantly in precisely defining those objectives. Recent advancement of the concept of Civilian Power and the interaction of the three pillars of defense, diplomacy and development are important steps.

Shortcomings remain, however, in determining how the IA process should improve the efficiency of information exchanges; technology interface; analysis; assessment; development of policy options and operational courses of action; anticipation of consequences; presentation of recommendations; the translation of policies, strategic guidance, and Presidential decisions into workable operational plans; and the management and adaptation of those plans once introduced into the operational environment.

Put another way, how does the USG most efficiently and effectively employ all of the elements of national power (DIME-FIL) to address specifically the threats posed by the full range threats to national security? What does success look like?

In the absence of standardized USG IA workflow and coordination procedures, gaining agreement in

identifying shared end states remains a challenge. This situation is particularly true overseas where HN, PN, IGO, and NGO influences beyond the USG IA community inevitably complicate the strategic components of where we are going (ends), how we are getting there (ways), and how we are going to resource the effort (means).

For instance, those from the international community assisting with the institutional reform of HN parliaments or national representative bodies inevitably bring with them their own knowledge and expectations of how the systems function within their own home countries. An American mentor to a country's legislative body, relying on U.S. congressional history as a backdrop, will offer different advice than someone from a parliamentary tradition or individuals from several different parliamentary traditions. This was certainly the case in Afghanistan when legislative systems from as many as seven different countries were offered simultaneously as the correct way to establish the ideal legislative body.

Thus, faced with what appears to be conflicting guidance, HN officials sincerely trying to develop the most effective representative democracy for their own country may find themselves receiving different and perhaps conflicting advice on how legislative bodies "should" work. That's just one example.

The presence of representatives from several different military forces—each with its own doctrine, TTPs—introduces similar confusion when all are advising the same HN military using their own familiar points of reference. The problem is compounded when those from different services from within the U.S. military and those of other countries train the HN more narrowly on "how we do it" in our service or, more narrowly, on our base.

Whether domestically or internationally, the USG IA process seeks to achieve efficiencies by leveraging diverse human and material resources toward a shared end state. Part of the effort involves minimizing task duplication and structural redundancy. Complete elimination of either is not possible, resulting in frustration for those who try to do so.

While horizontal coordination is necessary within the USG IA process, it is essential within the AO. In the absence of the familiar unity of command, the

special operations warrior must learn to work within an IA process guided by lead agencies pursuing a unity of effort or, in some cases, the even-softer unity of purpose.

As always, individual and organizational credibility is gained through producing results: Tangible measures of effectiveness (MOE). Operating within the USG IA process requires a difficult balancing act between loyalty to one's own home agency and allegiance to the objectives of U.S. policy. Understandably, that loyalty to home agency is a powerful motivator, one correctly viewed as essential to self-preservation.

Those seeking to improve the functioning of the USG IA process must wrestle with that reality and others. The USG IA process is in a condition very similar to the one that led to the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433). Goldwater-Nichols reorganized the DOD and redirected the efforts of the U.S. defense community. Though shortcomings remain, the DOD is a vastly more efficient defender of U.S. national security than it was in 1986. The process has taken time, as will any broader effort to bring similar reform to the entire USG IA structure.

While complex in its provisions, Goldwater-Nichols answered the basic question, "Who's in charge?" Such clarity could quickly boost the effectiveness of the USG IA process. Establishing responsibility within any context enables the reform of relationship-building, coordination, and workflow shortfalls. Admittedly, it's not likely that IA lines of responsibility will match the leadership clarity achievable within military organizations.

However, even precisely defined IA "leads" can provide a level of certainty in direction that leads to a harmonization of organizational or "tribal" cultures, but certainly not their replacement. If done well, establishing clear responsibility and follow-on reform initiatives will improve IA flexibility, adaptability, and responsiveness by creating consistency. It has worked in various IATF structures and can, with effort, in more complex organizations and situations.

How to improve the functioning of the IA enterprise is a question of persistent interest. The November 2008 report, Project on National Security Reform: Forging a New Shield, marked a significant step forward

in addressing this challenge. The changes within the international security environment discussed in the report have only accelerated in the years since its publication. It also focused on the challenges of balancing the employment of the Elements of National Power, noting that “the U.S. government has proved unable to integrate adequately the military and non-military dimensions of a complex war on terror, or to effectively integrate hard and soft power in Iraq.” It drew similar conclusions about the conditions in Afghanistan at the time and the response of the USG to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The report outlined four “fundamental principles” for addressing contemporary security threats:

1. “Efforts to address current and futures challenges must be as multidimensional as the challenges themselves.”
2. “The national security system must integrate diverse skills and perspectives.”
3. “A new concept of national security demands recalibration of how we think about and manage national security resources and budgeting.”
4. “The current environment virtually by definition puts a premium on foresight—the ability to anticipate unwelcome contingencies.”

The report goes on to identify what it calls “five interwoven problems.”

1. “The system is grossly imbalanced. It supports strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.”
2. “Resources allocated to departments and agencies are shaped by their narrowly defined core mandates rather than broader national missions.”
3. “The need for presidential integration to compensate for the systemic inability to adequately integrate or resource missions overly centralizes issue management and overburdens the White House.”
4. “A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole to be agile and collaborative at any time, but it is particularly vulnerable to breakdown during

the protracted transition periods between administrations.”

5. “Congress provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce the first four problems and make improving performance extremely difficult.”

In light of its stated “fundamental principles” and defined problems, the report proposes several specific recommendations:

1. “Mobilize and marshal the full panoply of the instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives.”
2. “Create and sustain an environment conducive to the exercise of effective leadership, optimal decision-making, and capable management.”
3. Devise a more constructive relationship between the executive branch and Congress appropriate for tackling the expanded national security agenda successfully.”
4. “Generate a sustainable capacity for the practice of stewardship—defined as the long-term ability to nurture the underlying assets of American power in human capital social trust and institutional coherence—throughout all domains of American Statecraft.”

While progress in IA and other relationship-based efforts has clearly been made, nothing has happened in the years since the report’s publication that challenges its basic conclusions or calls into question its recommendations. These findings, submitted to the president, along with other initiatives, have continued to seek a more efficient and effective relationship-based path to addressing the national security threats to the United States and its various intergovernmental and multinational partners. As we’ve discussed in this IA Guide, much work still needs to be done.

Just as many countries display maps that portray themselves as the center of their region or of the entire world, many participants regard the USG IA process with themselves as the central point of focus. Thus, the question for them becomes, How does the IA process support my department, agency, or organization?

That's the wrong question! Rather we should ask how the IA process can better support the achievement of U.S. national security objectives. Followed by the question of how best can my organization support the IA process and contribute to achieving those national security objectives?

The seemingly simple act of identifying *who's in charge* is an important first step in IA reform. As we've

discussed, that is not always a simple task! Until then, the special operations warrior—possessing defense, diplomatic, and development skills—must continue to navigate through a personality and situationally dependent environment, with all its attendant uncertainties and frustrations, to accomplish whatever mission they've been assigned.

## Reviewing the Past—A Technique for Looking Forward

Americans have always been a forward-looking people. At the same time, we're often accused of suffering from historical amnesia, either for not knowing or not remembering what has happened before. It's not important to know which. But it is helpful to understand that such a view is not entirely inaccurate and has consequences for American credibility and effectiveness.

One thing is certain: What comes in the future won't look exactly like what happened in the past. Neither will the response of the IA community to events and issues. That does not mean, however, that there is nothing to be learned by looking at both what did and did not work in the past. What follows is a brief sampling of IA structures, some still in place, that can inform the continued evolution of what it means to be effective while working through the process of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational.

### Interagency Task Force (IATF)

An IATF is made up of USG IA representatives, including the DOD, PNs, and others who are tasked with taking on specific issues or missions. Their primary focus is on geographic or functional responsibilities. Unlike the FBI's JTTF or coordinative organizations, IATFs are typically intended to be short-term organizations with specific tasks to perform and with the authority under a single commander to act on those tasks. They then disband once their purposes are fulfilled.

The ad-hoc purpose and structure of IATFs, however, provide flexibility that allows them to adapt to changing situations and thus occasionally breed longer-than-anticipated life cycles as missions expand or

threats become more immediate. IATF-South represents such an example. There are others as well whose functioning is instructive.

### Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South)

<https://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/>

Increased DOD involvement with counterdrug operations took shape beginning in 1989 with various senior military commanders establishing individual task forces and other similar organizations focused on their specific mission sets. With a reorganization in 1994 and a consolidation in 1999, the life cycle of JIATF-South now spans more than three decades in one form or another.

According to its mission statement, JIATF-South “conducts detection and monitoring operations throughout their Joint Operating Area to facilitate the interdiction of illicit trafficking in support of national partner nation security.” It coordinates across the IA enterprise and with international partners to identify transnational criminal networks and to support their interdiction and apprehension.

The JIATF-South's strategic goals include:

- Eliminate the primary flow of illicit drugs in and through the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- Expand to include all critical international and IA partners
- Achieve 100 percent domain awareness of illicit trafficking
- Shape the command for success

Although developed in the counter-drug environment, JIATF-South has become a model for the organization, staffing, coordination, information sharing,

intelligence fusion, planning, and execution for other IATFs faced with different complex missions. This model includes many of the IA features of the USAF-RICOM discussed in chapter 3 of this IA Guide.

Within the DOD, JIATF-South synchronizes activities with the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Army National Guard, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and Southern Command. Among the USG IA partners are:

- a. U.S. Coast Guard
- b. Customs and Border Protection
- c. Central Intelligence Agency
- d. Drug Enforcement Administration
- e. Defense Intelligence Agency
- f. Federal Bureau of Investigation
- g. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- h. National Security Agency
- i. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

To extend its reach, several Hemispheric and European countries have sent liaison teams and, in some cases, maritime assets to support the JIATF-South mission.

### Interagency Task Force-CT (Afghanistan)

As U.S. military forces began their fight against the Taliban and other insurgent forces in the fall of 2001, USCENTCOM established IATF-CT that deployed to Afghanistan in support of the effort. Its primary responsibilities were to act as an intelligence-gathering fusion center and to operate the interrogation facility at Bagram Air Base.

From its beginning, IATF-CT maintained a strong IA structure. Among others, membership included:

- a. Federal Bureau of Investigation
- b. Central Intelligence Agency
- c. Diplomatic Security Service
- d. Customs Service
- e. National Security Agency
- f. Defense Intelligence Agency
- g. New York City's Joint Terrorism Task Force
- h. Department of Justice
- i. Department of the Treasury
- j. Department of State

A few allied nations also provided representatives who worked side-by-side with the others to exchange

information and collectively apply their skill sets, resources, and experiences to the effort. As conditions on the ground in Afghanistan evolved, the IATF-CT returned to the U.S. in the spring of 2002 and began a transformation from the temporary, ad-hoc structure and focus of an IATF to more sustained operations as USCENTCOM's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).

Both JIATF-South and IATF-CT came into existence to address a specific threat to U.S. national security. Each organization demonstrated its abilities to accommodate the vastly different cultures, skill sets, and procedures that contributed to their diverse memberships. Harmonizing these differences allowed both to make significant contributions to the accomplishment of national security objectives and to act as models for newer IATF organizations created to address CT and other security threats.

### Other Examples

The linkage between economic recovery, stabilization, and development, has deep roots within the American international security experience. Some of these include:

#### Post-World War II Stabilization & "The Marshall Plan"

<https://www.marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/>

The incredible destruction brought about by World War II left Europe in shambles. Efforts began immediately in 1945 to provide humanitarian relief to the people on the continent and to begin taking measures to rebuild cities and economies and other aspects of civilized communities. Some 18 countries received assistance through "The Marshall Plan", known officially as the "European Recovery Program" or ERP. It came into existence in 1948 with the stated goal to "promote world peace and the general welfare, national interests, and foreign policy of the United States through economic, financial, and other measures necessary to the maintenance of conditions abroad in which free institutions may survive and consistent with the maintenance of the strength and stability of the United States."

The roles of recovery, stability, and development in supporting the achievement of foreign policy and national security goals is obvious. The geopolitical

situation at the time saw the establishment of the so-called “Iron Curtain” across large areas of Europe by the occupying military forces of the Soviet Union. The countries that came under Soviet domination included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Marshall Plan assistance was offered to those countries as well as to Western countries, but the Soviets prevented the delivery of any assistance to them. The political environment of the years between 1948 and 1951 and beyond, on both sides of the “Iron Curtain”, was affected by which countries received assistance through the Marshall Plan. It became a tool for building the levels of stability to resist Soviet influence and expansion. The confrontation between West and East during the Cold War took on an important military dimension with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949 and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact in May 1955. The Warsaw Pact disbanded in July 1991.

While no recovery, stabilization, and development effort has ever again matched the Marshall Plan in scope, smaller initiatives during decades since are often referred to as “Marshall Plans” to stabilize post-conflict and destabilized areas of the world.

#### The Office of Civil Operations and Rural Support (CORDS)

<https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/cords-region2.html>

Moving forward several decades and into an on-going Vietnam conflict, the Office of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) was established in May 1967 to pursue a wide range of stability and development initiatives that reached down to the village level in various regions throughout South Vietnam. Its mission involved “coordinating and managing all pacification and rural development operations and activities in support of the South Vietnamese Government.” Responsibilities included programs and initiatives pursued by both the South Vietnamese and the United States. The effort included an advisory component through which assistance was provided to local government officials at various levels “on providing continuous territorial security and destroying the local VC infrastructure.” While the various regions fielded organizations adapted to their areas of responsibility, the following functional areas of effort were typical:

- a. Deputy for CORDS (regional)
- b. Management Support Division
- c. Plans, Programs, and Reports Division
- d. Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) Division
- e. Land Reform Division
- f. New Life Development Division (Agricultural, Education, Engineer, and Rural Development Cadre Branches)
- g. Psychological Operations Division
- h. Public Administration Division
- i. Public Health Division
- j. Public Safety Division
- k. Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) Advisory Division

CORDS activities continued until early 1973 when it was disbanded as a step in the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

#### International Support for Afghanistan

The commitment of the international community to the challenges of rebuilding Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. presents a useful example of the complexities in place to challenge the special operations warrior. Figure 8 captures a flavor of the international presence.

As the Taliban regime crumbled throughout the country, members of the international community, sponsored by the UN, gathered in Bonn, Germany to discuss the way ahead. The product of their work was called the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institution,” known more commonly as the “Bonn Agreement” or “Bonn 1.” It established a timeline for the establishment of an elected government and an overview of the tasks necessary to accomplish that very specific objective.

The Afghan Presidential Election of October 2004, the inauguration of President Hamid Karzai in December 2004, the National Assembly Election of September 2005, and the seating of the National Assembly in December 2005 accomplished many of the goals of the agreement. As part of the Bonn Agreement Process, the UN and many in the international community committed themselves to various specific tasks to assist in bringing stability to Afghanistan. That commitment




Figure 8. International Support for Afghanistan

has been renewed in different forms many times in the years since. The Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational door opened wide as many in the world saw an opportunity to display their capabilities to help assist. In addition to the U.S. and other traditional international players, new partner countries engaged in the effort.

The commitments included Mongolia, which undertook the mission of training Afghan artillerymen because of their experience with the Soviet-era equipment used by the Afghan National Army (ANA). The NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), established by the Bonn Agreement to secure Kabul and its surroundings, swelled to more than 40 countries as nonmember countries signed on to assist. The scope of the ISAF mission expanded dramatically over the years.

Traditionally NATO had restricted its activities to the geographic boundaries of its member countries and their immediate region. Since its establishment, the alliance has been guided by the provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

As noted earlier, the only invocation of Article 5 came in response to the 2001 attacks on the United States. Over the decades, NATO has largely stayed away from direct military involvement in security missions considered to be outside of its geographical boundaries or “out of area.” Thus, Afghanistan became an entirely new experience for NATO and the other military forces, although certainly not for the U.S. and other countries acting alone or in concert outside NATO.

Although exercised for generations and put to the test in limited initiatives since the end of the Cold War,

NATO procedures were applied in an extended operation under the alliance commitment to Afghanistan. The challenges increased as NATO forces expanded the ISAF mandate to other parts of the country, as envisioned in the Bonn Agreement, and assumed new missions such as combat operations in the southern and regions of the country. In addition to ISAF, the original Coalition Force remained operational and continued the fight against Taliban remnants, al-Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations.

Reform of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and ANA initially became the responsibility of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), a U.S.-led multinational organization operating from a tiny corner of a small compound in Kabul. The organizational name and missions changed over the years. The ISAF mission and various advisory tasks later were carried out under the provisions of the Resolute Support Mission.

### Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

<https://www.usaid.gov/provincial-reconstruction-teams>

PRTs were first established in Afghanistan, where the Gardez City PRT opened in early 2002. PRTs were designed to assist in extending the influence of the central government from Kabul and other major cities into those isolated areas so that they are less likely to fall under the influence of destabilizing forces that breed and harbor terrorists and their networks. Much like the CORDS Program of the Vietnam Era, PRTs are regionally and locally focused. As stated on the USAID website, their goal has been to “improve security, support good governance, and enhance provincial development.” PRTs operate under the direction of both the United States and its various international partners. Thus, PRTs facilitate the international delivery of assistance into Afghan districts and promises.

The PRTs vary in size depending on local needs and the prevailing security situation. In addition to military personnel, the PRT includes USG IA representation (working through the Country Team), PNs, IGOs, and NGOs.

US-led PRT leadership consists of both military and Foreign Service officers who strive to synchronize the agendas, policies, strategies, procedures, and activities of all participants to gain the greatest impact from

the shared effort. PRTs work closely with local village, district and provincial officials, and military operational units to strengthen local governance, reform the security sector beginning with the police, and execute reconstruction and development projects.

Among others, specific PRT tasks involve establishing security, developing and executing plans for reconstruction and development, improving governance through the mentoring of local and district leaders and other measures, and judicial reform.

DOS, USAID, USDA, and other members of the USG IA community play prominent roles in building government capacity, combating corruption, discouraging poppy growth, encouraging the growth of alternative crops, and local and regional planning.

Specific USAID responsibilities include:

- Engage key government, military, tribal, village and religious leaders in the provinces, regarding local development priorities and USAID programs;
- Work with Afghan authorities to provide security, including support for key events such as the Constitutional Loya Jirga, presidential and parliamentary elections, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia forces;
- Assist in the deployment and mentoring of Afghan National Army and Police units assigned to the provinces; and
- Partner with the Afghan Government, the U.N., other donors and NGOs to provide needed development and humanitarian assistance.

### Village Stability Operations (VSO)

Another stability initiative employed in Afghanistan were the VSO through which SOF operating in Afghanistan have conduct operations in strategically important areas of rural Afghanistan. VSO represented a grass-roots campaign to improve security, develop responsive governance, and sustain development. Places like Afghanistan and similar social and political environments frequently have traditional indigenous methods of governance that can be brought into play to create conditions that can build stability while being unfavorable favorable to terrorists, rogue criminals, or insurgents. The placement of VSO enabled SOF to build

relationships and work with indigenous social, political, and economic dynamics to achieve necessary strategic objectives employing both hard and soft power. VSO efforts pursued four Lines of Effort:

1. Shape (to include gaining indigenous consent and investment in the VSO process).
2. Hold (to include SOF, supported by partner and coalition countries, HN agencies and indigenous police and military forces).
3. Build (to include meeting basic needs that contribute to the quality of life, undermine grievance narratives, and provide local populations with grounds for hope for a better future).
4. Expand and Transition (to include reducing village and district isolation—and vulnerability to terrorist, rogue criminal and insurgent influences—by creating connections between local leadership structures, through district and provincial governance, to the central government in places like Kabul).

NOTE: Over time, the roles and functions played by PRTs, VSO, and other structures and programs have and will continue to evolve and adapt to the unique conditions they find on the ground in a specific operational environment. Just as PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan didn't look or function in exactly the same ways, future programs will take on different appearances and provide similar, but not identical, services. The same will be true of VSO. That contemporary stabilization efforts draw upon the lessons of the past, to include the CORDS Program and even the extensive Marshall Plan, and illustrate the evolutionary nature of the effort. Creating positive effects should be the focus, not a concern over similarities or differences.

### Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

<https://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp>

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, successor to the earlier and very effective Pan-Sahel Initiative, is a DOS-led IA program involving DOS, DOD, USAID, and others in a broad initiative to confront the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in the

Maghreb and Sahel in Africa. The initiative's broad strategic goal is to defeat terrorist organizations by:

- Strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities.
- Enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces.
- Promoting democratic governance.
- Discrediting terrorist ideology.
- Reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States.

The multi-year initiative works within the wider context of the DOS's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) programs to counter international crime, illegal drugs, and instability overseas. TSCTP brings together CT, democratic governance, military assistance, and public diplomacy activities. In addition to USG IA components, regional IGOs such as the African Union (Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism) are involved with the efforts. Interagency participants have identified four specific strategic goals to be accomplished within the operational environment:

1. Build local capacity
2. Counter radicalization
3. Foster regional cooperation
4. Enhance public diplomacy and communication strategies

The partnership focuses on nine countries, including the Maghreb nations of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sahel nations of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Nigeria and Senegal are also participants.

Military support for the TSCTP is present in the form of USAFRICOM's Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), which is the USG's regional war on terrorism. However, OEF-TS engages TSCTP primarily as a security and cooperation initiative. OEF-TS partners with Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

Capacity-building programs focus on nurturing tactical intelligence capabilities that encourage the development of "eyes and ears" to identify and target potential terrorists and their networks.

Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) efforts are also involved.

A variety of train-and-equip programs support CT efforts to provide weapons, equipment, training, and tactical mentoring to stop the flow of uncontrolled weapons, goods, and people and to neutralize safe havens where terrorists thrive.

Efforts in counter radicalization, public diplomacy, and communications have contributed with a variety of initiatives. Programs to reduce the pool of potential terrorist recruits have focused on encouraging youth employment and civic education, improving educational access and quality, and reintegrating former combatants.

Additionally, programs to increase government credibility and reduce ungoverned areas have sought to improve good governance practices at the local level, the capacity of rule-of-law systems, and the ability of the government to be seen as providing necessary goods and services to their populations.

Upgrading communication capacity within the partner countries allows the government to counter extremist claims and behavior by keeping their populations informed about what is being done to protect them and improve their quality of life. Ideally, favorable views of the USG and its support of the HN government breed popular respect for a government that is able to partner with such a helpful and influential ally.

Other JIIM-styled case studies include, but are certainly not limited to:

- Operation Provide Comfort, 1991
- The Balkans and Kosovo War, 1991
- Somalia, 1992
- Tsunami Relief to Indonesia, 2004
- Haitian Earthquake, 2010
- Syrian Civil War, 2011

As national security challenges continue to diversify and intensify, innovative, flexible, and adaptable IA, intergovernmental, and multinational relationships, structures, and ways of doing business will continue to be required as documented within this SOF Interagency Guide.

## Appendix A. List of Organizations and Programs

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The following USG departments, agencies and organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and terminology provide the human and material resources and shared references involved with addressing national security challenges in JIIM environments. Some of the components listed here are not discussed in the text or have only a limited mention, but can be reached through the links to allow for individual research as required.

The national security JIIM environment is ever changing with new organizations, structures and programs regularly joining the fight. This list is not exhaustive, but it does identify the major players. As noted several times, this caveat is particularly apt for NGOs because there are many thousands that operate around the world. A comprehensive list would be more confusing than helpful; it would also never be completely accurate. The organizations and programs identified here, and others that come into and out of existence, are useful as resources to assist SOF in their performance of Core Activities across the Competition Continuum.

Action Against Hunger (USA) (NGO)  
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (DOS)  
African Union (Regional IGO)  
Africare (NGO)  
Agricultural Trade Office (ATO) (FAS/USDA)  
ALIGHT (formerly American Refugee Committee) (NGO)  
American Council for Voluntary Action (Interaction) (NGO)  
American Friends Service Committee (NGO)  
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) (FAS/USDA)  
Antiterrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) (DOJ)  
Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) (DOS)  
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Regional IGO)

Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)  
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF)  
Assistant Attorney General for National Security (DOJ)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security Affairs)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)  
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Regional IGO)  
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) (Regional IGO)  
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)  
Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) (ICE/DHS)  
Bureau for Food Security (BFS) (USAID)  
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (BATFE) (DOJ)  
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) (DOS)  
Bureau of Business and Security (BIS) (DOC)  
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) (DOS)  
Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) (DOS)  
Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) (USAID)  
Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance–Office of Civil Military Cooperation (CMC) (USAID)  
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)  
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) (DOS)  
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) (DOS)  
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) (DOS)  
Bureau of Global Public Affairs (DOS)

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS)  
Bureau of Industry and Security (DOC)  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) (DOS)  
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) (DOD)  
Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) (DOS)  
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) (DOS)  
Bureau of Justice Assistance (DOJ)  
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) (DOS)  
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) (DOS)  
Business Executives for National Security (BENS)  
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) (NGO)  
Center for Awareness & Location of Explosives-Related Threats (ALERT) (DHS)  
Center for Security Evaluation (CSE) (ODNI)  
Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication (CSCC) (DOS)  
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (DHHS)  
Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) (DHS)  
Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) (DOS)  
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
CIA Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC)  
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (DOD)  
Chemical Countermeasures Unit (CCU) (BFI-WMD Directorate) (FBI)  
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)  
Chief of Mission (COM) (DOS)  
Church World Service (CWS) (NGO)  
Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC)  
Civil-Military Information Center (CIMIC)  
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) (DOD)  
Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE) (DOD)  
Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) (DOC)  
Coalition Support Funds (CSF) (DOD)  
Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)  
Colonel Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation (DOD)  
Combatant Commanders Initiative Funds (CCIF) (DOD)  
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) (DOD)  
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) (DOD)  
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTT- SO) (DOD)  
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) (DOD)  
Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) (USAID)  
Congressional Research Service (CRS)  
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) (NGO)  
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) (DOD)  
Counterintelligence Center (CIC) (CIA)  
Counterintelligence Division (CD) (FBI)  
Counter-IED Collaboration Center (C3) (FBI)  
Counter-ISIS Finance Group (CIFC) (Treasury/IGO)  
Counter-Narco Terrorist (CNT) Training (DOD)  
Counterterrorism Financial Unit  
Counterproliferation Center (CPC) (FBI)  
Counterterrorism Center (CTC) (CIA)  
Counterterrorism Division (CTD) (FBI)  
Counterterrorism Finance Unit (CTF) (DOS)  
Counterterrorism Fly Team (FBI/DOJ)  
Counterterrorism Section (CTS) (DOJ)  
Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG) (NSC/PCC)  
Counterterrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement  
Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions (TFS) (DOS)  
Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) (CIA)  
Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) (DOJ)  
Cultural Support Teams (CST) (DOD)  
Cyber Crimes Center (C3) (ICE/DHS)  
Cyber Forensics Section (C3/ICE/DHS)  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) (DHS)  
Cyber-Threat Framework (CTF) (ODNI)  
Cyber-Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) (ODNI)

Defeat-ISIS Communications Working Group (IGA)  
 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)  
 Defense Attaché (DATT) (DOD/DIA)  
 Defense Attaché System (DAS) (DOD/DIA)  
 Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)  
 Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)  
 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)  
 Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) (DOD)  
 Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS)  
 Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) (DOD)  
 Defense and Management Contacts (DMC) Programs (DOD)  
 Defense Planning Committee (NATO) (Regional IGO)  
 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) (DOD)  
 Defense Security Services (DSS)  
 Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD) (DOD)  
 Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)  
 Department of Commerce (DOC)  
 Department of Defense (DOD)  
 Department of Energy (DOE)  
 Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)  
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  
 Department of Homeland Security's Traveler's Redress Inquiry Program (DHS-TRIP)  
 Department of Justice (DOJ)  
 Department of State (DOS)  
 Department of the Treasury (TREAS)  
 Department of Transportation (DOT)  
 Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) (DOS)  
 Deputy to the Commander for Civilian-Military Activities (DCMA) (USAFRICOM)  
 Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) (USAFRICOM)  
 Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) (DOS)  
 Director, Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) (CIA)  
 Director of Foreign Assistance Resources (F) (DOS)  
 Director of National Intelligence (DNI)  
 Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) (DOS)  
 Directorate of Intelligence (DI) (FBI)  
 Directorate of Support (DS) (CIA)  
 Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) (UN)  
 Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)  
 District Stability Framework (USAID)  
 Division for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions (DOS)  
 Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (NGO)  
 Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) (DHS)  
 DOS CT Bureau (DOS)  
 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DOJ)  
 East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI)  
 Economic Development Administration (DOC)  
 Economic Support Fund (ESF)  
 Electronic Crimes Task Force-London (DHS)  
 El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) (DEA/CBP)  
 E-Mine (UN)  
 Energy, Sanctions and Commodities (EEB/ESC) (DOS)  
 Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)  
 European Police Office (EUROPOL) (IGO)  
 European Union (EU) (Regional IGO)  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation—Most Wanted Terrorists (FBI) (DOJ)  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation—Terrorism (FBI) (DOJ)  
 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)  
 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (DHS)  
 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center-International Programs Division (FLETC) (DHS)  
 Federal Protective Services (FPS) (ICE/DHS)  
 Field Advance Civilian Team (FACT) (DOS)  
 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (IGO)  
 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)  
 Field Advance Civilian Team (FACT) (DOD)  
 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (UN) (IGO)  
 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (DHHS)  
 Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) (DOA)  
 Foreign Consequence Management Program (FCM) (DOS)  
 Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) (DOS)  
 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)  
 Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) (FBI)  
 Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (DOD)

Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF) (DOD)  
 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (DOD)  
 Foreign Service Institute (FSI)  
 Foreign Service Officer (FSO)  
 Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)  
 Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) (DOJ)  
 Forensics Engagement Working Group (FEWG) (DOS)  
 Fusion Centers & Intelligence Sharing  
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  
 Geographic combatant commander (DOD)  
 Global Coalition Against Daesh (IGO)  
 Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (DOS)  
 Global Engagement Center (GEC) (DOS)  
 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)  
 Global Intelligence Work Group (GIWG) (DOJ)  
 Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT)  
 Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) (DOS)  
 Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)  
 Global SOF Network (USSOCOM) (DOD)  
 Global Strategic Engagement Team (GSET) (DOS)  
 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (IGO)  
 Head of Mission (HOM) (DOS)  
 High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) (FBI)  
 Homeland Security Centers of Excellence (DHS)  
 Homeland Security Council (HSC) (White House)  
 Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) (ICE/DHS)  
 Homeland Security Investigations Forensic Laboratory (ICE/DHS)  
 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)  
 Human Terrain Teams (HTT) (DOD)  
 Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)  
 Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) (DOD)  
 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) (DSCA/DOD)  
 Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) (DOD)  
 Humanitarian Information Center (HIC)  
 Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) (DOS)  
 Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)  
 Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC)  
 Information Sharing Council (ISC) (ODNI)  
 Information Sharing Environment (ISE) (ODNI)  
 Information Sharing Environment Program Manager (PM-ISE) (ODNI)  
 Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) (DNI)  
 Intelligence Community (IC)  
 Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)  
 Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC)  
 Interagency Conflict Assessment Team (ICAT) (USAID)  
 Interagency Management System (IMS)  
 Interagency Operations Security Support Staff (IOSS)  
 Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) (UN)  
 Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) (NCTC/DNI)  
 Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) (OAS) (IGO)  
 International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH) (IGO)  
 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (IGO)  
 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (IGO)  
 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)  
 International Collection and Engagement Program (ICEP) (FBI)  
 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (IGO)  
 International Communications and Information Policy (EEB/CIP) (DOS)  
 International Cooperation Development Fund (ICDF)  
 International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)  
 International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) (DOJ)  
 International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (IGO)  
 International Development Association (IDA)  
 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (IGO)  
 International Finance Corporation (IFC)  
 International Humanitarian Law (IHL)  
 International Labor Organization (ILO) (UN) (IGO)

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International Maritime Bureau (IMB)

International Medical Corps (IMC) (NGO)

International Military Education and Training (IMET) (DOS/DOD)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IGO)

International Operational Response Framework (IORF) (DOS)

International Organization for Migration (IGO)

International Rescue Committee (IRC) (NGO)

International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (ISPI) (IGO)

International Security Events Group (ISEG) (DOS)

INTERPOL Washington—United States Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington—USNCB) (DOJ)

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (DOD)

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF)

Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) (DOD)

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) (DOD)

Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South)

Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) (DOD)

Joint Operations Center (JOC) (DOD)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) (DOD)

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) (DOJ/FBI)

Joint Terrorism Task Force Military Working Group (FBI/DOJ)

Law Enforcement Agency (LEA)

Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx) (DOJ)

Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) (NGO)

Media Operations Center (MOC) Merida Initiative (DOS)

Mercy Corps (NGO)

Military Committee (NATO) (Regional IGO)

Military Department Intelligence Services (DOD)

Military Group (MILGP)

Military Information Support Team (MIST) (DOD)

Military Intelligence Program (MIP) (DOD)

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)

Mission Management Teams (DNI)

Mobile Training Team (MTT) (DOD)

Multi-Jurisdiction Improvised Explosive Device Security Planning (MJIEDSP) (DHS)

Narcotics Control Officer (NCO) (DOS)

National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (NBCSC) (ICE/HSI/DHS)

National Center for Border Security and Immigration (NCBSI) (DHS)

National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) (DHS)

National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response (PACER) (DHS)

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (DHS)

National Counter-IED Capabilities Analysis Database (NCAAD) (DHS)

National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) (ODNI)

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) (DNI)

National Counterterrorism Team (DOS)

National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC) (DOJ)

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) (DOJ)

National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) (FBI/DOJ)

National Intelligence University (DOD)

National Explosive Task Force (NETF) (FBI)

National Fusion Center Network (DHS)

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (DOD)

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) (DOD)

National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) (ODNI)

National Intelligence Centers

National Intelligence Council (NIC) (DNI)

National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) (DNI)

National Intelligence Emergency Management Activity (NIEMA) (ODNI)

National Intelligence Managers (NIM) (ODNI)

National Intelligence Manager-Cyber (NIM-Cyber) (ODNI)

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST)

National Intelligence University (NIU) (DNI)

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National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) (DOJ/FBI)  
National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) (DOD)  
National Military Joint Intelligence Center (MNJIC) (DOD)  
National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE)  
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (DOC)  
National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) (FEMA/DHS)  
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) (DHS)  
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) (DOD)  
National Reconnaissance Program (NRP)  
National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) (DOD)  
National Security Branch (NSB) (FBI)  
National Security Council (NSC)  
National Security Council Deputy's Committee (NSC/DC)  
National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC)  
National Security Council Principal's Committee (NSC/PC)  
National Security Council System (NSCS)  
National Security Directive (NSD) (White House)  
National Security Decision Directive (White House)  
National Security Division (NSD) (DOJ/FBI)  
National Security Investigations Division (NSID) (ICE/DHS)  
National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) (White House)  
National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (NSISS) (White House)  
National Strategy Information Center (NSIC)  
National System for Geo-Spatial Intelligence (NSG) (DOD)  
National Targeting Center (NTC) (DHS/CBP)  
National Transportation Security Center of Excellence (NTSCO) (DHS)  
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) (DOJ lead)  
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE)  
NATO Counter-IED Centre of Excellence (C-IED COE)  
NATO Civil-Military Cooperation COE (CIMIC COE)  
NATO Defence Against Terrorism COE (COE DAT)  
NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal COE (EOD COE)  
NATO Human Intelligence COE (HUMINT COE)  
NATO Joint Chemical Biological Radiological & Nuclear Defence COE (JCBRND COE)  
NATO Strategic Communications COE (STRATCOM COE)  
NATO Security Force Assistance COE (SFA COE)  
NATO Stability Policing COE (SP COE)  
NCTC Online (NOL) (NCTC/DNI)  
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) (DOS)  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Regional IGO)  
Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) (DOE)  
Office of Acquisition, Technology, & Facilities (AT&F) (ODNI)  
Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs (OAPA) (USAID)  
Office of Agricultural Affairs (OAA) (FAS/USDA)  
Office of Anti-Crime Programs (INL/C) (DOS)  
Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) (DOS)  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASDPA)  
Office of the Biological Policy Staff (ISN/BPS) (DOS)  
Office of Capacity Building and Development (OCBD) (FAS/USDA)  
Office of Commercial and Business Affairs (EEB/CBA) (DOS)  
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) (USAID)  
Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction (ISN/CATR) (DOS)  
Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR) (DOS)  
Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (S/CCI) (DOS)  
Office of Counter Piracy and Maritime Security (PM/CPMS) (DOS)  
Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives (ISN/CPI) (DOS)

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Office of Counterterrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy (DOS)

Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) (DHS)

Office of Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (USAID)

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

Office of Export Controls Cooperation (ISN/ECC) (DOS)

Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) (TREAS)

Office of Foreign Assistance Resources (DOS)

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) (USAID)

Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Mine Action (HDM) (DSCA) (DOD)

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) (DHS)

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (ITA) (DOS/DS)

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) (Treasury)

Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (IN) (DOE)

Office of International Affairs (Treasury)

Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism (OVT) (DOJ)

Office of Justice Programs (OJP) (DOJ)

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (White House)

Office of Military Cooperation (DCHA/CMC) (USAID)

Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) (ODNI)

Office of National Security Intelligence (NN) (DEA)

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs (DOS)

Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) (DOJ)

Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) (FBI)

Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) (DOS)

Office of Regional Affairs (ISN/RA) (DOS)

Office of Small Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OS-DBU) (USAID)

Office of Strategic Communications and Outreach (ISN/SCO) (DOS)

Office of Strategic Plans (DHS)

Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) (Treasury)

Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) (Treasury)

Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC) (Treasury)

Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) (USAID)

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I))

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P))

Office for Bombing Protection (OBP) (DHS)

Organization of American States (OAS) (Regional IGO)

OAS/Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE) (Regional IGO)

Open Source Center (OSC) (CIA)

Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) (USAFRICOM)

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (IGO)

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (IGO)

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (IGO)

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OC-DETF) (DOJ)

Fusion Center (DOJ)

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OH-DACA) (DOD/DOS)

Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)

Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) (NGO)

Pacific Island Forum (IGO)

Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PRACT)

Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES)

Political Advisor (POLAD)

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) (White House)

President's Daily Brief (PDB) (DNI)

President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) (White House)

President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) (White House)

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) (DOS)

Project Hope (HOPE) (NGO)

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Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (DOS)  
 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) (DOS) (DOD)  
 Public Affairs Officer (PAO)  
 Refugees International (RI) (NGO)  
 Regional Centers for Security Strategies (DSCA)  
 Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) (DOD)  
 Resident Legal Advisor (RLA) (DOJ)  
 Rewards for Justice Program  
 Salvation Army World Service Office (SA/WSO) (NGO)  
 Save the Children (SC/US) (NGO)  
 Security Assistance (SA)  
 Security Assistance Officer (SAO)  
 Security Force Assistance (SFA)  
 Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) (IGO)  
 Secretary of Defense (SecDef)  
 Secretary of State (SECSTATE)  
 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)  
 Shiprider Agreements (USCG/DHS)  
 Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) (FBI)  
 Special Operations Forces (SOF)  
 Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF)  
 Special Operations Support Team (SOST) (DOD)  
 Special Security Center (SSC) (ODNI)  
 Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN) (OFAC/TREAS)  
 Stop Hunger Now (NGO)  
 Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) (DOJ/FBI)  
 Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) (DOD)  
 Technical Support Working Groups (TSWG) (DOS/DOD)  
 Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) (FBI/DOJ)  
 Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) (TREAS)  
 Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS) (FBI-CTD)  
 Terrorism Fly Team (FBI)  
 Terrorism and International Victim Assistance Services Division (TIVASD) (DOJ)  
 Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) (NCTC/DNI)  
 Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)  
 Terrorist Screening and Interdiction Program (TSI) (DOS)  
 Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) (FBI)  
 Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) (DOD/USAF)  
 Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) (DOD)  
 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (DOS/USAID/DOD)  
 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (DHS)  
 Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF) (Treasury)  
 Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF) (Treasury)  
 Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence-USD(I) (DOD)  
 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-USD(P) (DOD)  
 Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis (U/SIA) (DHS)  
 Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (DOS)  
 Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment (DOS)  
 Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (S/R)  
 Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) (TREAS)  
 United Nations (UN) (IGO)  
 UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) (IGO)  
 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (IGO)  
 UN Development Program (UNDP) (IGO)  
 UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)  
 UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) (IGO)  
 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (IG)  
 UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (IGO)  
 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) (IGO)  
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (IGO)  
 UN Humanitarian Operations Center (UNHOC) (IGO)  
 UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)  
 UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (IGO)

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UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) (IGO)	United States Mission to the European Union (USEU) (FAS/USDA)
UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) (UN)	United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN) (FAS/USDA)
United States Advisory Committee on Public Diplomacy (ACPD)	United States Navy Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBER-COM) (DOD)
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)	United States Navy Oceanographic Office (NAVO-CEANO) (DOD)
United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM)	United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) (DOD)
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	United States Public Health Service (USPHS) (DHHS)
United States Air Force Cyber Command (24 AF) (AF-CYBER) (DOD)	United States Secret Service (USSS) (DHS)
United States Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (AF/ISR Agency)	United States Southern Command (DOD)
United States Army Corps of Engineers	United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)	United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) (DOD)
United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) (DOD)	United States Mission's (UN) Military Staff Committee (MSC)
United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) (DOD)	United States Trade Representative (USTR) (FAS/USDA)
United States Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)	United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) (DOD)
United States Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (NGO)	Village Stability Operations (VSO) (USSOCOM)
United States Central Command (DOD)	Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) (DOD)
United States Coast Guard (USCG) (DHS)	Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) (CIA)
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) (DHS)	Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD) (FBI)
United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (DHS)	World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (WANGO) (NGO)
United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) (DOD)	World Bank
United States European Command (DOD)	World Bank International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (IGO)
United States Government (USG)	World Bank International Development Association (IDA) (IGO)
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS)	World Food Program (WFP) (UN) (IGO)
United States Indo-Pacific Command (DOD)	World Health Organization (WHO) (UN) (IGO)
United States Institute of Peace (USIP)	World Intelligence Review (WIRe) (DNI)
United States Marine Forces Cyber Command (MAR-FORCYBER) (DOD)	World Trade Organization (WTO) (IGO)
United States Marine Security Detachment (MSG)	World Vision (NGO)
United States Marshalls Special Operations Group (SOG) (DOJ)	

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## Appendix B. Ranks of Foreign Service, Military, Civil Service, and NATO Officials

Foreign Service Grades	Diplomatic Title	Consular Title	Military Equivalent Rank	Civil Service Equivalent	NATO
Career Ambassador	Ambassador		General/Admiral	SES-6	OF-9
Career Minister (FE-CM)	Ambassador; Minister-Counselor	Consul General	Lieutenant General/ Vice Admiral	SES-5	OF-8
Minister Counselor (FE-MC)	Ambassador; Counselor	Consul General	Major General/ Rear Admiral (Upper Half)	SES-3 & SES-4	OF-7
Counselor (FE-0C)	Counselor	Consul General/ Consul	Brigadier General/ Rear Admiral (Lower Half)	SES-1 & SES-2	OF-6
FSO-1	Counselor; First Secretary	Consul General/ Consul	Colonel/Captain	GS-15	OF-5
FSO-2	First Secretary	Consul	Lieutenant Colonel/ Commander	GS-13 & GS-14	OF-4
FSO-3	Second Secretary	Consul	Major/ Lieutenant Commander	GS-12	OF-3
FSO-4	Second Secretary	Vice Consul	Captain/Lieutenant	GS-10 & GS-11	OF-2
FSO-5	Third Secretary	Vice Consul	1st Lieutenant/ Lieutenant Junior Grade	GS-8 & GS-9	OF-1
FSO-6	Third Secretary	Vice Consul	2nd Lieutenant/Ensign	GS-7	OF-1

### Foreign Services Grades

**CMSFS-CA.** Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Personal Rank of Career Ambassador

**CMSFS-CM.** Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Career Minister

**CMSFS-M-C.** Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor

**CMSFS-C.** Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Counselor

**CMSES.** Career Member of the Senior Executive Service

**FSO.** Foreign Service Officer



## Appendix C. Interagency-Related Definitions

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**Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement.** Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis with U.S. allies or coalition partners that allow U.S. forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense and may or may not be delegated. Governed by legal guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed under the conditions of the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. (DOD Dictionary, JP 4-07)

**Actionable Intelligence.** Intelligence information that is directly useful to customers for immediate exploitation without having to go through the full intelligence production process. (DOD Dictionary, JP 2-01.2)

**Ambassador.** A diplomatic agent of the highest rank accredited to a foreign government or sovereign as the resident representative of his own government; also called the Chief of Mission. In the U.S. system, the Ambassador is the personal representative of the President and reports to him through the Secretary of State. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Guide)

**Antiterrorism (AT).** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local and civilian forces. (DOD Dictionary, 3-07.2)

**Area of Operations (AO).** An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. See also area of responsibility; joint operations area; joint special operations area. (DOD Dictionary, JP 2-0)

**Asset (Intelligence).** Any resource—person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, or supply—at the disposition of an intelligence organization for use in an operational or support role. Often used with a qualifying term such as agent asset or propaganda asset. (JP 2-0)

**Assistance.** Activities that provide relief to refugees, conflict victims, and internally displaced persons. Such relief includes food, clean water, shelter, health care, basic education, job training, sanitation, and provision of physical and legal protection. Humanitarian assistance is often given in emergencies, but may need to continue in longer-term situations. (State Department)

**Attaché.** A person attached to the embassy in a diplomatic status who is not normally a career member of the diplomatic service. In the U.S. system, attachés generally represent agencies other than the Department of State such as the Department of Defense (DOD) and others. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Guide)

**Bilateral.** Bilateral discussions or negotiations are between a state and one other. A bilateral treaty is between one state and one other. “Multilateral” is used when more than two states are involved. (<https://www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm>)

**Capacity Building.** The process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems. (FM 3-07)

**Capacity-Building Activities.** Training staff of humanitarian organizations to provide better quality service to refugees and internally displaced persons. (State Department)

**Center of Gravity (COG).** The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action or will to act. See also decisive point. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**Chargé d’Affaires, A.I.** Formerly a chargé d’affaires was the title of a chief of mission, inferior in rank to an ambassador or a minister. Today with the a.i. (ad interim) added, it designates the senior officer taking charge for the interval when a chief of mission is absent from his or her post. (<https://www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm>)

**Chief of Mission (COM).** The principal officer (the Ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission’s direct responsibility. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-08)

**Civil Administration.** An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-05)

**Civil Affairs (CA).** Designated active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. See also civil-military operations (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-57)

**Civil Affairs Operations (CAO).** Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other IA organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-57)

**Civilian Power.** “The combined force of civilians working together across the U.S. government to practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and prevent and respond to crises ... It is the power of diplomats in 271 missions around the world, development professionals in more than 100 countries, and experts from other U.S. government agencies working together to advance America’s core interests in the world.” (Department of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power, 2010)

**Civil-Military Operations (CMO).** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated Civil Affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-57)

**Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).** An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. See also civil-military operations; operations. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-57)

**Civil Society Entities.** Nongovernmental associations of citizens, charitable or otherwise, formed for the purpose of providing benefit to the members and to society. The term includes nongovernmental organizations engaged in humanitarian work. (State Department)

**Coalition.** An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also alliance; multinational. (DOD Dictionary, JP 5-0)

**Combatant Commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. See also combatant command; specified combatant command; unified combatant command. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-0)

**Combating Terrorism (CbT).** Actions, including AT (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and CT (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (DOD Dictionary)

**Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF).** A task force composed of special operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one U.S. military Department formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The CJSOTF may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

**Counterinsurgency (COIN).** Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (JP-2, JP 3-24)

**Counterterrorism (CT).** Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. See also antiterrorism; combating terrorism; terrorism. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-26)

**Country Team.** The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-07.4)

**Cyberspace.** A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-12)

**Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).** Support provided by US Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract

personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32 United States Code, status) for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. See also civil support. (JP-2, JP 3-13)

**Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS).** The combination of Department of Defense personnel, procedures, equipment, computer programs, and supporting communications that support the timely and comprehensive preparation and presentation of intelligence and information to military commanders and national-level decision makers. (JP 2-0)

**Development Assistance.** Programs, projects, and activities carried out by the United States Agency for International Development that improve the lives of the citizens of developing countries while furthering United States foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and promoting free market economic growth. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-08)

**Direct Action (DA).** Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. See also special operations; special operations forces. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-05)

**Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).** A team of specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, rapidly deployed to assist US embassies and United States Agency for International Development missions with the management of US government responses to disasters. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-08)

**Displaced Person.** A broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons. See also evacuee; refugee. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-29)

**Elements of National Power.** All the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. (DOD Dictionary, JP 1). Elements of National Power: Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement (DIME-FIL)

**End State.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-0)

**Foreign Assistance.** Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters; that may be provided through developmental assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. See also domestic emergencies; foreign disaster; foreign humanitarian assistance; security assistance (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-29)

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA).** Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, or privation. See also foreign assistance. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-29)

**Foreign Internal Defense (FID).** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to security. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-22)

**Fusion.** In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (JP2-0)

**Governance.** The state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. (JP 1-01, JP 3-24)

**Gray Zone (Challenges).** Competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality. They are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.

Overall, gray zone challenges rise above normal, everyday peacetime geo-political competition and are aggressive, perspective-dependent, and ambiguous. (US Special Operations Command White Paper, The Gray Zone, 9 September 2015)

**Host Country/Host Nation (HN).** A nation that permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders. (DOD Dictionary, JP 2-01.2) A nation that receives the forces and/ or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-57)

**Host Country/Host Nation Support (HNS).** Civil and/ or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. See also host nation. (DOD Dictionary, JP 4-0)

**Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.** Assistance to the local populace, specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities, provided by predominantly United States Forces in conjunction with military operations. See also foreign humanitarian assistance. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-29)

**Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC).** An international and IA body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign assistance operation. See also operation. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-29)

**Hybrid Warfare.** In the absence of a commonly accepted definition, the concept is presented here in terms laid out by Christopher S. Chivvis of the Rand Corporation in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, 22 March 2017, Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare." "As used today in reference to Russia, "hybrid warfare" refers to Moscow's use of a broad range of subversive instruments, many of which are nonmilitary, to further Russian national interests. Moscow seeks to use hybrid warfare to ensure compliance on a number of specific policy questions; to divide and weaken NATO;

to subvert pro-Western governments; to create pretexts for war; to annex territory; and to ensure access to European markets on its own terms. Experts use the term “hybrid warfare” in different ways. Several related terms are now in use, including “gray zone strategies”, “competition short of conflict”, “active measures”, and “new generation warfare.”

**Indications.** In intelligence usage, information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bear on the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. (DOD Dictionary, JP 2-0)

**Information Operations (IO).** The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. See also electronic warfare, military deception, operations security; military information operations. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-13)

**Information Sharing.** Providing a common platform for ideas, information (including databases), strategies, approaches, activities, and plans and programs. (UN)

**Insurgency.** The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-24)

**Integrated Country Strategy (ICS).** A four-year strategy that articulates the U.S. priorities in a given country. Led by the Chief-of-Mission, the ICS develops a common set of Mission Goals and Objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort. (State Department)

**Intelligence.** 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information, concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 2. The activities that result in the product. 3. The organizations engaged in such activities. (JP 2-0)

**Intelligence Community (IC).** All departments or agencies of a government that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatory role. (DOD Dictionary, JP 2-0)

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).** An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. See also intelligence; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance visualization; and reconnaissance; surveillance. (DOD Dictionary, JP 2-01)

**Interagency.** Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also IA coordination. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-08)

**Interagency Coordination.** Within the context of DOD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-0)

**Intergovernmental Organization (IGO).** An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-08)

**Internal Capacity Building.** Facilitating capacity building and skills development of members with critical expertise to support actors in disaster management and other activities through training, joint activities, and sharing lessons-learned experiences. (UN)

**Internal Defense and Development (IDAD).** The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other threats to its security. See also foreign internal defense. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-22)

**Internal Security.** The state of law and order prevailing within a nation. (JP 1-2, JP 3-08)

**Interorganizational Coordination.** The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (JP 1-2, JP 3-08)

**Irregular Forces.** Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.

**Irregular Warfare (IW).** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). (JP 1-2, JP 1)

**Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF).** A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-57)

**Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC).** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. See also joint force commander. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-0)

**Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC).** An interdependent, operational intelligence organization at the Department of Defense, combatant command, or joint task force (if established) level, that is integrated with national intelligence centers and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment. (DOD Dictionary, JP 2-0)

**Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE).** A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. See also intelligence; joint force; joint operations. (DOD Dictionary, JP 2-01)

**Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).** A staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-08)

**Lead Federal Agency (LFA).** The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-41)

**Letter of Assist (LOA).** A contractual document issued by the UN to a government authorizing it to provide goods or services to a peacekeeping operation. (DOD Dictionary, JP 1-06)

**Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA).** Standard Department of Defense form on which the United States Government documents its offer to transfer to a foreign government or international organization U.S. defense articles and services via foreign military sales pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act. See also foreign military sales. (DOD Dictionary, JP 4-08)

**Liaison.** That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-08)

**Local Integration.** One of the three “durable solutions”—voluntary return, local integration, third-country resettlement—sought for refugees. When voluntary return to their home country is not possible, refugees can sometimes settle with full legal rights in the country to which they have fled (also known as the country of first asylum). This is local integration. (State Department)

**Measure of Effectiveness.** A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. See also combat assessment; mission. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-0)

**Measure of Performance.** A criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-0)

**Military Civic Action.** Programs and projects managed by United States Forces but executed primarily by indigenous military or security forces that contribute to the economic and social development of a host nation civil society thereby enhancing the legitimacy and social standing of the host nation government and its military forces (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-57)

**Military Information Support Operations (MISO).** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately

the behavior of foreign governments organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-13.2)

**Mobile Training Team (MTT).** A team consisting of one or more U.S. military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon HN requests.

**Multinational.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (DOD Dictionary, JP 5-0)

**Multinational Force.** A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. See also multinational force commander; multinational operations. DOD Dictionary, JP 1)

**National Defense Strategy.** A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of Defense agencies and other instruments of power to achieve national security strategy objectives. (DOD Dictionary, JP 1)

**National Intelligence.** All intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived, and including that which is gathered within or outside the United States, that pertains to more than one agency, and involves (1) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests, (2) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction, or (3) any other matter bearing on U.S. national or homeland security. (DOD Dictionary, JP 2-01)

**National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).** A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or other IC agencies as required.

**National Policy.** A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (DOD Dictionary, JP 1)

**National Security.** A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. A favorable foreign relations position; or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. See also security. (DOD Dictionary, JP 1)

**National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service Representative.** The senior theater or military command representative of the director, NSA/Chief, Central Security Service in a specific country or military command headquarters who provides the director, NSA with information on command plans requiring cryptologic support. The NSA/Central Security Service representative serves as a special advisor to the combatant commander for cryptologic matters, to include signals intelligence, communications security, and computer security. See also counterintelligence. (DOD Dictionary, JP 2-01.2)

**National Security Strategy (NSS).** A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. See also national military strategy; strategy; theater strategy. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-0)

**Nongovernmental Organization (NGO).** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-08)

**Partner Nation (PN).** A nation that the United States works with in a specific situation or operation. (DOD Dictionary, JP 1)

**Peacekeeping.** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and

support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacemaking; peace operations. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-07.3)

**Preventive Diplomacy.** Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence.

**Protection.** 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and non-military personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-0)

**Refugee.** A person, who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. See also dislocated civilian; displaced person; evacuee; stateless person. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-29)

**Resettlement.** The process of relocating a refugee from the country of first asylum to another country. When it is clear that a refugee will not be able to return to his or her home and cannot be integrated into the country to which he or she has fled, resettlement is often the only solution left. However, worldwide refugee resettlement figures are very low; fewer than 1 percent of refugees will ever be considered and accepted for resettlement. The U.S. has the largest refugee resettlement program in the world. (State Department).

**Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (DOD Dictionary, JP 1-04)

**Security Assistance (SA).** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Agency. See also security cooperation. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-22)

**Security Assistance Organizations (SAO).** All DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions.

**Security Cooperation.** All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host country. See also security assistance. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-22)

**Security Force Assistance (SFA).** The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (DOD Dictionary, Source JP 3-22)

**Security Sector Reform.** A comprehensive set of policies, plans, programs, and undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice. activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (DOD Dictionary, FM 3-07)

**Special Operations.** Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-05)

**Special Operations Forces (SOF).** Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. See also Air Force special operations forces; Army special operations forces; Navy special operations forces. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-05)

**Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE).** A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-05)

**Stability Operations.** An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-0)

**Statelessness.** According to UNHCR, a stateless person is “someone who, under national laws, does not enjoy citizenship—the legal bond between a government and an individual—with any country.” While some people are de jure or legally stateless (meaning they are not recognized as citizens under the laws of any state), many people are de facto or effectively stateless persons (meaning they are not recognized as citizens by any state even if they have a claim to citizenship under the laws of one or more states). (State Department)

**Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).** A bilateral or multilateral agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-16)

**Strategic Communication.** Focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (DOD Dictionary, JP 5-0)

**Strategy.** A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 2-0, JP 3-0)

**Terrorism.** The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-07.2)

**Terrorist.** An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives.

**Terrorist Group.** Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological goals.

**Trafficking in Persons.** Any person who is recruited, harbored, provided, or obtained through force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjecting that person to involuntary servitude, forced labor, or commercial sex qualifies as a trafficking victim. (State Department)

**Unconventional Warfare (UW).** Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-05.1)

**Unity of Effort.** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (DOD Dictionary, JP 1)

**Vulnerable State.** A nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).** Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and excluding the means of transporting or propelling

the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. See also special operations. (DOD Dictionary, JP 3-40)

**Whole-of-Government Approach.** An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

# Appendix D. U.S. Government Interagency and Other Abbreviations/Acronyms

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One of the most disruptive causes of friction among IA partners is the employment of a vast number of acronyms that exist within different organizational cultures and their frequent use without context or explanation. Quite simply, it's often not possible to communicate effectively because partners to a discussion don't understand what the others are saying. Acronyms can provide communication shortcuts, but only among those who understand what they mean. For those who don't understand, acronyms build strong walls that separate partners. The DOD is certainly not the only culprit in this dynamic. What follows are several pages of acronyms that play roles within the national security IA environment. They certainly are not complete because acronyms appear and disappear with virtually no fanfare and rarely with an effort to explain their value. Many of these acronyms do not appear in the text, but are included as a reference for those the reader may encounter in further reading, research, and practice.

**3D.** defense, diplomacy, and development

**AAH-USA.** Action Against Hunger-United States of America (NGO)

**ACT.** Advance Civilian Team (DOS)

**ADAC.** Arctic Domain Awareness Center of Excellence (DHS)

**AFIAA.** Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency (DOD)

**AFISRA.** Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (DOD)

**AFSC.** American Friends Service Committee (NGO)

**AIT.** American Institute of Taiwan (FSA/USDA)

**ALERT.** Center for Excellence for Awareness and Location of Explosives-Related Threats (DHS)

**AMISOM.** African Union Mission in Somalia (AU)

**AML.** Anti-Money Laundering

**AO.** area of operations (DOD)

**AOR.** area of responsibility (DOD)

**APEC.** Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Regional IGO)

**APHS/CT.** Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (White House)

**ARC.** American Refugee Committee (NGO)

**ARF.** Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (Regional IGO)

**ASD.** Assistant Secretary of Defense (DOD)

**ASD(GSA).** Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs (DOD)

**ASD(HD&ASA).** Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs) (DOD)

**ASD(SO/LIC).** Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (DOD)

**ASEAN.** Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Regional IGO)

**AT.** Antiterrorism (DOD)

**AT&F.** Office of Acquisition, Technology & Facilities (ODNI)

**ATA.** Antiterrorism Assistance Program (DOS)

**ATAC.** Antiterrorism Advisory Council (DOJ)

**ATFC.** Afghan Threat Finance Cell

**ATO.** Agricultural Trade Office (FAS/USDA)

**AU.** African Union (Regional IGO)

**AVC.** Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (DOS)

**BATFE.** Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (DOJ)

**BAU.** Biometrics Analysis Unit (FBI) (TEDAC)

**BCSC.** Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (ICE/DHS)

**BENS.** Business Executives for National Security

**BEST.** Border Enforcement Security Task Force (ICE/DHS)

**BFS.** Bureau for Food Safety (USAID)

**BIFS.** EPIC Border Intelligence Fusion Center (DHS)

**BIS.** Bureau of Industry and Security (DOC)

**BJA.** Bureau of Justice Assistance (DOJ)

**BMAP.** Bomb-Making Awareness Program (DHS)

**BSA.** Bank Security Act

**BTI.** Borders, Trade, and Immigration Institute (DHS)

**BWC.** Biological Weapons Convention

**C3.** Cyber Crimes Center (HSI/ICE) (DHS)

**C4I.** command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (DOD)

**CA.** Bureau of Consular Affairs (DOS); civil affairs (DOD)

**CAF.** Conflict Assessment Framework (USAID)

**CAISE.** civil authority information support element (DOD)

**CAO.** civil affairs operations

**CAOE.** Center for Accelerating Operational Efficiency (DHS)

**CAP.** Crisis Action Planning

**CARE.** Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (NGO)

**CARSI.** Central American Regional Security Initiative (DOS)

**CAT.** Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (DOS); civil affairs Team (DOD)

**CBM.** Confidence-Building Measures

**CBP.** United States Customs and Border Protection (DHS)

**CBRN.** chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (DOD)

**CbT.** combating terrorism (DOD)

**CCDR.** combatant commander (DOD)

**CCIF.** Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (DOD)

**CCIR.** commander's critical information requirement (DOD)

**CCP.** Critical Capabilities and Practices (PSI)

**CCU.** Chemical Countermeasures Unit (FBI-WMD Directorate)

**CD.** Counterintelligence Division (FBI)

**CDC.** Civilian Deployment Center (USAID); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (DHHS)

**CDCS.** Country Development Cooperation Strategy (DOS/USAID)

**CDRJSOTF.** commander, joint special operations task force (DOD)

**CDRTSOC.** commander, theater special operations command (DOD)

**CEG.** Cultural Engagement Group

**CERP.** Commanders' Emergency Response Program (DOD)

**CFIUS.** Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (DOJ)

**CFT.** Countering the Financing of Terrorism Finance (DOS)

**CI.** counterintelligence (DOD)

**CIA.** Central Intelligence Agency (IC)

<b>CIC.</b> Counterintelligence Center (CIA) (IC)	<b>COG.</b> center of gravity (DOD)
<b>CICC.</b> Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (DOJ)	<b>COI.</b> community of interest (DOD)
<b>CICTE.</b> Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (OAS) (IGO)	<b>COIN.</b> counterinsurgency (DOD)
<b>CIE.</b> collaborative information environment (DOD)	<b>COM.</b> chief of mission (DOS)
<b>C-IED.</b> counter-improvised explosive device (DOD)	<b>CONOPS.</b> concept of operations (DOD)
<b>C-IED COE.</b> Counter-IED Center of Excellence (NATO)	<b>COP.</b> common operational picture (DOD)
<b>CFG.</b> Counter-ISIS Finance Group (Treasury)	<b>CP.</b> counterproliferation (DOD)
<b>CIMIC.</b> Civil-Military Cooperation; Civil-Military Information Center	<b>CPC.</b> Counterproliferation Center (FBI)
<b>CINA.</b> Criminal Investigations and Network Analysis Center (DHS)	<b>CPG.</b> Contingency Planning Guidance (DOD)
<b>CIRI.</b> Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute (DHS)	<b>CRC.</b> Coastal Resilience Center of Excellence (DHS)
<b>CISA.</b> Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (DHS)	<b>CREATE.</b> Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (DHS)
<b>CJCS.</b> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (DOD)	<b>CRS.</b> Catholic Relief Services (NGO); Congressional Research Service
<b>CLDP.</b> Commercial Law Development Program (DOC)	<b>CS.</b> Civil Support
<b>CJTF.</b> Combined joint task force (NATO); commander, joint task force (DOD)	<b>CSCC.</b> Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication (DOS)
<b>CMC.</b> Civil Military Cooperation	<b>CSE.</b> Center for Security Evaluation (ODNI)
<b>CMCC.</b> Civil-Military Coordination Center	<b>CSG.</b> Counterterrorism Support Group (NSC/PCC)
<b>CMM.</b> Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID)	<b>CSO.</b> Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (DOS)
<b>CMO.</b> civil-military operations (DOD)	<b>CST.</b> combat support team (DOD)
<b>CMOC.</b> civil-military operations center (DOD)	<b>CT.</b> counterterrorism (DOD); Counterterrorism—Finance (DOS)
<b>CMPASS.</b> Civilian-Military Planning and Assessment Section (DOS)	<b>CTC.</b> UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee
<b>CMSE.</b> civil-military support element (DOD)	<b>CTC.</b> Counterterrorism Center (CIA) (IC)
<b>CNC.</b> Crime and Narcotics Center (CIA) (IC)	<b>CTD.</b> Counterterrorism Division (FBI)
<b>COA.</b> course of action (DOD)	<b>CTF.</b> Counterterrorism Finance Unit
<b>COCOM.</b> combatant command (command authority) (DOD)	<b>CTFP.</b> Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (DOD)
<b>COE.</b> Center of Excellence (NATO, among others)	<b>CTF.</b> Cyber Threat Framework (ODNI)
	<b>CTIIC.</b> Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (ODNI)

<b>CTR.</b> cooperative threat reduction Program (DOD)	<b>DI.</b> Director of Intelligence (FBI)
<b>CTS.</b> Counterterrorism Section (DOJ)	<b>DIA.</b> Defense Intelligence Agency (DOD) (IC)
<b>CTTF.</b> Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Counterterrorism Task Force	<b>DIAC.</b> Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DOD)
<b>CVE.</b> countering violent extremism (DOD)	<b>DIAG.</b> Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (UN)
<b>CWC.</b> Chemical Weapons Convention	<b>DIME.</b> Defense, Information, Military, Economic [traditional elements of national power]
<b>CWMD.</b> countering weapons of mass destruction (DOD)	<b>DIME-FIL.</b> Finance, Intelligence, Law Enforcement [expanded elements]
<b>CWS.</b> Church World Service (NGO)	<b>DJIOC.</b> Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DOD)
<b>CXS.</b> Communications Exploitation Section	<b>DMAT.</b> Disaster Medical Assistance Team
<b>DA.</b> direct action (DOD)	<b>D/NCTC.</b> Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (ODNI) (IC)
<b>D/As.</b> Departments and Agencies (USG)	<b>DNI.</b> Director of National Intelligence
<b>DAO.</b> defense attaché office (DOD)	<b>DNSA/SC.</b> Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications (White House)
<b>DARPA.</b> Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DOD)	<b>DOA.</b> Department of Agriculture
<b>DART.</b> Disaster Assessment Team (DOS)	<b>DOC.</b> Department of Commerce
<b>DAT.</b> District Assessment Team	<b>DOD.</b> Department of Defense
<b>DATT.</b> defense attaché (DOD/DIA)	<b>DODIIS.</b> Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DOD)
<b>DCHA.</b> Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)	<b>DOE.</b> Department of Energy
<b>DCHA/CMC.</b> Office of Military Cooperation (USAID)	<b>DOJ.</b> Department of Justice
<b>D/CIA.</b> Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	<b>DOL.</b> Department of Labor
<b>DCM.</b> Deputy Chief of Mission (DOS)	<b>DOS.</b> Department of State
<b>DCO.</b> defense coordinating officer (DOD)	<b>DOT.</b> Department of Transportation
<b>DCS.</b> Direct Commercial Sales	<b>DPC.</b> Defense Planning Committee (NATO)
<b>DDII.</b> Deputy Director for Intelligence Integration (ODNI)	<b>DPKO.</b> Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
<b>DDR.</b> disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DOD)	<b>DRL.</b> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DOS)
<b>DEA.</b> Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ)	<b>DS.</b> Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DOS); Directorate of Support (CIA)
<b>DEST.</b> Domestic Emergency Support Team (DHS)	<b>DSB.</b> Defense Science Board
<b>DFAS.</b> Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DOD)	<b>DS&amp;T.</b> Directorate of Science & Technology (CIA)
<b>DHHS.</b> Department of Health and Human Services	
<b>DHS.</b> Department of Homeland Security	

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<b>DSCA.</b> Defense Support of Civil Authorities; Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DOD)	<b>EU.</b> Explosives Unit (FBI/TEDAC)
<b>DSF.</b> District Stability Framework (USAID)	<b>EUROPOL.</b> European Police Office (IGO)
<b>DSPD.</b> defense support to public diplomacy (DOD)	<b>F.</b> Director of Foreign Assistance Resources (DOS)
<b>DSS.</b> Defense Security Service (DOD); Diplomatic Security Service (DOS)	<b>F3EAD.</b> find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (DOD)
<b>DTRA.</b> Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)	<b>FACT Training.</b> Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat Training (DOS)
<b>EARSI.</b> East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative	<b>FAO.</b> Food and Agriculture Organization (UN; IGO)
<b>EB.</b> Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (DOS)	<b>FAS.</b> Foreign Agricultural Service (DOA)
<b>EB/CBA.</b> Commercial and Business Affairs (DOS)	<b>FATF.</b> Financial Action Task Force (IGO)
<b>EB/CIP.</b> International Communications and Information Policy (DOS)	<b>FBI.</b> Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)
<b>EB/EPPD.</b> Economic Policy Analysis & Public Diplomacy (DOS)	<b>FCM.</b> Foreign Consequence Management (DOS)
<b>EB/IFD.</b> International Finance and Development (DOS)	<b>FDA.</b> Food and Drug Administration (DHHS)
<b>EB/TFS.</b> Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions (DOS)	<b>FDIC.</b> Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
<b>EB/TFS/SPI.</b> Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation (DOS)	<b>FEMA.</b> Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)
<b>ECA.</b> Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (DOS)	<b>FEST.</b> foreign emergency support team (DOS)
<b>ECHA.</b> Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (UN)	<b>FEWGW.</b> Forensics Engagement Working Group
<b>ECOSOC.</b> Economic and Social Council (UN)	<b>FFP.</b> Office of Food for Peace (USAID)
<b>EDA.</b> Economic Development Administration (DOC)	<b>FHA.</b> foreign humanitarian assistance (DOD)
<b>EEl.</b> Essential Elements of Information (DOD)	<b>FID.</b> foreign internal defense (DOD)
<b>EIPC.</b> Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities	<b>FIRST.</b> Federal Incident Response Support Team
<b>EMU.</b> Evidence Management Unit	<b>FITF.</b> Foreign Intelligence Task Force (FBI)
<b>EPIC.</b> El Paso Intelligence Center (DEA/CBP)	<b>FLETC.</b> Federal Law Enforcement Training Center-International Programs Division (DHS)
<b>ERO.</b> Enforcement and Removal Operations (DHS)	<b>FLTCYBERCOM.</b> Fleet Cyber Command (U.S. Navy) (DOD)
<b>ERT.</b> emergency response team (FEMA)	<b>FMF.</b> foreign military financing (DOD)
<b>ESC.</b> Energy, Sanctions, and Commodities (DOS)	<b>FMS.</b> foreign military sales (DOD, DOS)
<b>ESF.</b> Economic Support Fund	<b>FON.</b> Freedom of Navigation
<b>ESG.</b> executive steering group (DOD)	<b>FPS.</b> Federal Protective Services (ICE/DHS)
<b>EU.</b> European Union (Regional IGO)	<b>FSF.</b> foreign security forces (DOD)
	<b>FSI.</b> Foreign Service Institute (DOS)

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<b>FTO.</b> Foreign Terrorist Organizations (DOS)	<b>HOPE.</b> Health Opportunities for People Everywhere (Project Hope, NGO)
<b>FTTTF.</b> Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (DOJ)	<b>HPSCI.</b> House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
<b>GATT.</b> General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	<b>HSC.</b> Homeland Security Council (White House)
<b>GCC.</b> geographic combatant commander (DOD); Gulf Cooperation Council (IGO)	<b>HSCC.</b> Homeland Security Coordinating Committee (DOS)
<b>GCERF.</b> Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (IGO)	<b>HSI.</b> Homeland Security Investigations (ICE/DHS)
<b>GCTF.</b> Global Counterterrorism Forum (DOS)	<b>HSPD.</b> Homeland Security Presidential Directive
<b>GEC.</b> Global Engagement Center (DOS)	<b>HUMINT.</b> human intelligence (DOD)
<b>GICNT.</b> Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (IGO)	<b>HVE.</b> Homegrown Violent Extremists
<b>GIWG.</b> Global Intelligence Work Group (DOJ)	<b>IA.</b> Interagency (USG)
<b>GMSC.</b> Global Mission Support Center (USSOCOM) (DOD)	<b>I&amp;A.</b> Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS)
<b>GPOI.</b> Global Peace Operations Initiative (DOS)	<b>IAAH.</b> International Alliance Against Hunger (IGO)
<b>GSCF.</b> Global Security Contingency Fund	<b>IAEA.</b> International Atomic Energy Agency (IGO)
<b>GSD.</b> Gulf Security Dialogue (DOS)	<b>IARPA.</b> Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (ODNI)
<b>GSEC.</b> Global Strategic Engagement Center (DOS)	<b>IASC.</b> Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UN)
<b>HACC.</b> humanitarian assistance coordination center (DOD)	<b>I&amp;W.</b> Indications and Warning (DOD)
<b>HA.</b> humanitarian assistance (DOD)	<b>IBRD.</b> International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IGO)
<b>HAST.</b> humanitarian assistance survey team (DOD)	<b>IC.</b> Intelligence Community (USG)
<b>HCA.</b> humanitarian and civic assistance (DOD)	<b>ICAT.</b> interagency conflict assessment team
<b>HDM.</b> Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action (DOD/DSCA)	<b>ICC/JOC.</b> Integrated Cyber Center/Joint Operations Center (CYBERCOM)
<b>HIC.</b> humanitarian information center (DOD)	<b>ICDF.</b> International Cooperation Development Fund
<b>HIG.</b> High-Value Interrogation Group (FBI)	<b>ICE.</b> United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)
<b>HIU.</b> Humanitarian Information Unit (DOS)	<b>ICITAP.</b> International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (DOJ)
<b>HN.</b> host nation (DOD)	<b>ICRC.</b> International Committee of the Red Cross (IGO)
<b>HNS.</b> host-nation support	<b>ICS.</b> Incident Command System (FEMA)
<b>HOC.</b> humanitarian operations center	<b>ICS.</b> Integrated Country Strategy (DOS)
<b>HOCC.</b> humanitarian operations coordination center	
<b>HOM.</b> head of mission	

<b>ICSID.</b> International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (IGO)	<b>INSCOM.</b> U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (DOD)
<b>ICVA.</b> International Council of Voluntary Agencies	<b>INTERPOL.</b> International Criminal Police Organization (IGO)
<b>IDA.</b> International Development Association (IGO)	<b>INTERPOL Washington-USNCB.</b> INTERPOL Washington—United States National Central Bureau (DOJ)
<b>IDAD.</b> internal defense and development (DOD)	<b>IO.</b> Bureau of International Organization Affairs (DOS); information operations (DOD)
<b>IDP.</b> internally displaced person (DOD)	<b>IOB.</b> President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (White House)
<b>IE.</b> Intelligence Enterprise (DHS)	<b>IOM.</b> International Organization for Migration (IGO)
<b>IFC.</b> International Finance Corporation (IGO)	<b>IORF.</b> International Operational Response Framework (DOS)
<b>IFRC.</b> International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IGO)	<b>IOSS.</b> Interagency Operations Security Support Staff
<b>IGO.</b> Intergovernmental Organization	<b>IPC.</b> Interagency Policy Committee (White House) See also PCC (White House)
<b>IHL.</b> International Humanitarian Law	<b>IPI.</b> Indigenous Populations and Institutions
<b>IJJ.</b> International Institute for Justice: The Rule of Law (IGO)	<b>IPR.</b> National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (HSI/ICE/DHS)
<b>IMAP.</b> Instability Monitoring Assessment Platform (DOS)	<b>IRS.</b> Internal Revenue Service
<b>IMAT.</b> Incident Management Assistance Team	<b>IRTPA.</b> Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
<b>IMB.</b> International Maritime Bureau	<b>ISC.</b> Information Sharing Council (ODNI)
<b>IMC.</b> International Medical Corps (NGO)	<b>ISE.</b> Information Sharing Environment (ODNI)
<b>IMET.</b> international military education and training (DOS, DOD)	<b>ISEG.</b> International Security Events Group (DOS)
<b>IMF.</b> International Monetary Fund (IGO)	<b>ISN.</b> Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (DOS)
<b>IMS.</b> Interagency Management System	<b>ISN/BPS.</b> Office of the Biological Policy Staff (DOS)
<b>IN.</b> Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE)	<b>ISN/CATR.</b> Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction (DOS)
<b>INCLE.</b> International Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement Program	<b>ISN/CPI.</b> Office of Counter-proliferation Initiatives (DOS)
<b>INDRAC.</b> Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities	<b>ISN/CTR.</b> Office of Cooperative Threat Reductions (DOS)
<b>INL.</b> Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DOS)	<b>ISN/ECC.</b> Office of Export Controls Cooperation (DOS)
<b>INL/C.</b> Office of Anti-Crime Programs (DOS)	
<b>INR.</b> Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DOS)	

<b>ISN/RA.</b> Office of Regional Affairs (DOS)	<b>KIQ.</b> key intelligence questions
<b>ISN/SCO.</b> Office of Strategic Communications and Outreach (DOS)	<b>LEA.</b> law enforcement agency; law enforcement activities
<b>ISR.</b> intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (DOD)	<b>LFA.</b> lead federal agency
<b>ITACG.</b> Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (NCTC/ODNI)	<b>LNO.</b> liaison officer
<b>IU.</b> Intelligence Unit (FBI—TEDAC)	<b>LOA.</b> Letter of Assist (UN); Letter of Offer and Acceptance (DOD)
<b>IW.</b> irregular warfare (DOD)	<b>LOE.</b> line of effort (DOD)
<b>JCC.</b> joint collaboration cell; joint cyberspace center (DOD)	<b>MA.</b> Management and Administration (DHS)
<b>JCET.</b> joint combined exchange training (DOD)	<b>MBN.</b> Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. (BBG)
<b>JCMOTF.</b> joint civil-military operations task force (DOD)	<b>MARSOC.</b> U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command (DOD)
<b>JCS.</b> Joint Chiefs of Staff	<b>MC.</b> Military Committee (NATO)
<b>JFCC-ISR.</b> Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (USSTRATCOM) (DOD)	<b>MCC.</b> Millennium Challenge Corporation
<b>JFSOCC.</b> joint force special operations component commander (DOD)	<b>MCIA.</b> Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (DOD)
<b>JIACG.</b> joint interagency coordination group (DOD)	<b>MEPI.</b> Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA): Middle East Partnership Initiative (DOS)
<b>JIATF.</b> joint interagency task force (DOD)	<b>MJIEDSP.</b> Multi-Jurisdictional Improvised Explosive Device Security Planning (DHS)
<b>JIIM.</b> Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational	<b>MILDEP.</b> Military Department (DOD)
<b>JIOC.</b> joint intelligence operations center (DOD)	<b>MIP.</b> military intelligence program (DOD)
<b>JIPOE.</b> joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (DOD)	<b>MISO.</b> military information support operations (formerly PSYOP) (DOD)
<b>JISE.</b> joint intelligence support element (DOD)	<b>MIST.</b> military information support team (DOD)
<b>JLOC.</b> joint logistics operations center (DOD)	<b>MIT.</b> Mobile Integration Teams (FBI-HIG)
<b>JMISTF.</b> joint military information support task force (DOD)	<b>MOA.</b> memorandum of agreement
<b>JOA.</b> joint operations area (DOD)	<b>MOC.</b> media operations center
<b>JOC.</b> joint operations center (DOD)	<b>MOE.</b> measure of effectiveness (DOD)
<b>JTF.</b> joint task force (DOD)	<b>MOI.</b> Ministry of the Interior
<b>JTTF.</b> joint terrorism task force (DOJ/FBI)	<b>MOP.</b> measure of performance (DOD)
	<b>MOU.</b> memorandum of understanding
	<b>MPAT.</b> Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
	<b>MRE.</b> Mine Risk Education (UN)
	<b>MRR.</b> Mission Resource Requirements (USAID)

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<b>MSC.</b> United States Mission’s (UN) Military Staff Committee	<b>NEA.</b> Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (DOS)
<b>MSC.</b> Maritime Security Center of Excellence (DHS)	<b>NEC.</b> National Economic Council
<b>MSF.</b> Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (NGO)	<b>NEO.</b> Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
<b>MSG.</b> Marine security guard (DOD)	<b>NEST.</b> Nuclear Emergency Support Team (DOE)
<b>MTT.</b> mobile training team (DOD)	<b>NETF.</b> National Explosive Task Force (FBI)
<b>NADR.</b> Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (DOS)	<b>NGA.</b> National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (DOD)
<b>NATO.</b> North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Regional IGO)	<b>NGO.</b> Nongovernmental Organization (NGO)
<b>NAVOCEANO.</b> Naval Oceanographic Office (DOD)	<b>NIC.</b> National Intelligence Council (ODNI)
<b>NBCSC.</b> National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (HSI/ICE/DHS)	<b>NIE.</b> National Intelligence Estimate (ODNI)
<b>NCBSI.</b> National Center for Border Security and Immigration (DHS)	<b>NIEMA.</b> National Intelligence Emergency Management Activity (ODNI)
<b>NCCAD.</b> National Counter-IED Capabilities Analysis Data Base (DHS)	<b>NIM-CT.</b> National Intelligence Manager—CT (ODNI)
<b>NCFPD.</b> National Center for Food Protection and Defense (DHS)	<b>NIM-Cyber.</b> Cyber National Intelligence Manager (ODNI)
<b>NCIJTF.</b> National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (FBI/DOJ)	<b>NIMA.</b> National Imagery and Mapping Agency (DOD)
<b>NCIRC.</b> National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCTC)	<b>NIPF.</b> National Intelligence Priorities Framework (DNI)
<b>NCISP.</b> National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (DOJ)	<b>NIS.</b> National Intelligence Strategy (ODNI)
<b>NCO.</b> Narcotics Control Officer (DOS)	<b>NISP.</b> National Intelligence Support Plan
<b>NCPC.</b> National Counter-Proliferation Center (ODNI)	<b>NIST.</b> National Intelligence Support Team (ODNI)
<b>NCR.</b> National Capital Region	<b>NIT.</b> Nuclear Incident Team
<b>NCS.</b> National Clandestine Service (CIA)	<b>NITTF.</b> National Insider Threat Task Force
<b>NCSC.</b> National Counterintelligence and Security Center (ODNI)	<b>NIU.</b> National Intelligence University (ODNI)
<b>NCTC.</b> National Counterterrorism Center (ODNI)	<b>NJTTF.</b> National Joint Terrorism Task Force (DOJ/FBI)
<b>NDIC.</b> National Defense Intelligence College (DOD)	<b>NLE.</b> National Level Exercises
<b>NDS.</b> national defense strategy (DOD)	<b>NMCC.</b> National Military Command Center (DOD)
	<b>NMIC.</b> National Maritime Intelligence Center (DOD)
	<b>NNSA.</b> National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE)
	<b>NOAA.</b> National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (DOC)
	<b>NOL.</b> NCTC Online (NCTC/DNI)
	<b>NP.</b> Nonproliferation

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- NPD.** National Preparedness Directorate (FEMA/DHS)
- NRO.** National Reconnaissance Office (DOD)
- NRP.** National Reconnaissance Program
- NSA/CSS.** National Security Agency/Central Security Service (DOD)
- NSB.** National Security Branch (DOJ/FBI)
- NSC.** National Security Council (White House)
- NSC/DC.** Deputy's Committee (White House)
- NSC/IPC.** Interagency Policy Committee (White House)
- NSC/PC.** Principal's Committee (White House)
- NSC/PCC.** Policy Coordination Committees (Bush Administration)
- NSCS.** National Security Council System
- NSD.** National Security Division (FBI); National Security Directive (White House)
- NSDD.** National Security Decision Directive (White House)
- NSG.** National System for Geospatial Intelligence (DOD)
- NSIC.** National Strategy Information Center
- NSID.** National Security Investigations Division (HSI/ICE/DHS)
- NSPM.** National Security Presidential Memorandum (White House) See also PPD.
- NSS.** National Security Strategy
- NSS/GE.** National Security Staff Directorate for Global Engagement (White House)
- NSSIS.** National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (White House)
- NTAS.** National Terrorism Advisory System (DHS)
- NTB.** National Terrorism Bulletin (NTB) (NCTC/DNI)
- NTC.** National Targeting Center (DHS/CBP)
- NTM-A.** NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
- NTSCOE.** National Transportation Security Center (DHS)
- OAA.** Office of Agricultural Affairs (FAS/USDA)
- OAPA.** Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs (USAID)
- OAS.** Organization of American States (Regional IGO)
- OAS/CICTE.** Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (Regional IGO)
- OASD(PA).** Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (DOD)
- OBP.** Office for Bombing Prevention (DHS)
- OCBD.** Office of Capacity Building and Development (FAS/USDA)
- OCHA.** Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
- ODNI.** Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- ODP.** Office of Development Partners (ODP)
- OE.** operational environment (DOD)
- OECD.** Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (IGO)
- OEF-TS.** Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (DOD/AFRICOM)
- OFDA.** Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
- OGA.** Other Government Agency
- OHCHR.** Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN)
- OHDACA.** Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (DSCA) (DOD)
- OIA.** Office of Intelligence and Analysis (Treasury)
- OJVOT.** Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism (DOJ)
- OMB.** Office of Management and Budget (White House)
- ONCIX.** Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ODNI)
- ONI.** Office of Naval Intelligence (DOD)
- ONSI.** Office of National Security Intelligence (DOE)
- OPCON.** Operational control (DOD)

<b>OPCW.</b> Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (DOS)	<b>PDIP.</b> Public Diplomacy Implementation Plan (DOS)
<b>OPDAT.</b> Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (DOJ)	<b>PIAB.</b> President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (White House)
<b>OPE.</b> Office of Partner Engagement (ODNI)	<b>PIR.</b> priority intelligence requirement (DOD)
<b>OPIC.</b> Overseas Private Investment Corporation	<b>PISCES.</b> Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
<b>OSAC.</b> Overseas Security Advisory Council (DOS)	<b>PKO.</b> peacekeeping operations (DOD)
<b>OSC.</b> Open Source Center (ODNI) (CIA)	<b>PKSOI.</b> Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (DOD)
<b>OSCE.</b> Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (IGO)	<b>PM.</b> Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS)
<b>OPCW.</b> Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (IGO)	<b>PM/CPA.</b> Office of Congressional and Public Affairs (DOS/PM)
<b>OSD.</b> Office of the Secretary of Defense (DOD)	<b>PM/CPMS.</b> Counter Piracy and Maritime Security (DOS)
<b>OSDBU.</b> Office of Small Disadvantaged Business Utilization (USAID)	<b>PM/DDTC.</b> Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DOS)
<b>OTA.</b> Office of Technical Assistance (Treasury)	<b>PM/GPI.</b> Office of Global Programs and Initiatives (DOS)
<b>OTI.</b> Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID); Office of Transnational Issues (CIA)	<b>PM/ISO.</b> Office of International Security Operations (DOS)
<b>OUSD(I).</b> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (DOD)	<b>PM/SA.</b> Office of Security Assistance (DOS)
<b>OUSD(P).</b> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DOD)	<b>PM/SDI.</b> Office of State-Defense Integration (DOS)
<b>OVT.</b> Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism (DOJ)	<b>PM/SNA.</b> Office of Security Negotiations and Agreements (DOS)
<b>OXFAM.</b> Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (NGO)	<b>PM-ISE.</b> Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (ODNI)
<b>P5.</b> Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council	<b>PMC.</b> private military company
<b>PA.</b> Public Affairs	<b>PN.</b> partner nation (DOD)
<b>PACER.</b> National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Even Response (DHS)	<b>PNG.</b> Persona Non Grata
<b>PAO.</b> Public Affairs Officer	<b>PNSP.</b> Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (DOS) Peace Operations
<b>PCC.</b> Policy Coordinating Committee (White House) See also IPC.	<b>POA.</b> Program of Analysis; Partners for the Americas (NGO)
<b>PD.</b> Public Diplomacy (DOS)	<b>POLAD.</b> political advisor
<b>PDB.</b> President’s Daily Brief (DNI)	<b>POLMIL.</b> political-military
<b>PDD.</b> Presidential Decision Directive (White House)	<b>PPD.</b> Presidential policy directive (White House) See also NSPM

<b>PPL.</b> Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning (USAID)	<b>SC/USA.</b> Save the Children Federation, Inc. (NGO)
<b>PREACT.</b> The Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism	<b>SDN.</b> Specially Designated Nationals List (OFAC/Treasury)
<b>PRM.</b> Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (DOS)	<b>SecDef.</b> Secretary of Defense (DOD)
<b>PRT.</b> provincial reconstruction team (DOS) (DOD)	<b>SETL.</b> Security Environment Threat List
<b>PSA.</b> List. Politically Sensitive Areas List	<b>S/F.</b> Director of Foreign Assistance Resources (DOS)
<b>PSD.</b> Presidential Study Directive (White House)	<b>SFA.</b> security force assistance
<b>PSI.</b> Proliferation Security Initiative (DOS)	<b>SIGINT.</b> signals intelligence (DOD)
<b>QDDR.</b> Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (DOS)	<b>SIN.</b> Standing Information Needs
<b>QDR.</b> quadrennial defense review (DOD)	<b>SIOC.</b> Strategic Information and Operations Center (DOJ/FBI)
<b>QHRSR.</b> Quadrennial Homeland Defense Review (DHS)	<b>S/J.</b> Undersecretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (DOS)
<b>RDT&amp;E.</b> research, development, test, and evaluation (DOD)	<b>SLTP.</b> State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Partners (ITACG)
<b>RFA.</b> Request for Assistance; Radio Free Asia (BBG)	<b>SMEB.</b> Significant Military Exercise Brief
<b>RFE/RL.</b> Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (BBG)	<b>SMEE.</b> Subject Matter Expert Exchanges
<b>RFI.</b> Request for Information	<b>SOD.</b> Special Operations Division (DEA)
<b>RI.</b> Refugees International (NGO)	<b>SOF.</b> Special Operations Forces (DOD)
<b>RLA.</b> Resident Legal Advisor (DOJ/FBI)	<b>SOFA.</b> status of forces agreement
<b>R/PPR.</b> Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS)	<b>SOG.</b> U.S. Marshalls Special Operations Group (DOJ)
<b>RSAT.</b> Regional Security Teams	<b>SOJTF.</b> special operations joint task force (DOD)
<b>RSI.</b> Regional Strategic Initiative (DOS)	<b>SOLE.</b> special operations liaison element (DOD)
<b>RSO.</b> regional security officer	<b>SOLO.</b> special operations liaison officer (DOD)
<b>SA.</b> security assistance (DOD, DOS)	<b>SOST.</b> special operations support team (DOD)
<b>SAO.</b> security assistance officer	<b>S/P.</b> Policy Planning Staff (DOS)
<b>SAR.</b> suspicious activity report	<b>SPAR.</b> Strategy, Plans, Analysis and Risk (DHS)
<b>SAU.</b> Scientific Intelligence Unit (FBI-TEDAC)	<b>SPP.</b> Strategic Planning Process (DOS)
<b>SA/WSO.</b> Salvation Army World Service Office (NGO)	<b>S/R.</b> Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS)
<b>SC.</b> security cooperation (DOD, DOS)	<b>S&amp;R.</b> Guiding Principles for Stabilization & Reconstruction (DOS)
<b>S/CCI.</b> Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (DOS)	
<b>SCO.</b> Security Cooperation Agency	

<b>S/R/IIP.</b> Bureau of International Information Programs (DOS)	<b>TIDE.</b> Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (NCTC/DNI)
<b>S/R/PA.</b> Bureau of Public Affairs (DOS)	<b>TIEDS.</b> TEDAC Improvised Explosives Detection and Synthesis (FBI-TEDAC)
<b>S/R/PD.</b> Public Diplomacy (DOS)	<b>TIP.</b> Terrorist Interdiction Program (DOS); Trafficking in Persons.
<b>S/R/PPR.</b> Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS)	<b>TOC.</b> transnational organized crime (DOD)
<b>SRT.</b> Smuggling Response Team (WMDT) (DOS)	<b>TOPOFF.</b> Top Officials Exercises (NLE)
<b>SSC.</b> Special Security Center (ONCIX) (ODNI)	<b>TREAS.</b> Department of the Treasury
<b>SSCI.</b> Senate Select Committee on Intelligence	<b>TSA.</b> Transportation Security Administration (DHS)
<b>SSR.</b> Security Sector Reform	<b>TSC.</b> Terrorist Screening Center (DOJ/FBI)
<b>SST.</b> Stability Transition Team	<b>TSCP.</b> Theater security cooperation plan (DOD)
<b>SSTR.</b> Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction	<b>TSCTP.</b> Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (DOS/USAID, DOD)
<b>START.</b> National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (DHS)	<b>TSI.</b> Terrorist Screening and Interdiction Program
<b>START.</b> Stabilization, Transition, and Response Team (Successor to Civilian Response Corps)	<b>TSOC.</b> theater special operations command (DOD)
<b>SVTS.</b> Secure Video-Teleconference Service	<b>TTP.</b> tactics, techniques, and procedures (DOD)
<b>SWAT.</b> Special Weapons and Tactics (DOJ)	<b>UCP.</b> Unified Command Plan (DOD)
<b>TCO.</b> Transnational Criminal Organization	<b>UN.</b> United Nations (IGO)
<b>TEDAC.</b> Terrorist Explosives Device Analytical Center (FBI/DOJ)	<b>UNDAC.</b> United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
<b>TEL.</b> Terrorist Exclusions List (DOS)	<b>UNDMT.</b> Disaster Management Team (IGO)
<b>TExU.</b> Technical Exploitation Unit (FBI-TEDAC)	<b>UNDP.</b> United Nations Development Program (IGO)
<b>TEOAF.</b> The Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (Treasury)	<b>UNDPKO.</b> United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (IGO)
<b>TFF.</b> Treasury Forfeiture Fund (Treasury)	<b>UNESCO.</b> Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (IGO)
<b>TFFC.</b> Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (Treasury)	<b>UNHCHR.</b> United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (IGO)
<b>TFI.</b> Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (Treasury)	<b>UNHCR.</b> High Commissioner for Refugees (IGO)
<b>TFOS.</b> Terrorism Financing Operations Section (FBI/DOJ)	<b>UNHOC.</b> Humanitarian Operations Center (IGO)
<b>TFTP.</b> Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (Treasury)	<b>UNICEF.</b> Children's Fund (IGO)
	<b>UNJLC.</b> Joint Logistics Center (UN)

**UNOCHA.** United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

**UNRWA.** Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East

**U/SIA.** Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis

**USACIDC.** United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (DOD)

**USA for UNHCR.** United States Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (NGO)

**USAFRICOM.** United States Africa Command (DOD)

**USAID.** United States Agency for International Development

**USAID/FFP.** Office for Food for Peace

**USAID/OFDA.** Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

**USCENTCOM.** United States Central Command (DOD)

**USCG.** United States Coast Guard (DHS)

**USCIS.** United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS)

**USCYBERCOM.** United States Cyber Command (DOD)

**USDA.** United States Department of Agriculture

**USD(I).** Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (DOD)

**USD(P).** Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DOD)

**USEU.** United States Mission to the European Union (FAS/USDA)

**USEUCOM.** United States European Command (DOD)

**USG.** United States Government

**USINDOPACOM.** United States Indo-Pacific Command (DOD)

**USIP.** United States Institute of Peace

**USNORTHCOM.** United States Northern Command (DOD)

**USPHS.** United States Public Health Service (DHHS)

**USSOCOM.** United States Special Operations Command (DOD)

**USSOUTHCOM.** United States Southern Command (DOD)

**USSS.** United States Secret Service (DHS)

**USSTRATCOM.** United States Strategic Command (DOD)

**USTRANSCOM.** United States Transportation Command (DOD)

**USTR.** United States Trade Representative (FAS/USDA)

**USUN.** U.S. Mission to the United Nations (DOS)

**UW.** unconventional warfare (DOD)

**VA.** (mine) Victim Assistance (UN)

**VTF.** Voluntary Trust Fund (UN)

**VOA.** Voice of America (BBG)

**VSCC.** Village Stability Coordination Center (USAID)

**WANGO.** World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO)

**WFP.** World Food Program (UN, IGO)

**WHO.** World Health Organization (UN, IGO)

**WIF.** Wales Initiative Fund (DOD)

**WINPAC.** Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (CIA)

**WIRe.** World Intelligence Review (DNI)

**WMD.** weapons of mass destruction (DOD)

**WMDD.** Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (FBI)

**WMD/DT.** Weapons of Mass Destruction and Domestic Terrorism Section (FBI)

**WMD-T.** Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (DOS)

**WOG.** Whole-of-Government

**WRI.** World Relief Institute

**WTO.** World Trade Organization (IGO)