



**JSOU Rapporteur Report**  
**SOF Forum Series on**  
**THE FUTURE OF SOF IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: A LOOK AT**  
**INDO-PACIFIC AND BEYOND**  
**5-6 May 2021**

Session/Event/Panel	
<b>Session/Event/Panel</b>	<b>Panel 1: Reconsidering the Strategic Landscape</b>
<b>Rapporteur</b>	<b>Dr. Homer Harkins</b>
<b>Course/Program/ Content Area</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Dave Oakley</b>, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) (moderator)</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Yuval Weber</b>, Krulak Center, Marine Corps University, “Historical Cases of Strategic Competition: History Redux?”</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Dave Dudas</b>, JSOU, “Towards a Definition of Strategic Competition”</li> <li>▪ <b>Mr. Bob Jones</b>, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) J5, “Competitive by Nature”</li> </ul>
General	
<b>Content Summary</b>  What are the main points of this panel/session?	<p><b>Dr. Weber</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Is strategic competition new, or in what ways is it new?              There are new powers (e.g., a resurgent Russia or new Chinese mega power). But, as in the past, alliance networks will help deter aggression. Domestic politics will impact in new ways and governments will struggle to sustain engagement.</li> <li>2. What is great power competition (GPC) and how is it done? What is the special operations forces (SOF) role in GPC (acting on the margin, increasing partner capability, proactive engagement)?              GPC is about deterring confrontation, managing alliances, and sustaining social contracts.</li> </ol> <p><b>Dr. Dudas</b></p> <p>Low intensity conflict can be used as a flanking maneuver. Where and how are the current global conflicts taking place?            A new American way of thinking is needed for strategic competition. There must be a new pragmatism. First, we must understand the new way conflicts are managed. They are hybrid and cross continuum. We are in a post-binary (win or lose) era where irregular gray zone actions and activities will be the norm. Russia is expertly employing non-lethal/low-cost information operations. China is leveraging its growing economic element of national power (OBOR-One Belt One Road). Influence is the new goal. The U.S. must achieve and maintain legitimacy; work by, through, and with allies and partners; and move beyond black and white SOF. The meta-frame should be irregular warfare (IW) exercised through security cooperation with allies and partners.</p> <p><b>Mr. Jones</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What are we competing for?              We are probably competing for leadership of the world-based system. Mr. Jones’s recommendation is to influence and not try to control. We should exploit legally</li> </ol>

	<p>irreconcilable political grievances. According to Jones, we are currently shifting into a post-industrial age. This post-control era is now about the focused competition for influence (strategic influence.) We are moving from threat suppression to managing change and away from reaction towards influence.</p> <p>2. How should the U.S. play the game of competition? We are moving away from a paradigm of allies and enemies and toward a support-to-determinism paradigm. We must show we support others' legitimate aspirations.</p> <p><b>Wrap up: JSOU should have learning experiences that define GPC and use history.</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Can JSOU successfully inject complex subjects such as history or international relations into its curriculum under the current model?</li> <li>2. Can we inject advanced knowledge earlier in the SOF career path so this knowledge can be practically employed?</li> <li>3. What learning models will enable this learning?</li> <li>4. Should we focus on how to think, what to know, or both?</li> <li>5. What is success and how do we define it?</li> <li>6. Can we help build leadership that knows how to build relationships?</li> <li>7. SOF has a critically important role in SOFT power. Can we educate our students on this role?</li> <li>8. We need to be in others' hearts and minds- in our friend's hearts and our adversary's minds. How do we improve strategic communication both in narrative (what we represent) and methodology to best influence our friends and adversaries?</li> </ol>
<p><b>Relevance for JSOU</b></p> <p>What knowledge, people, or activities discussed are relevant for JSOU?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the new strategic landscape</li> <li>▪ the value of alliance in the 21st Century</li> <li>▪ the role of SOF in GPC</li> <li>▪ cross-spectrum conflict management</li> <li>▪ competitor IW strategies</li> <li>▪ strategic control versus strategic influence</li> </ul>
<p><b>Future Opportunities</b></p> <p>What further opportunities were identified that merit current or future efforts in the following areas?</p>	<p><b>Teaching and Learning (T&amp;L)</b></p> <p>Create learning objectives that address current geopolitics wherever appropriate in current courses and seminars. Emphasize what GPC is and how relevant actors are playing the game. All elements of national power should be addressed. Our interagency education courses can help here.</p> <p>Inject current strategic thought into courses and seminars, particularly those that come from the USSOCOM J5. We should both leverage and feed this strategic thought.</p> <p><b>Research &amp; Analysis (R&amp;A)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the new strategic landscape</li> <li>▪ the value of alliance in the 21st Century</li> <li>▪ the role of SOF in GPC</li> <li>▪ cross-spectrum conflict management</li> <li>▪ competitor IW strategies</li> <li>▪ strategic control versus strategic influence</li> </ul> <p><b>Service Outreach &amp; Engagement (SO&amp;E)</b></p> <p>We should feed the J5 strategic thought process.</p>

<p><b>Trends</b></p> <p>What relevant and emerging trends were identified in this session?</p>	<p>We are moving from threat suppression to managing change and away from reaction towards influence.</p> <p>The new way that conflicts are managed is hybrid and cross continuum. We are in a post-binary (win or lose) era where irregular gray zone actions and activities will be the norm.</p> <p>We are moving away from a paradigm of allies and enemies and toward a support-to-determinism paradigm. We must show we support others' legitimate aspirations.</p>
<p><b>Course/Program/Content Specific</b></p>	
<p><b>Relationship</b></p> <p>What is the relationship of this session content with your course/ program learning outcomes?</p>	<p>I don't have a course. This session will support various pathway development efforts.</p>
<p><b>Utility</b></p> <p>What parts or portions of this session support the learning outcomes of your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>The ideas discussed provide excellent starting points for the development of material that can be used to push pathway learning to the analytical level of learning and promote geopolitically relevant critical and creative thinking.</p>
<p><b>Instructional Strategy</b></p> <p>How would you use or incorporate those parts of this session into your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>This material could be translated into case studies or stage setters for relevant classes. This would tie up the material for higher level education (application, evaluation, synthesis). Each pathway director would need to identify specific employment.</p>
<p><b>Research Opportunities</b></p> <p>In what areas of this lesson would additional research benefit your course or program?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the new strategic landscape</li> <li>▪ the value of alliance in the 21st Century</li> <li>▪ the role of SOF in GPC</li> <li>▪ cross-spectrum conflict management</li> <li>▪ competitor IW strategies</li> <li>▪ strategic control versus strategic influence</li> </ul>
<p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <p>In what other courses or programs would you recommend incorporating content from this session?</p>	<p>This material could support our interagency, IW, and planning and design courses.</p>
<p><b>Notes or Comments</b></p>	<p>JSOU should strive to inject learning outcomes into JSOU courses designed for mid-career professionals that challenge them to think critically and creatively about how SOF can be used to influence partners and adversaries through leadership and narrative as part of U.S. SOFT power activities and programs.</p>

	<p>The subjects addressed in this session are all very big ideas that take hundreds of hours for students to master. But, as one speaker suggested later, JSOU can teach students how to think about these ideas through classes, seminars, courses, and research and leave the goal of mastering these ideas to other educational forums. Again, through case study, readings, and discussion, students can gain sufficient knowledge to think critically and creatively about aspects of these big ideas within experiences well within JSOU resourcing constraints (e.g., student contact hours per event).</p>
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<b>Session/Event/Panel</b>	<b>Panel 2: China’s Aspirations and Strategy in the Greater Pacific</b>
<b>Rapporteur</b>	<b>Dr. Homer Harkins</b>
<b>Course/Program/ Content Area</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Chris Marsh</b>, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) (moderator)</li> <li>▪ <b>Mr. Kelly Hicks</b>, JSOU, “Whatever Happened to China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’?”</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Andrew Erickson</b>, U.S. Naval War College, “What is China’s Strategy in the Greater Pacific?”</li> <li>▪ <b>Brigadier General David “Baja” Shoemaker</b>, DJ3 USINDOPACOM, “Dealing with a Rising China”</li> </ul>

**General**

<b>Content Summary</b>	<b>Mr. Hicks</b>
What are the main points of this panel/session?	<p><b>What happened to China’s peaceful rise?</b></p> <p>It has been a steady rise in power, which was never peaceful. Chinese psychology is influenced by the Century of Humiliation (1841–1949). Xi is more aggressive (e.g., Hong Kong/Taiwan) than his predecessors, but he has more power. His actions are more like a continuation of the plan than a change in strategic direction. China has steadily acquired dual-use technology both through the free market and espionage. The Chinese strategy is both realistic in goal and legitimate in their eyes. We must understand their goals and take measures to counter where needed multilaterally.</p> <p><b>Dr. Erickson</b></p> <p>The communist party has pursued consistent priorities—control of the homeland, securing borders, and now the near seas east/south China seas.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- control, influence, and reach across domains.</li> <li>- 400 Navy ships, 1,300 Coast Guard ships, and 700 vessels maritime militia (many very professional and capable and used geopolitically)</li> <li>- irregular warfare (IW) implications of maritime militia</li> <li>- open-source intelligence in IW</li> </ul> <p><b>Brigadier General Shoemaker</b></p> <p>He said this is a huge region and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are trying to replace current world order with a hierarchical one with them at the top. We want:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- a free and open Indo-Pacific region</li> <li>- debt-trap diplomacy</li> <li>- the quad in military terms as well as others</li> <li>- stable regional growth</li> <li>- typhoon and COVID relief</li> <li>- the Indonesian lost sub</li> </ul>

	<p>These are old habits that don't support new mission.</p> <p><b>Wrap-up Questions</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What caused military investment in China? (RMA (Desert Storm), 1990 Taiwan Strait crisis, Belgrade bombing)</li> <li>2. How can SOF support all-domain deterrence?</li> <li>3. Can the Australian-U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) task force be expanded to other countries (e.g., FVEY plus Japan)?</li> </ol>
<p><b>Relevance for JSOU</b></p> <p>What knowledge, people or activities discussed are relevant for JSOU?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Chinese strategic perspective</li> <li>▪ Chinese force build-up and implications for U.S. SOF</li> <li>▪ the use of SOFT power in influence</li> </ul>
<p><b>Future Opportunities</b></p> <p>What further opportunities were identified that merit current or future efforts in the following areas?</p>	<p><b>Teaching and Learning (T&amp;L)</b></p> <p>Challenge students to think strategically and without bias. This can be done in a variety of ways—gaming, exercises that require imagination and critical thought, required student feedback through learning management system methodologies, etc.</p> <p>Maximize foreign student attendance in JSOU courses to help learners enhance their multicultural expertise and comfort with other points of view.</p> <p><b>Research &amp; Analysis (R&amp;A)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Chinese strategic perspective</li> <li>▪ Chinese force build-up and implications for U.S. SOF</li> <li>▪ the use of SOFT power in influence</li> <li>▪</li> </ul> <p><b>Service Outreach &amp; Engagement (SO&amp;E)</b></p> <p>We should work with the Australian-U.S. SOF task force to expand it to other countries (e.g., FVEY plus Japan).</p>
<p><b>Trends</b></p> <p>What relevant and emerging trends were identified in this session?</p>	<p>China is pursuing consistent priorities—control of the homeland, securing borders, and now the near seas east/south China seas.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- control, influence, and reach across domains</li> <li>- 400 Navy ships, 1,300 Coast Guard ships, and 700 vessels maritime militia (many very professional and capable and used geopolitically)</li> <li>- irregular warfare (IW) implications of maritime militia</li> <li>- open-source intelligence in IW</li> </ul>
<b>Course/Program/Content Specific</b>	
<p><b>Relationship</b></p> <p>What is the relationship of this session content with your course/ program learning outcomes?</p>	<p>This material could be used in the pathway development effort.</p>
<p><b>Utility</b></p> <p>What parts or portions of this session support the learning outcomes</p>	<p>The ideas discussed provide excellent starting points for the development of material that can be used to push pathway learning to the analytical level of learning and promote geopolitically relevant critical and creative thinking.</p>

<p>of your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	
<p><b>Instructional Strategy</b></p> <p>How would you use or incorporate those parts of this session into your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>This material could be translated into case studies or stage setters for relevant classes. This would tie up the material for higher level education (application, evaluation, synthesis). Each pathway director would need to identify specific employment.</p>
<p><b>Research Opportunities</b></p> <p>In what areas of this lesson would additional research benefit your course or program?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Chinese strategic perspective</li> <li>▪ Chinese force build-up and implications for U.S. SOF</li> <li>▪ the use of SOFT power in influence</li> </ul>
<p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <p>In what other courses or programs would you recommend incorporating content from this session?</p>	<p>This material could support our interagency, IW, and planning and design courses.</p>
<p><b>Notes or Comments</b></p>	<p>JSOU should strive to inject learning outcomes into JSOU courses designed for mid-career professionals that challenges them to think critically and creatively about how SOF can be used to influence partners and adversaries through leadership and narrative as part of U.S. SOFT power activities and programs.</p> <p>The subject addressed in this session are all very big ideas that take hundreds of hours for students to master. But, as one speaker suggested later, JSOU can teach students how to think about these ideas through classes, seminars, courses, and research and leave the goal of mastering these ideas to other educational forums. Again, through case study, readings, and discussion, students can gain sufficient knowledge to think critically and creatively about aspects of these big ideas within experiences well within JSOU resourcing constraints (e.g., student contact hours per event).</p>



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Session/Event/Panel	
<b>Session/Event/Panel</b>	<b>Panel 3: Actors and Aspirations in the INDOPACOM AOR</b>
<b>Rapporteur</b>	<b>Dr. Homer Harkins</b>
<b>Course/Program/ Content Area</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev</b>, U.S. Naval War College (moderator)</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick</b>, Montclair State University, “What is the Status of Sino-Russian Relations Today?”</li> <li>▪ <b>Mr. DeVan Shannon</b>, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), “Building Partner Capacity in Mongolia”</li> <li>▪ <b>CW5 Maurice “Duc” Duclos</b>, U.S. Special Operations Command, “Practitioner’s Perspective”</li> </ul>
General	
<b>Content Summary</b> What are the main points of this panel/session?	<p><b>Introduction</b> <b>Are there partners who are too expensive and risky?</b></p> <p><b>Mr. Shannon</b> Why would partners be willing to put their security on the line for us? The Indo-Pacific is largely stable from a nation-state model. But China isn’t happy with the status quo. Countries such as Mongolia might prove to be valuable partners. For example, Mongolia sees themselves as the third target—Hong Kong, Taiwan, then Mongolia.</p> <p><b>Dr. Wishnick</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. She focused on Russia and the challenge of the Sino-Russian partnership, a partnership of consequence and not an alliance—yet. Ambiguity is a strategy. China has a policy against alliances. Could pressure on Ukraine and Taiwan be coordinated? It could be simultaneous but not coordinated. We agree to disagree on key issues (India, Taiwan, North Korea).</li> <li>2. China says Asia is for Asians, so where does that leave China? Is Russia now the junior partner? Economically, yes, but China is resource dependent, lacks water, and isn’t trusted in SOFT power. China needs Russia.</li> <li>3. What drives the partnership? Many factors drive it, but the aim is to create a new type of great power relations. We need information sovereignty.</li> <li>4. What are the limitations? Arctic, Silk Road, Central Asia—who manages security there? They have shared interests and act in parallel but not in coordination.</li> </ol>

	<p><b>CW5 Duclos</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The practitioner’s perspective—so what? Actors and aspirations. Us versus them. Special operations forces (SOF)—unconventional warfare (UW)—is a multiple-player game. Manifests below the threshold of conflict—how can SOF be used to avoid conflict? Non-state actors are players. But in great power conflict (GPC), the actors have a vested interest at a higher level. The game is asymmetric and multiplayer.</li> <li>2. We want to maintain the current world order but China wants change, so what does country X want? Are they with or against us or for themselves? What are the relevant national interests? Can you win in this infinite game?</li> </ol> <p>Questions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What do they want from us?</li> <li>2. How do we see these countries?</li> <li>3. What do they want to do?</li> <li>4. How much risk are we willing to take in this relationship?</li> <li>5. How does history and historic ties (e.g., vaccines in Central Asia and Russian SOFT power)?</li> <li>6. Can local issues complicate grand designs (e.g., border issues in Central Asia and OBOR)?</li> <li>7. What are the gaps we have with potential partners?</li> <li>8. How is the concept of denied area changing? It is more than geographic? Is it multi-domain?</li> <li>9. What limitations do we have, and what potential partners can help us to reduce? At the tactical level, we want to fill gaps. We need to work through partners that fill gaps.</li> <li>10. Could China bribe Russia to act and draw forces away from Taiwan? So much depends upon the issue. There are capabilities we need and don’t have that partners can provide. Russia is multi-ethnic and often in conflict with China. We need to change the definition of occupations.</li> <li>11. Can adversaries achieve objectives beyond statecraft?</li> <li>12. How could we divide Russia and China? Limited, most are domestic drivers.</li> <li>13. Can we engage others too indirectly?</li> <li>14. Is there common ground for cooperation as in the Cold War? We need to be realistic. China is clearly pushing the U.S. but we could stir the consequences.</li> </ol>
<p>What knowledge, people or activities discussed are relevant for JSOU?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the risk/return nature of partners</li> <li>▪ the common interests of our key competitors</li> <li>▪ competition in a multiplayer, multipolar world/environment</li> <li>▪ new strategic landscape</li> <li>▪ how to cooperate with our key competitors</li> </ul>
<p><b>Future Opportunities</b></p> <p>What further opportunities were identified that merit current or future</p>	<p><b>Teaching and Learning (T&amp;L)</b></p> <p>Incorporate learning activities that highlight the SOF role in SOFT power such as relationship building and demonstrated ability to improve partner capability in low intensity conflict and competition.</p> <p>Inject modern UW case studies in courses or in JSOU-sponsored theoretical wargames which heighten student understanding of the complex inter-player dynamics of modern UW.</p>

<p>efforts in the following areas?</p>	<p><b>Research &amp; Analysis (R&amp;A)</b>  the risk/return nature of partners  the common interests of our key competitors  competition in a multiplayer, multipolar world/environment  new strategic landscape  how to cooperate with our key competitors</p> <p><b>Service Outreach &amp; Engagement (SO&amp;E)</b>  We should provide periodic region reports that provide a SOF-unique view of important regions that will play a salient role in GPC (e.g., Central Asia or western Pacific) that can be used to inform the Enterprise in general and JSOU learning activities in specific. These products can be used to move learning quickly to the analysis level where critical and creative thinking can occur.</p>
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<p><b>Trends</b>  What relevant and emerging trends were identified in this session?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. We are moving from binary, global competition to a multiplayer, complex agenda environment.</li> <li>2. China is increasingly challenging the current rules-based status quo.</li> <li>3. The risk/return dynamics are changing as old alliances seem inadequate and new ones are required.</li> </ol>
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**Course/Program/Content Specific**

<p><b>Relationship</b>  What is the relationship of this session content with your course/ program learning outcomes?</p>	<p>This session will support various pathway development efforts.</p>
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<p><b>Utility</b>  What parts or portions of this session support the learning outcomes of your course or program?  (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>The ideas discussed provide excellent starting points for the development of material that can be used to push pathway learning to the analytical level of learning and promote geopolitically relevant critical and creative thinking.</p>
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<p><b>Instructional Strategy</b>  How would you use or incorporate those parts of this session into your course or program?  (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>This material could be translated into case studies or stage setters for relevant classes. This would tie up the material for higher-level education (application, evaluation, synthesis). Each pathway director would need to identify specific employment.</p>
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<p><b>Research Opportunities</b>  In what areas of this lesson would additional</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the risk/return nature of partners</li> <li>▪ the common interests of our key competitors</li> <li>▪ competition in a multiplayer, multipolar world/environment</li> <li>▪ new strategic landscape</li> <li>▪ how to cooperate with our key competitors</li> </ul>
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<p>research benefit your course or program?</p>	
<p><b>Recommendations</b> In what other courses or programs would you recommend incorporating content from this session?</p>	<p>This material could support our interagency, irregular warfare, and planning and design courses.</p>
<p><b>Notes or Comments</b></p>	<p>JSOU should strive to inject learning outcomes into JSOU courses designed for mid-career professionals that challenges them to think critically and creatively about how SOF can be used to influence partners and adversaries through leadership and narrative as part of US SOFT power activities and programs.</p> <p>The subject addressed in this session are all very big ideas that take hundreds of hours for students to master. But, as one speaker suggested later, JSOU can teach students how to think about these ideas through classes, seminars, courses, and research and leave the goal of mastering these ideas to other educational forums. Again, through case study, readings, and discussion, students can gain sufficient knowledge to think critically and creatively about aspects of these big ideas within experiences well within JSOU resourcing constraints (e.g., student contact hours per event).</p>



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Session/Event/Panel	
Session/Event/Panel	Panel 4: The “Indo” in INDOPACOM
Rapporteur	Mr. Greg E. Metzgar, CAIS-IP
Course/Program/ Content Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Robert Tomlinson</b>, U.S. Naval War College (moderator)</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Anit Mukherjee S. Rajaratnam</b>, School of International Studies, “After Ladakh: Indian Military Transformation and Its Implications for the Indo-Pacific”</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Sumit Ganguly</b>, Indiana University, “What is India’s Strategy?”</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Joe Felter</b>, Stanford University, “Policy/Practitioner Perspective”</li> </ul>
General	
Content Summary  What are the main points of this panel/session?	<p>The 2008 Unified Command Plan, signed on 17 December 2008, documented the transfer of all areas of the Indian Ocean previously assigned to U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) west of 68 degrees east to the newly established U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). As a result, four island countries off the east coast of Africa that were formerly assigned to USPACOM were reassigned to AFRICOM—Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Reunion.</p> <p>On 30 May 2018, Secretary of Defense, James N. Mattis, officially announced that the USPACOM would become U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), recognizing the increasing connectivity between the Indian and Pacific oceans as the U.S. focuses west.</p> <p>INDOPACOM protects and defends in concert with other U.S. government agencies, the territory of the U.S., its people, and its interests. With allies and partners, INDOPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the Indo-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness.<sup>1</sup></p> <p>During the Obama administration, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates worked to shift focus from the war on terrorism and the Middle East in order to refocus back on an emerging China, which threatened with not only economic power but also a growing military power within the region.</p> <p>India is the main discussion point in this seminar—and the speakers highlighted that India shares a common border with China. It is also one of the few countries within the region that has had military encounters with China. India also remains a non-aligned country and despite the discussions from a U.S. perspective of the quad comprising the countries of U.S., Australia, India, and Japan—India will maintain their autonomy.</p> <p>Not only does India have to deal with the growing economic and military power of a rising China, they also face a threat from a nuclear-armed Pakistan with known ties to terrorist</p>

<sup>1</sup> “History of United States Indo-Pacific Command,” USINDOPACOM, 1 June 2021, <https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/History/>.

	groups. The fact that India is also one the nuclear power states, it presents another level of challenges for policy and military decision makers.
<p><b>Relevance for JSOU</b></p> <p>What knowledge, people or activities discussed are relevant for JSOU?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. India shares many of the national values as the West, with a common unifying interest in containing the influence (direct and indirect) of China.</li> <li>2. The Indian Chief of Defense Staff is currently moving toward jointness and Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) international education provides an opportunity to support these efforts.</li> </ol> <p>“The geopolitical engagement of the major powers in the WIO [Western Indian Ocean] region is mostly driven by their desire to secure the region from falling prey to a hostile environment. The WIO region lies on the arc of growth and opportunity and the arc of energy. The security of the region is important for all those countries that face its waters and for all those states that depend on global maritime trading that passes through the region. The SLOCs in the Indian Ocean are one of the busiest in the world: for instance, ‘more than 80 percent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through Indian Ocean choke points, with 40 percent passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 percent through the Strait of Malacca and 8 percent through the Bab el-Mandab Strait’ (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2011). The geographical position of the critical choke points and the strategic SLOCs around the WIO also provide the most Kumar economical and shortest lines of communication between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.”<sup>2</sup></p>
<p><b>Future Opportunities</b></p> <p>What further opportunities were identified that merit current or future efforts in the following areas?</p>	<p><b>Teaching and Learning (T&amp;L)</b> Explore the impacts of India as a non-aligned actor when working with any element of the special operations forces (SOF) Enterprise, especially the SOF maritime and naval components.</p> <p><b>Research &amp; Analysis (R&amp;A)</b> There are several areas which could be used to develop SOF research topics, especially with the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ impacts of China/Russia in Western Indian Ocean (WIO)</li> <li>▪ Pakistan-India terrorist tensions between two nuclear armed powers</li> <li>▪ over-the-horizon military projections</li> </ul> <p><b>Service Outreach &amp; Engagement (SO&amp;E)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ proactive engagement with the Joint Staff (JS) J7, especially as the JS, develops/refines their concept for globally integrated operations/planning</li> <li>▪ engagement with INDOPACOM headquarters and staff for targeted JSOU course/SME support</li> <li>▪ partnerships with strategic studies centers at specific universities with pacific studies programs</li> </ul>
<p><b>Trends</b></p> <p>What relevant and emerging trends were identified in this session?</p>	<p><b>Dr. Felter</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. India, as of 2016, is working military-to-military contacts to include sharing of technology and military knowledge, which has doubled since 2008.</li> <li>2. Challenges with human rights but challenges with India and the U.S. should be done in private, not in open-source media.</li> <li>3. Partnerships with the U.S. for weapons, but not trying to exclusively corner the market. Accepting India’s reliance on mix of Russian and U.S. purchases but ensuring they are capable of working together such as what we see in Colombia with MI-17s and UH-60s.</li> </ol>

<sup>2</sup> Raghvendra Kumar, “India’s Strategic Interests and Partnership with Island States of Africa in the Western Indian Ocean Region, *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 7, no. 2 (2020): 234-235.

	<p><b>Dr. Ganguly</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. India is ambivalent when being described in the quad—it does not have formal agreements and wants to maintain its autonomy of action.</li> <li>5. India is challenged with a lack of a defense industrial base (e.g., it still cannot produce its own auto-loading rifle).</li> <li>6. Challenges with weapons procurement—Russia is quicker to sales than the U.S. due to Congress restrictions/protocols on arms sales (e.g., tech transfer, human rights, etc.). There could be acceptance of using European Union military sales.</li> <li>7. The recent COVID-19 spike is a tragedy in the making—for years India has failed to support health spending, and now this is coming back on the government.</li> <li>8. India is still working to develop a grand strategy. It has not thought about the day which it currently finds itself in—they are in flux right now trying to determine what their new role is in the 21st Century given its strategic location.</li> </ol>
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**Course/Program/Content Specific**

<p><b>Relationship</b></p> <p>What is the relationship of this session content with your course/ program learning outcomes?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ to understand the history and culture of a rising India from the Cold War to the current strategic challenge era with Russia and China</li> <li>▪ to comprehend the diplomatic, informational/influence, military and economic challenges, and opportunities with a non-aligned India and U.S. partnership</li> <li>▪ to comprehend the military significance of the WIO and the role SOF plays in addressing military challenges</li> <li>▪ to understand how the Chinese and Russians are working to dominate the Indian Ocean trade, influence, and diplomatic processes</li> </ul>
<p><b>Utility</b></p> <p>What parts or portions of this session support the learning outcomes of your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>This session was a general overview of the strategic importance and challenges that India is having in trying to remain a non-aligned country among three strong challengers of Russia, China and the U.S. This could set the context for a number of JSOU-related courses which highlight planning, sensitive activities, and geostrategic strategy and culture.</p> <p>This could also be a tremendous opportunity to develop through INDOPACOM a regional education strategy for the SOF Enterprise and international partners in the region, especially targeted on India.</p>
<p><b>Instructional Strategy</b></p> <p>How would you use or incorporate those parts of this session into your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>Given the general nature and broad overview, there could be some elements (e.g. short clips) which could be integrated into presentations to start or enhance presentations and discussions centered on the WIO and India.</p> <p>Another key area is to develop a class or integrate into a lesson concerning how the SOF Enterprise works with the Joint, Interagency, Intragovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) to plan, partner, and participate with nation states that remain non-aligned where they could find themselves working with peer competitors in the same area(s) (e.g., American and Russian military trainers in India).</p>
<p><b>Research Opportunities</b></p> <p>In what areas of this lesson would additional research benefit your course or program?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ SOF engagement with non-aligned nations to build partnerships</li> <li>▪ development of scenarios in the WIO which could augment design, planning, and staff orientation courses</li> </ul>
<p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <p>In what other courses or programs would you</p>	<p>The academic departments of JSOU should review the report on this panel and assess where their current portfolio of courses or learning pathways might have a need to discuss the</p>

recommend incorporating content from this session?	strategic importance of the WIO, specifically India, to determine what lessons or products this might affect.
<b>Notes or Comments</b>	The panel provided a broad overview of recent trends occurring with and in India. If there are specific JSOU courses which incorporate India, this provides a useful context.



**JSOU Rapporteur Report**  
**SOF Forum Series on**  
**THE FUTURE OF SOF IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: A LOOK AT**  
**INDO-PACIFIC AND BEYOND**  
 5-6 May 2021

<b>Session/Event/Panel</b>	<b>Panel 5: Surrogate Forces and Proxies in the Indo-Pacific Region</b>
<b>Rapporteur</b>	<b>Mr. Greg E. Metzgar, CAIS-IP</b>
<b>Course/Program/Content Area</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Tom Dolan</b>, University of Central Florida (moderator)</li> <li>▪ <b>Mr. Will Irwin</b>, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), “Taiwan: Resilience and Preparation for Resistance”</li> <li>▪ <b>Ambassador Harry Thomas</b>, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), “Can the Philippines Address Its Terrorist Challenges?”</li> <li>▪ <b>Colonel (Ret) Dave Maxwell</b>, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “North Korea: A Rogue Spoiler in Great Power Competition”</li> </ul>
<b>General</b>	
<b>Content Summary</b> What are the main points of this panel/session?	<p>This panel encapsulated discussions focused on resistance in three key areas of the INDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR)—Taiwan, Philippines, and North Korea. Each of these areas has key considerations which the panel highlighted, and various social, physical, and economical challenges that work to develop a resistance design would have to be considered.</p> <p>This panel did not specifically mention but highlighted some of the challenges found in the JSOU <i>Resistance Operating Concept (ROC)</i>, which was developed a few years ago to capture the challenges with “developing a nationally authorized, organized resistance capability prior to an invasion and full or partial occupation resulting in a loss of territory and sovereignty. Resistance, as a form of warfare, can be conceived as part of a layered, in-depth national defense.” Panel members highlighted challenges with the following areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. identifying and developing key components in a national resilience within the specific countries of the region</li> <li>2. what national populations would tolerate concerning the opportunity cost of conducting a resistance campaign if conflict comes about</li> <li>3. a cornerstone of knowledge for strategists, policymakers, researchers, academics, and practitioners involved in furthering resistance capabilities</li> </ol>
<b>Relevance for JSOU</b> What knowledge, people or activities discussed are relevant for JSOU?	The development of resistance concepts and education, which is complementary and not competitive with the SOF Enterprise (building partnerships), is relevant for JSOU.
<b>Future Opportunities</b> What further opportunities were identified that merit	<p><b>Teaching and Learning (T&amp;L)</b> This panel could inform some of the ongoing course work in irregular warfare, sensitive activities, design, and planning.</p> <p><b>Research &amp; Analysis (R&amp;A)</b></p>

<p>current or future efforts in the following areas?</p>	<p>The JSOU <i>ROC</i> is an important place to start as the JSOU faculty and interested partners (e.g. INDOPACOM staff and interagency) work to identify national resilience and the “criticality of maintaining legitimacy during the conduct of resistance operations during the struggle to restore and resume national sovereignty” if conflict comes in this AOR.</p> <p><b>Service Outreach &amp; Engagement (SO&amp;E)</b> Further develop outreach to the strategists, policymakers, researchers, academics, and practitioners involved in furthering resistance capabilities.</p>
<p><b>Trends</b></p> <p>What relevant and emerging trends were identified in this session?</p>	<p><b>Mr. Irwin</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Taiwan resilience for resistance is hard to gauge at this point. If a conflict occurs with the People’s Republic of China, it will be heavily influenced by urban operations.</li> <li>2. There are unique resistance challenges in Taiwan (e.g., no cross-border sanctuary).</li> <li>3. Consider the population’s ability to accept risk conducting resistance (national will).</li> </ol> <p><b>AMB Thomas</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Philippines offers a terrorist challenge that has been a difficulty with origins 400 years ago into 21st century.</li> <li>2. Its composed of seven-thousand islands with some inhabited but with pervasive corruption and challenging governance.</li> <li>3. National unification is almost impossible in this region.</li> <li>4. Over the past decades, we’ve had a lot of engagement with the Philippine Government and their armed forces. How do we continue to build upon these relationships?</li> <li>5. The U.S. has a challenging history with the Philippine Islands—it goes back to the expansion of the U.S. empire at the beginning of the 20th century.</li> </ol> <p><b>Retired Colonel Maxwell</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. North Korea can serve as a spoiler role between China and the U.S.</li> <li>2. China wants to export its policy to improve its position, but this gets harder in North Korea due to the cult of personality with the Kim family.</li> <li>3. Nuclear weapons are a key component of the North Korean status—it’s hard to get them out of their hands at this point.</li> <li>4. Consider the use of blackmail diplomacy.</li> <li>5. North Korea has made great strides in global reach through their ability to develop cyber and ballistic capabilities.</li> </ol>
<p><b>Course/Program/Content Specific</b></p>	
<p><b>Relationship</b></p> <p>What is the relationship of this session content with your course/ program learning outcomes?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ to understand the history and applications of resistance theory in the INDOPACOM AOR</li> <li>▪ to comprehend the diplomatic, informational/influence, military and economic challenges, and opportunities required to build and execute resistance campaigns</li> <li>▪ to comprehend the military significance of the target population’s ability to conduct resistance activities</li> </ul>
<p><b>Utility</b></p> <p>What parts or portions of this session support the learning outcomes of your course or program?</p>	<p>This panel, as we’ve noted, has applications to further develop the principles of resistance campaigning and education integration into a number of different courses JSOU conducts or supports.</p>

(Please be specific.)	
<p><b>Instructional Strategy</b></p> <p>How would you use or incorporate those parts of this session into your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>Given the general nature and broad overview, there could be some elements (e.g. short clips) which could be integrated into presentations to start or enhance presentations and discussions centered on the resistance and sensitive activities curriculum.</p>
<p><b>Research Opportunities</b></p> <p>In what areas of this lesson would additional research benefit your course or program?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ SOF engagement with regional partners to counter the threats</li> <li>▪ development of scenarios from the region to augment design, planning, and staff orientation courses</li> <li>▪ engagement with the SOF Enterprise to develop multifunctional practices and procedures for SOF and the Joint Force within Globally Integrated Campaigns and Operations</li> </ul>
<p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <p>In what other courses or programs would you recommend incorporating content from this session?</p>	<p>The academic departments of JSOU should review the report on this panel and assess where in their current portfolio of courses or learning pathways might have a need to discuss the strategic importance of the region and resistance.</p>
<p><b>Notes or Comments</b></p>	<p>A good leverage point to determine resistance education requirements and information for new scenarios based upon the three countries covered.</p>



JSOU Rapporteur Report  
 SOF Forum Series on  
**THE FUTURE OF SOF IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: A LOOK AT  
 INDO-PACIFIC AND BEYOND**  
 5-6 May 2021

<b>Session/Event/Panel</b>	<b>Panel 6: Interests and Linkages Beyond GCC</b>
<b>Rapporteur</b>	<b>Mr. Greg E. Metzgar, CAIS-IP</b>
<b>Course/Program/Content Area</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Rebecca Patterson</b>, Georgetown University (moderator)</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Evan Ellis</b>, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), “China and SOUTHCOM”</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Marlene Laruelle</b>, George Washington University, “Central Asia: The New Great Game”</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Derek Reveron</b>, U.S. Naval War College, “Closing the Gap: Security Cooperation and GPC”</li> </ul>

**General**

<p><b>Content Summary</b></p> <p>What are the main points of this panel/session?</p>	<p><b>Introduction</b></p> <p>The panel highlighted three key regions of the world where China is growing and expanding. The first presentation highlighted many of the challenges China is presenting in the western hemisphere (Foreign Affairs Committee).</p> <p><b>Dr. Ellis</b></p> <p>China’s increased engagement in South America began in 2008 in the middle of a commodity boom that led to increased investment in South America’s mining and extractives sector. This investment helped reduce poverty and fund social programs throughout the region, but it also resulted in the region’s dependence on China for the production and transportation of these materials.</p> <p>Chinese financing in the region peaked at \$35.6 billion in 2010 compared to \$22.5 billion from the U.S.-led World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank combined.</p> <p>Since then, Chinese direct investment has dropped. However, China’s focus has trended towards other areas including energy, 5G and telecommunications, security cooperation, and a concerning push to shape a positive public opinion about China through state-backed propaganda.</p> <p><b>Dr. Laruelle</b></p> <p>She highlighted China’s attempts to exert influences into Central Asia, but it has to walk a tightrope with Russia, who predominantly holds the greater influence based upon their cultural and historical experience in the region.</p> <p><b>Dr. Reveron</b></p> <p>He focused on the security cooperation challenges facing the U.S., China, and Russia. President Biden has declared that a major foreign policy objective is “building back better” our partnership and alliances with key partners, especially those who can assist in checking China and Russia.</p>
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<p><b>Relevance for JSOU</b></p> <p>What knowledge, people or activities discussed are relevant for JSOU?</p>	<p>In March 2021, Foreign Affairs reported that “the Chinese and Russian foreign ministers... rejected Western criticism of their human rights records and issued a joint statement offering an alternative vision for global governance. The U.S.-led international order, Lavrov said, “does not represent the will of the international community.”</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. JSOU will need to identify key learning, experimentation, and strategies to how special operations forces (SOF) can address the challenges posed by both Russia and China as the 21st century security environment continues to emerge.</li> <li>2. The shifting of focus from 20 years of violent extremist organizations to great power competition (GPC) will require a shift in mind-set and more indirect applications of soft power and SOF’s role.</li> </ol>
<p><b>Future Opportunities</b></p> <p>What further opportunities were identified that merit current or future efforts in the following areas?</p>	<p><b>Teaching and Learning (T&amp;L)</b> This panel could inform some of the ongoing course work in irregular warfare, sensitive activities, design, and planning, and expanded opportunities to highlight civil affairs and military influence operations.</p> <p><b>Research &amp; Analysis (R&amp;A)</b> China and Russia are using a series of indirect methods (e.g. cyber and influence operations). This presents unique opportunities to explore integration of SOF into cyber operations and strategic/operational influence linkages.</p> <p><b>Service Outreach &amp; Engagement (SO&amp;E)</b> Facilitate engagement between the SOF Enterprise and civilian academic/think tank organizations working to find holistic solutions to address this challenge.</p>
<p><b>Trends</b></p> <p>What relevant and emerging trends were identified in this session?</p>	<p><b>Dr. Ellis</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. China is dramatically expanding into the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR)</li> <li>2. China is investing heavily in physical infrastructure (e.g. ports, construction, precious minerals)</li> <li>3. It is supporting Argentina and Chile with nuclear power for electricity.</li> <li>4. They’re also providing technology, which will allow governments to track and monitor populations.</li> <li>5. People’s Republic of China (PRC) is investing in military professional military education and training with SOUTHCOM forces as well as leveraging the regions militaries to garner their own knowledge for the PRC.</li> </ol> <p><b>Dr. Marlene Laruelle</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Central Asia has been a major partner with Russia since 2009. Russia has provided a lot of investment in the area to win influence—China recognizes and respects this.</li> <li>2. Russia is seen as unreliable—a lot of promise is unfilled in this region.</li> <li>3. We have little knowledge of the China area and limited cultural influence, but contacts are growing and expanding. Some Sinophobia and fear of PRC intentions remain in the region.</li> <li>4. It is viewed as a test zone for the China/Russia relationship.</li> </ol> <p><b>Dr. Derek Reveron</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. We have challenges to economically compete with China because U.S. businesses are profit driven.</li> <li>2. The U.S. does lead in defense cooperation at this time.</li> <li>3. The withdraw of U.S. forces from Afghanistan will impact Russian/Chinese influence as we come out.</li> </ol>

**Course/Program/Content Specific**

<p><b>Relationship</b></p> <p>What is the relationship of this session content with your course/program learning outcomes?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ to understand the history and applications of strategic competitor’s influencing the southern flank of the U.S. and western hemisphere</li><li>▪ to comprehend the diplomatic, informational/influence, military and economic challenges and opportunities required to counter Chinese and Russian material support, and to counter their selling of technologies which monitor populations and threaten individual liberty</li><li>▪ to comprehend the military significance to build partnerships with regional partners— current and emerging to counter Russia and China</li><li>▪ to understand how challenges of posturing SOF to regionally orient back into areas that have been underserved due to the violent extremist organizations requirements in U.S. Central Command</li></ul>
<p><b>Utility</b></p> <p>What parts or portions of this session support the learning outcomes of your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>The challenges posed by Russia and China in these regions will focus SOF and the U.S. to develop new and long-lasting relationships with current partners and be open to greater involvement with new ones (e.g. Vietnam).</p> <p>How does JSOU expand International engagement with region’s military and civilian decision makers to enhance SOF education?</p>
<p><b>Instructional Strategy</b></p> <p>How would you use or incorporate those parts of this session into your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>Given the general nature and broad overview, there could be some elements (e.g. short clips) which could be integrated into presentations to start or enhance presentations and discussions centered on the strategic engagements SOF is/will conduct in these regions.</p>
<p><b>Research Opportunities</b></p> <p>In what areas of this lesson would additional research benefit your course or program?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ SOF shifts to new strategic challenges requiring indirect approaches and methods</li><li>▪ enhancing partners with operations less than war</li></ul>
<p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <p>In what other courses or programs would you recommend incorporating content from this session?</p>	<p>The academic departments of JSOU should review the report on this panel and assess where their current portfolio of courses or learning pathways might have a need to discuss the strategic importance for SOF to focus back on this region along with expanding international education for countries in the AOR.</p>
<p><b>Notes or Comments</b></p>	<p>The panel did not indicate it specifically, but there seems to be value added to partnering with NATO to identify SOF applications and opportunities to counter Russia.</p>



JSOU Rapporteur Report  
SOF Forum Series on  
**THE FUTURE OF SOF IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: A LOOK AT  
INDO-PACIFIC AND BEYOND**  
5-6 May 2021

Session/Event/Panel	
Session/Event/Panel	Panel 7: Strategic Culture: Avoiding Mirror Imaging
Rapporteur	Mr. Mark James
Course/Program/ Content Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Brigadier General (Ret) Russ Howard (moderator)</li> <li>▪ Dr. Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard University, “What is China’s Strategic Culture?”</li> <li>▪ Dr. Dima Adamsky, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, “Russian Strategic Culture”</li> <li>▪ Dr. Andrew Scobell, RAND, “Chinese Strategic Culture: Implications”</li> </ul>
General	
Content Summary	<p><b>Dr. Johnston</b> He poses a three-question strategic paradigm and strategic culture analysis:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership is closest to the hyper-militaristic of the Mao and Lenin models from which they draw and shape their leadership culture. Is the PLA is neo-Maoist?</li> <li>2. Is the PLA leadership more standard interstate real politics? Will the use of force only be used when national interest is threatened?</li> <li>3. Is the PLA closer to a pacifist with economic interdependence of commerce and finance?</li> </ol> <p><b>Dr. Adamsky</b> He talked about the risk of strategic culture—it can be misused when ethnic, racial, and cultural nationalism collide.</p> <p>He then covered five main characteristics of Russian strategic culture trying to shape them from strategic to tactical.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Siege mentality</b>—The world is against Russia. This helps shape Russia’s approach. Russia feels it is encircled by the geopolitical U.S.- and NATO-led encirclement. They will attempt to demonize their competitors and have a fixation with surprise attacks which leads to a forum of passive and active defensive posture. Israel and Iran are also nation states that use siege mentality in their strategic culture.</li> <li>▪ Another characteristic of Russian strategic culture is a holistic or systematic approach to all embracing within other systems, recognizing contradiction, and traditional strategic intervention. This approach has been used in Syria as a forum of deterrence.</li> <li>▪ <b>A Command and Control (C2) style of culture</b>—Hierarchical in nature, any transformation is driven from the top down. This system limits imagination for future war and the way they will develop the force. Some attempt of adopting a more mission command system is hampered by the C2 culture at the operational and tactical levels.</li> <li>▪ <b>Theory should drive practice culture</b>—While this system is useful for thinking of the future, it is wishful thinking for reality. From a pro perspective, it is useful for thinking outside of the box.</li> </ul>
What are the main points of this panel/session?	<p>What are the main points of this panel/session?</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Material and moral culture</b>—The Russians believe that a psychological mentality will overcome a material and numerically superior force. They believe that the individual toughness of the Russian soldier (i.e. the ability to out fight and suffer more) lends them a strategic advantage.</li> </ul> <p>Dr. Adamsky believes mirror imaging can be used to analyze and predict power—utilized at the strategic level to flush out phobias, used at the operational level for cultural prediction style of war and innovation, and applied at the tactical level for future theory of victory.</p> <p><b>Dr. Scobell</b> He talked about the PLA and its strategic culture. He also spoke to two approaches of Chinese culture. Confucius is described as pacifist and Ming is more realist. He believes that with the Ming approach, the use of force is very much a critical part of Chinese statecraft. The Ming approach is very operative in nature, while the Confucius approach is used for geopolitical narrative.</p> <p>He stated that the Chinese rationalize any Chinese action as defensive in nature. He cautions that the Chinese could elevate a crisis because they assume the worst and are probably overconfident in their ability to handle a crisis. By understanding the Chinese strategic culture, the U. S., allies, and partners can have a range of options that can help rule out types of responses and identify preferences for action. His thought on mirror imagining is that is not happening with China and the U.S. with regard to the rationality of conflict.</p>
<p><b>Relevance for JSOU</b></p> <p>What knowledge, people or activities discussed are relevant for JSOU?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ current and future strategic environment</li> <li>▪ the role special operations forces (SOF) will play in strategic competition</li> <li>▪ the value of security cooperation, alliances, and partnership</li> </ul>
<p><b>Future Opportunities</b></p> <p>What further opportunities were identified that merit current or future efforts in the following areas?</p>	<p><b>Teaching and Learning (T&amp;L)</b> Learning objectives that address past, current, and future strategic environment wherever they exist in current courses in the university. This panel nests in JSOU-Enlisted Academy (EA) CEP 3 strategic threat-based series and the strategic estimate in the JSW capstone.</p> <p><b>Research &amp; Analysis (R&amp;A)</b> There are several areas that could be used to develop SOF research topics—China’s strategic culture, Russian strategic culture, and a study on the Gerasimov versus the Primakov doctrine.</p> <p><b>Service Outreach &amp; Engagement (SO&amp;E)</b> Continue facilitated engagements between the SOF Enterprise, JSOU, and civilian academic and think tank organizations working to address and solve challenges.</p>
<p><b>Trends</b></p> <p>What relevant and emerging trends were identified in this session?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ China leveraging economic incentives to gain political leverage while gaining access and placement</li> <li>▪ China controlling the international narrative</li> <li>▪ Russian siege mentality</li> </ul>
<b>Course/Program/Content Specific</b>	
<p><b>Relationship</b></p> <p>What is the relationship of this</p>	<p>This panel would be a resource for EA students conducting their JSW capstone strategic estimate and weekly JSW threat-based study to gain a better understanding of the environment.</p>

session content with your course/ program learning outcomes?	
<p><b>Utility</b></p> <p>What parts or portions of this session support the learning outcomes of your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	The utility of understanding China and Russia strategic culture will help focus SOF approach in global integrated operations.
<p><b>Instructional Strategy</b></p> <p>How would you use or incorporate those parts of this session into your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	The use of the entire video of the panel or short, specific clips as pre-lesson tasks prior to weekly discussion on strategic competition with China and Russia could be useful.
<p><b>Research Opportunities</b></p> <p>In what areas of this lesson would additional research benefit your course or program?</p>	n/a
<p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <p>In what other courses or programs would you recommend incorporating content from this session?</p>	Linking these panels to relative learning objectives and outcomes can help focus to current lessons and courses in JSOU. For example, this panel would be a resource for EA students conducting their JSW capstone strategic estimate and weekly JSW threat-based study to gain a better understanding of the environment.
<b>Notes or Comments</b>	n/a



JSOU Rapporteur Report  
 SOF Forum Series on  
**THE FUTURE OF SOF IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: A LOOK AT  
 INDO-PACIFIC AND BEYOND**  
 5-6 May 2021

<b>Session/Event/Panel</b>	<b>Panel 8: Future Force Capability, Capacity, and SOF Core Activities</b>
<b>Rapporteur</b>	<b>Mr. Mark James</b>
<b>Course/Program/ Content Area</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Master Chief Petty Officer Brad Rhinelander</b>, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) (moderator)</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Dave Ellis</b>, JSOU, “How Do We Imagine SOF Utility Outside of the 12 Core Activities?”</li> <li>▪ <b>Dr. Lilian “Doc” Alessa</b>, JSOU, “What Is the Utility of SOF in Complex Adaptive Systems?”</li> <li>▪ <b>Mr. Charlie Black</b>, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) J5, “How Do We Re-conceptualize Force Structure? Implications for Education and Force Generation”</li> </ul>

**General**

<b>Content Summary</b>	This panel was made up of JSOU members and professors.
What are the main points of this panel/session?	<p><b>Dr. Ellis</b>          Dr. Ellis began his discussion by asking “Why do we have twelve core activities?” then linking it to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichol legislative act. Toward a theory of special operations, what are the things that the service components are focused on? What are the roles that special operations forces (SOF) will play? Conventional forces will be focused on hard power and SOF on soft power activities. He then shifted his discussion to the five basic strategic effects SOF can have.</p> <p>First and foremost, the most important thing SOF can do is support the strategic narrative through influence and information support operations. He linked this to Dr. Webb’s narrative of providing an alternative by attacking the enemy’s strategy. He then suggested that SOF can provide support to resilience, supporting Mr. Bob Jones’s narrative of redirecting the opponent’s energy. He then specifically referenced the JCIC and SOF support through the Join, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational-Commercial (JIIM-C) environment and building networks. Lastly, he said SOF is uniquely suited to provide support to resistance and counter global threats.</p> <p><b>Dr. Alessa</b>          Dr. Alessa began by pointing out the first SOF truth—humans are more important than hardware. Human dynamics is what makes things complicated. She then spoke to the power in polycentric environmental governance, the three types of power (design, pragmatic, and framing), while highlighting the key social concepts associated with each power. She emphasized how USSOCOM was built to operate within the poly-centralism system. She then talked about how to best utilize developing scientific and technology, specifically mentioning binary technology like artificial intelligence (AI). Within the polycentric environment, humans determine the rules, and this is designed off perceived challenges.</p>

	<p>Dr. Alessa stated opportunities exist within the polycentric environment as a combination of humans and technology. Expertise in AI will require machine help but will still need humans to provide context to those roles. Lastly, she emphasized that “humans will come first in the hybrid AI environment, not abandoning the technology but complementing it.”</p> <p><b>Mr. Black</b> He framed how the partitioner should frame strategic competition, suggesting multi-varied games to the infinite game. He pointed out that framing is dependent on the players. He specifically mentioned the utility of focusing on theory and history to frame.</p> <p>Mr. Black then said congressional research has noted that the military crosses hemispheres to engage in conventional terms but struggles at crossing or operating at a level less than war. He noted three things in SOF roles:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SOF can extend reach into denied areas through partners.</li> <li>2. SOF can extend power and limit political risk.</li> <li>3. SOF can operate at the sub-sovereign level.</li> </ol>
<p><b>Relevance for JSOU</b></p> <p>What knowledge, people or activities discussed are relevant for JSOU?</p>	<p>This panel’s concepts can inform, develop, and complement ongoing course work in JSOU.</p>
<p><b>Future Opportunities</b></p> <p>What further opportunities were identified that merit current or future efforts in the following areas?</p>	<p><b>Teaching and Learning (T&amp;L)</b> Learning objectives that address past, current, and future strategic environment wherever they exist in current courses in the university. This panel nests in JSOU-Enlisted Academy (EA) CEP 3 strategic threat-based series and the strategic estimate in the JSW capstone.</p> <p><b>Research &amp; Analysis (R&amp;A)</b> There are several areas that could be used to develop SOF research topics—China’s strategic culture, Russian strategic culture, and a study on the Gerasimov versus the Primakov doctrine.</p> <p><b>Service Outreach &amp; Engagement (SO&amp;E)</b> Continuing facilitated engagements between SOF Enterprise with JSOU specific panels working to address and solve challenges can be of value to other organizations and academia.</p>
<p><b>Trends</b></p> <p>What relevant and emerging trends were identified in this session?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SOF will continue to be the force of choice when applying SOFT power.</li> <li>2. Humans are more important than hardware.</li> <li>3. SOF is ideally suited to use advances in technology, combining the best talents of the human operator and technology, with opportunity to apply this with AI.</li> <li>4. SOF works with allies and partners.</li> <li>5. SOF size and utility provide politicians a choice with less risk.</li> </ol>
<b>Course/Program/Content Specific</b>	
<p><b>Relationship</b></p> <p>What is the relationship of this session content with your course/ program learning outcomes?</p>	<p>This panel would be a resource for EA students conducting their JSW capstone strategic estimate and weekly JSW threat-based study to gain a better understanding of the environment.</p>
<p><b>Utility</b></p>	<p>n/a</p>

<p>What parts or portions of this session support the learning outcomes of your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	
<p><b>Instructional Strategy</b></p> <p>How would you use or incorporate those parts of this session into your course or program? (Please be specific.)</p>	<p>The use of the entire video of the panel or short, specific clips as pre-lesson tasks prior to design thinking and strategic competition discussions would be useful.</p>
<p><b>Research Opportunities</b></p> <p>In what areas of this lesson would additional research benefit your course or program?</p>	<p>n/a</p>
<p><b>Recommendations</b></p> <p>In what other courses or programs would you recommend incorporating content from this session?</p>	<p>Linking these panels to relative learning objectives and outcomes can help focus current lessons and courses in JSOU. For example, this panel would be a resource for EA students conducting their JSW capstone strategic estimate and weekly JSW threat-based study to gain a better understanding of the environment and design thinking classes.</p>
<p><b>Notes or Comments</b></p>	<p>n/a</p>